

HISTORICAL REVIEW


ESSAYS | ARTICLES | BOOK REVIEWS

2022/2023 EDITION

BISHOP'S UNIVERSITY HISTORY DEPARTMENT

In partnership with the Bishop's University History Association

The Bishop's University History Association would like to acknowledge that Bishop's University is located on the traditional and unceded lands of the Abenaki people and that, as historians, we should all work together in a spirit of truth and reconciliation in our activities, research and discussions. The Association would also like to acknowledge that this edition of the the Review has been edited on various ancestral lands of diverse groups of Indigenous nations.





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president's note

JUSTIN GOBEIL

Dear readers,

I am extremely proud to present to you this year's edition of Bishop's University History Association's very own Historical Review. The Review is a collection of student work created over the year. It serves as a display and a celebration of the talent found among history students at Bishop's University. This edition of the Review is composed of great essays that made their authors proud of their work and efforts on their journey towards the obtaining of their bachelor's degree.

As you might imagine, many hours have been worked for the completion of this edition of the Review, from the creation of the essay by the history students, to the editing and formatting of all the texts, as well as the creation of the front page and the design found throughout the Review by the BUHA Executive Team. I want to thank everyone who helped and contributed to this year's edition of the Review. Thanks to the students who submitted their work, to my awesome BUHA exec team for editing the review, and a special thanks to Dr. Jean Manore and the History Department for providing the funding to print the Review this year.

This year was incredible for BUHA and the Department. While last year was crucial in rebuilding BUHA from its COVID ashes, this year, our association was able to bloom and thrive in these post-pandemic days. This year, the association launched a fundraising campaign by selling merchandise and we were able to have many movie nights and a game night for the entertainment of all. With the help of the History Department, we were able to revive a BUHA tradition by coming together for a Christmas potluck in Cleghorn and doing a weekend trip to Ottawa.

However, this year is also bittersweet for me, as it is my last with you all. Although it is hard for me to leave, I am confident that I am leaving to the following team a stronger BUHA than when I inherited it, and I am certain that my successors will do an amazing job. To my fellow graduates of the class of 2023, congratulations, we did it! To the other students and all the teachers that I have had the pleasure to meet and to learn from,

Thank you!

editors note

The end of the Winter 2023 Semester marks the culmination of another great academic year for history students at Bishop's. This period has been marked by great work done by all. While many excellent projects have been completed in history courses over the past year, the History Association has published this Review in order to highlight the very best. The goal of the Bishop's Historical Review has long been to encourage the writing of history at an undergraduate level by providing the opportunity for students to have their work published. We believe that the continuous adherence to this goal is evident in the quality of work that has been submitted this year. Bishop's is considered a smaller school, but time and time again, our students show that they can match the intellect and writing capacities of any of the large institutions. While we might not have the size of some of the other schools, the work done in our courses show that our academic rigor is just as thorough as anyone else's.


The History Association would like to thank everyone who has made contributions to the Review this year, from the students who submitted essays, the professors who assigned those essays, the editors, the design team, etc. Our sincere and undying thank you to everyone. Without the efforts that everyone put in, the Review would not be possible. Working on this project has been an experience that everyone in BUHA will never forget.

Thank you once again, and please enjoy the outstanding work of the students,
Sophie Brady, Melina Carrier, Michael Carrier, Michael Geary, Justin Gobeil, Paris Kilbourne-Olver & Jacobus Voorneveld



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NIGHT FEVER

THE NIGHT AS A TRANSGRESSIVE SPACE AND ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSGRESSIVE DISCO MUSIC

ULRIK DOYON

“Music centered around the night has long been popular,” writes Jessica L. Murdock.¹ The evocative classical pieces that are the nocturnes, of which the most known would probably be the ones by Frédéric Chopin and Gabriel Fauré, are standards of the classical repertoire while the form of the nocturne itself has remained an important compositional tool. However, less attention has been given to the night as a phenomenon within the context of popular music. Nighttime is part of our daily life, and pop music makes everyday life manageable;² as such, the relationship between night and popular music is a “fundamental part of how music is not only made but consumed.”³ Dance music and its many subgenres immediately come to mind if we would define a style of accessible pop music associated with nocturnal activities, like clubbing. At its core, contemporary broad

variations like house, techno, or drum and bass to name a few, trace their origins to disco, a genre and subculture that became popular in the 1970s and a major trend of the era. Musically, disco is characterized by lush orchestrations, subdued guitars, steady four-on-the-floor beats on the drums and heavy syncopated bass lines emphasizing the up-tempo groove.⁴ The emergence of disco music ran concurrently along with the transformation of formal social dancing into the activity that is nightclubbing amidst the aftermath of the sexual liberation of the 1960s and the development of queer culture.⁵ In this small essay of cultural history, I will dress a brief overview of how the ‘night’ has been a foundational component in the history of disco and its legacy. By tracing the history of the night as a transgressive space for marginalized communities – more precisely homosexuals – and the role nightclubs played in challenging social and musical conventions of the early 1970s, links will be made on how disco music was a form of escapism for members of these different groups and the ways in which it defied preexisting established notions of popular music.

Disco was from its beginnings associated with cultural differences,⁶ “a musical, social, and cultural space with critical African-American, Latino/a, and variously queer involvements,”⁷ outsiders for which the night provided solace from regular daily exclusion by the preexisting

structures of power. Tim Lawrence, professor of Cultural Studies at the University of East London,⁸ writes that disco culture was “queer in terms of its refusal of both straight normative and gay normative articulations, [...] grounded in its sexually mixed demographic base in New York private party and public discotheque venues.”⁹ Building upon this, two other key factors can be discerned when attempting to trace the origins of the disco culture, all linked with the social upheaval of the 1960s. One is the transformation from heterosexist codified and structured social dancing into solo dancing without a partner, “partially inaugurated within the culture of the 1960s music festival, where women and men started to dance in a swaying motion to the sound of acid rock.”¹⁰ The other is the aftermath of the Stonewall Riots, which “[changed] gay nightlife and, by implication, the spaces and places where music was consumed by gay men.”¹¹

Until the industrial era, the night “imposed fundamental limits on daily life” and was considered a natural force “with little or no escape.”¹² In the West, the advent of the so-called ‘nightlife’ is due in great part to the development and implementation of artificial lighting as well as the consumption of new exotic stimulative drinks like tea and coffee that allowed the creation of social life after

dark.¹³ Nevertheless, the night has always had its own rules and norms, a separate jurisdiction within which historically “spiritual and political authorities forced the individuals and groups they excluded into.”¹⁴ Thus, the night was – and remains – a space in which transgressive behaviours took place and thrived, but also where marginalized communities like gays and lesbians (but also non-White people) have felt relatively safe in comparison to heterosexual daytime “bourgeois domesticity and capitalist productivity.”¹⁵ The emergence of the disco scene is intrinsic with these aforementioned elements because as seen previously in this paper, disco culture was born out of the gay liberation movement, yet was not limited to it. Indeed, “dance crowds were aware of their hybrid character as well as their proximity to the rainbow coalition of the countercultural movements of the late 1960s, they took to exploring [its possibilities] in the relatively safe space of dance venues.”¹⁶

Consequently, as Nadine Cattán and Alberto Vanolo argued, “[the] nocturnal time-space may be relevant in terms of its provision of freedom of behaviour and emotions, as well as its function as a type of exception from the rest of the emotional heteronormative urban space.”¹⁷ Moreover, they also denote how “urban nighttime entertainment

spaces, including bars, pubs, and clubs, are a crucial space for the performance of gendered social relations and the experience of sexual identities.”¹⁸ Scholarly attention has recently been given on how nightclubs and other after-dark venues (such as the *discothèque*) contribute to the social life of cities and gave birth to cultural innovations; urban geographer David Grazian provides the following astute comment:

*“[The night gave] birth to innovations in music and art, politics and performance. The poetry of the Beats and Bob Dylan; the bebop sounds of Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie; the urban blues of Muddy Waters and Howlin' Wolf; the rock music of the Grateful Dead and the Ramones; the raucous comedy of Lenny Bruce and John Belushi; the Stonewall riots and the gay rights movement—all germinated in bars, clubs, coffeehouses, and other late-night spots in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.”*¹⁹

This statement clearly demonstrates not only the importance of the ‘night’ within a broader cultural context as a vehicle for change, but also of the clubs active nocturnally. The discotheque, which was from early on a den of resistance, “offered safety and security [for socially marginalized groups] not found on city streets or in straight bars and clubs, where violence and aggression have been an all too common response to social difference.”²⁰

In conclusion, with the night established as a transgressive space “sheltered from the hostile, heterosexual and unaccepting ‘outside’ world,”²¹ and from the elements explored in this paper, it is possible to presume that the juxtaposition between the night and disco music makes the latter a form of transgressive music. But in what ways disco challenged the musical norms of the seventies?

As it rose in popularity by the middle of the decade, disco was vehemently attacked as gay, gender- transgressive, elitist, and socially threatening, an antithesis to mainstream rock music and culture of the time which was no longer perceived as youth music but now had intimations of “sincerity, authenticity, and art.”²² As rock audiences were now supposed to be “appreciative listeners who could recognize the virtuosity and depth of the musicians’ performance,”²³ disco was perceived as vapid and inauthentic since its enjoyers partook more in all-night hedonistic dancing rather than active listening. For Walter Hughes, “the mere memory of disco provokes from many people a vehement dismissal of it as an affront and an embarrassment,” whilst “the intensity of this hostility and its peculiar rhetoric result [...] from the enduring association of disco with male homosexuality.”²⁴ Disco transgressed and challenged heteronormative social conventions, the same way the night did across history.

*"Disco, in short, brazenly confirmed all the old fears that under the right conditions the passions aroused in clubs might overflow their bounds and foster a broader ferment. For a short while the essential cultural tension between restraint and desire seemed to be overthrown. From its very origins the history of disco is a story of strange bedfellows, of odd couplings and midnight encounters that take place only in clubs. Associations banished from broad daylight— between debutantes and bikers, between working-class delivery boys and high-profile fashion designers, between mobsters and newly liberated gay men—freely blossomed in the fantasy-scape of the discotheque."*²⁵

Nonetheless, despite its rapid decline in popularity following 'Disco Demolition Night' of 1979, the influence of disco persists well into the 21st century; the style had never properly died,²⁶ much to the chagrin of certain back in the 1970s, able to keep its strong political energy too often stripped by the attachment of various aesthetic monikers.²⁷ Disco in itself is far from being an apolitical form of escapism with a retro appeal, it is a form of emancipation.²⁸

As stated in the introduction, disco's innovations are still found in subsequent musical continuity, whilst the discotheques and their associated nocturnal culture were among the first

'mainstream' "islands in the heteronormative landscape."²⁹ Analyzing the sociocultural role of the night in the history of disco provides, I believe, an interesting addition to cultural studies across interdisciplinary fields but also illuminates, in a sense, the contribution of marginalized groups.

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Notes

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- ² Giacomo Bottà and Geoff Stahl, "Introduction: Because the Night..." in *Nocturnes: Popular Music and the Night*, ed. Geoff Stahl and Giacomo Bottà (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 1.
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- ⁵ Tim Lawrence, "Disco and the Queering of the Dance Floor," *Cultural Studies* 25, No. 2 (2011): 231-233.
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- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 233.
- ¹¹ Frank, "Discophobia," p. 284.
- ¹² Craig Koslofsky, *Evening's Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1-4.

- ¹³ Benjamin Schwarz, "Night Owls," *The Atlantic*, April 2012, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/night-owls/308917/>.
- ¹⁴ Koslosfky, *Evening's Empire*, p. 15.
- ¹⁵ Lawrence, "Disco and the Queering of the Dance Floor," p. 238.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 233.
- ¹⁷ Nadine Cattán and Alberto Vanolo, "Gay and Lesbian Emotional Geographies of Clubbing: Reflections from Paris and Turin," *Gender, Place, and Culture* 21, No. 9 (2014): 1161.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 1158.
- ¹⁹ David Grazian, "Urban Nightlife, Social Capital, and the Public Life of Cities," *Sociological Forum* 24, No. 4 (December 2009): 909.
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- ²¹ Kath Browne and Leela Bakshi, "We are here to party? Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Leisurescapes beyond Commercial Gay Scenes," *Leisure Studies* 30, no. 2 (2011): 179.
- ²² Frank, "Discophobia," pp. 279-281.
- ²³ Ibid., p. 281.
- ²⁴ Walter Hughes, "In the Empire of the Beat: Discipline and Disco," in *Microphone Fiends: Youth Music and Youth Culture*, eds. Andrew Ross and Tricia Rose (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 147.
- ²⁵ Peter Braunstein, "Disco," *American Heritage*, November 1999, <https://www.americanheritage.com/disco#1>
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A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE COMFORT WOMEN DURING WORLD WAR II

WHY CHINA SHOULD OPEN A TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR GENDER- BASED CRIMES

****TRIGGER WARNING: MENTION OF
SEXUAL ABUSE AND RAPE****

LEE A REBECA RUTA

Introduction

Over the last few decades, many Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) have been opened by different governments around the world to seek out the truth about a multitude of crimes against humanity; for example Residential Schools in Canada, Apartheid in South Africa, and the Indonesian Occupation in East Timor. While a number of these commissions have been relatively successful in providing victims and their families with a much needed solace or closure for the abuses they experienced, no TRC has been created for gender-based or sexual

violence, such as female genital mutilation, femicide, and, as will be discussed in this essay, wartime rapes. Before and during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army forced women and girls from occupied countries and territories into sex slavery. They were known as “comfort women” or “comfort girls.” The majority of them were from occupied countries such as Korea, China, and the Philippines. This essay will present a brief history of Chinese comfort women between 1937 and 1945. By employing primary and secondary sources, I will argue that China should open a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to record the stories of Chinese women who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese military, because these women and their families deserve some form of justice or reparation. I acknowledge this will be difficult because most, if not all of the victims have passed away. The first part of this essay will provide some historical context about Chinese comfort women, including some first-hand accounts of the abuses suffered. The second part of the essay will focus on why China should open a TRC on gender-based violence to provide justice to these survivors.

Historical Context

In the early 20th century, Japan wanted their Emperor to control an empire beyond its islands, which meant conquering regions in order to be superior to other Asian ethnicities, a belief expressed in the political slogan *Hakk ichiu*, which translates to: “all the world under one roof.”¹ Invoking this powerful concept of nationalism and supremacy, they started their invasion of

Manchuria in 1931 and had taken over a large portion of the coast and North China Plain by 1941.² As a result of those invasions, over 200,000 women were forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), which they cruelly referred to as “comfort stations” throughout Asia.³

Numerous women from Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Thailand, East Timor, and Europe were forced into sexual slavery in Japanese-occupied territories.⁴ However, one of the groups that is least represented in the discussion about comfort women is Chinese comfort women.⁵ They were among the first to become official comfort women during the Japanese occupation of China.⁶ They were treated with a high level of cruelty because China was particularly viewed as one of Japan's major enemies.⁷ Japanese staff officers of subordinate units developed a plan and carried it out after receiving orders from senior staff officers of each army to create comfort stations; all soldiers and officers were to use them.⁸ The system was developed for a number of reasons, including to allegedly increase army morale, monitor soldier behaviour, contain venereal illnesses among the troops, and prevent rapes by Japanese soldiers in order to minimize on-growing hostility among locals in occupied territories.⁹ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a historian from Japan, uncovered that soldiers never stopped raping local women and that even though military doctors at comfort stations would frequently examine the women, they were unable to stop the spread of the diseases because

soldiers did not follow the doctors' elaborate preventive measures recommendations.¹⁰

It is not always simple to explain the history of comfort women due to a paucity of archival records and historical documentation, and generally, many individuals have neglected the concerns of comfort women, especially in China.¹¹ Given the large number of Chinese women who participated in this system, it is crucial and valuable to acknowledge their experiences during and after the war.¹² The first military comfort station was established in Shanghai in 1932.¹³ The Japanese Army had launched a full-scale invasion of China beyond Manchukuo in November 1937, sparking a terrible war that resulted in the destruction of towns and extensive rape, including both rapes committed at random and rapes committed deliberately using the comfort women stations.¹⁴ One survivor, Li Meijin, recalls some of her saddest moments in the documentary *Twenty Two (Er Shi Er)*: “at night, when you slept at that room, you could hear people screaming from rape.”¹⁵

Guantangyan born survivor Lei Guiying wrote a book entitled *Chinese Comfort Women*, in which she shared her experience as a comfort woman in 1937.¹⁶ She was seven years old when her father passed away in 1935, and her mother could no longer care for her, so Lei was given to another family.¹⁷ She had been living alone and begging on the streets since she was 12 years old, until one day when she began working at a comfort center in Nanking at the age of 15 as the owner's two sons' caregiver.¹⁸ Japanese soldiers raped Lei when there

were no ladies present to serve them, and after that she was made to act as a comfort woman for the following 18 months.¹⁹ As Lei recalls her experience from that time:

I took care of Yamamoto's two children. About half a year later, my first menstrual cycle came. Yamamoto and his wife came to me and said 'Congratulations!' At that time, due to the lack of girls, I was forced to become a comfort woman. One day, a Japanese soldier dragged me onto the communal bed and ripped off my pants. In my violent resistance, I hurt my wrist, of which you can still see the scar now. Then the Japanese soldier pushed his knees against my belly, and the butt of his bayonet against my head. I was raped.²⁰

Lei also explained how, during the most "prosperous" season, the Japanese soldiers would arrive in groups larger than ten, whereas during the "slower" season, they would arrive in smaller groups of five or six.²¹ The women did nothing but eat and "serve" the Japanese soldiers sexually for the entire day and intensive sexual abuse even caused several girls' deaths.²² One girl in particular had her body repeatedly abused by Japanese soldiers for a very long time, causing her tummy to swell up; older girls tried to rub her stomach to make her feel better, but all they saw was blood and a lot of liquid gushing out of her as she passed away. ²³ Wild physical violence was used against any resisting attitude coming from the girls.²⁴

The need for a TRC

In the 2006 book by Jane W. Yamazaki, *Japanese apologies for World War II: a rhetorical study*, Yamazaki noted how despite numerous Japanese apologies over the past [at the time] 20 years, the general consensus was that Japan had not expressed regret for its role in past wars, notwithstanding repeated pleas from the two Koreas and China.²⁵ The postwar era presented many difficulties for comfort women survivors, such as infertility, psychological trauma, a lack of empathy from their nation and communities, and a lack of financial help and justice.²⁶ The majority of the Chinese "comfort women" survivors went on to have miserable lives while the public failed to comprehend or acknowledge the horrors they had endured.²⁷ China was probably the biggest victim of the Japanese invasion during World War II, but no victim has successfully won a court case or received compensation.²⁸

Professor of History at Shanghai Normal University Su Zhiliang has played a significant role in raising awareness of the suffering of Chinese comfort women, in China and elsewhere. Through conducting studies and providing archival evidence of the Japanese army's active involvement in the management and recruitment of the comfort women, Su spoke out about this in his paper "New Evidence of the Wartime Sex Slave System Implemented by Japan: Reading the Archives on the 'Comfort Women' of the Kwantung Army."²⁹ His research is important; it was also extremely challenging to conduct because at the end of World War II, the Japanese army headquarters had ordered the destruction of documents pertaining to

the use of comfort women and other issues, as they realized Japan was losing the war.³⁰

According to socio-legal scholar and researcher Nicola Henry, who has studied the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, rape did not fit the prevalent discourse of post-conflict justice, nor did it conform to the political intent of the victors at either trial.³¹ She contends that the widespread sexual enslavement of the comfort women may not have been “political enough” in the view of the prosecutors to merit significant consideration during these procedures and gender justice is absent from victor’s justice since military success is an overwhelmingly masculinized concept.³² Because of this, individual victims were ignored at both trials when rape was brought up in order to highlight the bravery of one country as opposed to the barbarism of the other and Henry views this as a kind of “legal amnesia” that is a result of the patriarchal (and hence gendered) structure of legal discourse as well as political circumstances.³³

Justice has not been delivered in cases involving comfort women, and the lack of compensation has caused the survivors to endure extreme misery and studies have shown that the living conditions for Chinese comfort women who were still alive were deplorable.³⁴ For instance, all identified survivors in Yu County, Shanxi Province, were impoverished and struggling.³⁵ The survivors worked tirelessly to cope with the physical and mental wounds that were a direct result of the suffering they underwent in the comfort stations, in addition to living in poverty.³⁶ The victims frequently had uterine damage, sterility, and a range of

psychological symptoms, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, chronic headaches, insomnia, nightmares, mental breakdowns, and a persistent fear of having sex.³⁷ Even though it had been more than 50 years since Lin Yajin was tortured at the military comfort station, the pain of those events still affected her: she hardly ever smiled and avoided interacting with others.³⁸ In June 2007, when she received an invitation to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Chinese “Comfort Women” Archives at Shanghai Normal University as one of the survivors’ delegates, she barricaded herself in her bedroom and avoided social interaction.³⁹

In addition, when victim Li Lianchun was invited to the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery in Tokyo in 2000, the local official refused to give her the necessary travel documents because he thought it was inappropriate for her to speak of her “shameful past” abroad.⁴⁰ This shows how pervasive patriarchal ideology, and the sexism that is inextricably linked to it, still is in Chinese society and given that China is the largest victimized state, patriarchal misogyny contributed to their failure to swiftly pursue justice for the hundreds of thousands of Chinese comfort women.⁴¹ Survivors suffered in silence as a result of postwar social, political, and cultural conditions on an international and domestic level.⁴² However, things started to improve, and as a result of the international redress movement that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, China’s efforts to seek justice for those who were harmed by the Japanese

military comfort women system have finally gained traction.⁴³

The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities report lays out the legal foundation for individual criminal liability, state responsibility, and liability for compensation; however, the Japanese government has not complied with the UN's advice to punish those responsible for the comfort women system and to compensate its victims.⁴⁴ Chinese legal experts and activists began to reevaluate postwar international legal norms and the China-Japan treaties involving war compensation in the early 1990s as a result of the Japanese government's refusal of its obligations to its victims.⁴⁵ The Japanese Legal Team for Chinese War Victims' Compensation Claims (Chgokujin sensu higai baishu seikyū jiken bengodan) was established in August 1995 following a year of planning with Oyama Hiroshi leading the legal team, Onodera Toshitaka as secretary-general, and Watanabe Shōgo in charge of administrative operations.⁴⁶ Between 1995 and 2001, surviving Chinese comfort women, with the assistance of non-governmental international organizations, filed five lawsuits with Japanese courts; four of these actions were submitted by women from Mainland China, and one was filed by women from Taiwan; as of March 3, 2010, every case had been rejected.⁴⁷

The patriarchy and these strictly defined gender roles continued to play out during times of conflict in which Japanese soldiers sexually oppressed women in this setting as a form of both warfare and brutality.⁴⁸ Women were already

precarious in everyday life; under the comfort women system during the war, they were practically powerless.⁴⁹ Military and political authorities, or those in a position to stop it, have long mischaracterized and disregarded rape as a private crime, a sexual act, the deplorable behaviour of one errant soldier, or, worse still, as something that has come to be accepted precisely because it is so widespread.⁵⁰ Rape is not a private or incidental matter; it frequently performs a strategic role in conflict and is a crucial weapon for accomplishing specific military goals.⁵¹

To dispel the widespread misconception that rape in war is personal or incidental, it is crucial to document where and how it is used as a military strategic instrument.⁵² Rape in war is distorted by this emphasis on size as what makes it an abuse requiring restitution, failing to take into account both the experiences of individual women and the varied roles of wartime rape.⁵³ It is noteworthy that rape has not been criminalised like other forms of abuse given that it typically behaves in much the same way as torture or other cruel and inhumane acts and the issue is not a lack of sufficient legal restrictions, but rather the readiness of the international community to accept women's subjugation.⁵⁴ The reason why soldiers commit rape is because it advances the assertion of male dominance over women and they act in this way specifically because they are "protected."⁵⁵

The Japanese government did not formally acknowledge or apologize for enslaving thousands of women for sexual purposes during World War II until

recently; even so, official declarations have been silent on the need for reparations as well as the classification of the Japanese army's actions as war crimes.⁵⁶ This apology comes several years after survivors came forward to share their accounts of being abducted, seduced by fraudulent employment offers, and transported to various areas where they were made to perform prostitution.⁵⁷ The fact that rape still mostly goes unpunished shows that recognition of the seriousness of rape as a form of military cruelty has not changed much since World War II.⁵⁸

Adversarial legal processes frequently fall short of providing what victims most need: atonement and healing, whether there is a conviction or not.⁵⁹ A truth and reconciliation commission on sexual violence presents an appealing alternative because it places a strong emphasis on democratic deliberation and national soul-searching.⁶⁰ People from all around the world have gathered to discuss some of the worst and most widespread human rights crimes in history at state-sponsored and independently organized TRCs.⁶¹ A TRC on sexual violence would provide survivors, offenders, allies, and bystanders with the framework and organisation they need to face our past and imagine a shared future.⁶² A TRC would grant gender justice the categorical urgency historically reserved for genocide and racial segregation if only as a signalling tool; TRCs would give communities a realistic way to think and suggest viable answers to current issues.⁶³

While restorative justice conferences promote respect and reciprocity from the

bottom up, TRCs do the opposite, but the two processes work in concert and reinforce one another.⁶⁴ The fundamental requirements of restorative justice conferences are that participants meet in person, process their grievances, and take responsibility for their acts and different restorative justice conference models employ various techniques to encourage respect and reciprocity.⁶⁵ While a TRC might be difficult to achieve in China given that by now all the comfort women survivors have passed away, many of these women might have surviving relatives, maybe even children or grandchildren who would probably get involved in these healing-circles in order to preserve these women's legacy and memory for generations to come. This perhaps may be the best way to honor them: uncover the truth, talk about it and make sure it never happens again. It would also be able to accept victims of gender-based violence from all walks of life and would allow women (and even men), to be more open to discuss their sexual assault stories in order to heal and break stigma and strong patriarchal traditional values about sexuality.

The legacy of the comfort women is crucial in the quest for a more equitable and humane world, especially in light of the continued use of rape of women as a weapon in armed conflict and the pervasiveness of sexual exploitation of women worldwide.⁶⁶ This legacy will continue to educate us and future generations as more and more of the comfort women's individual recollections become ingrained in our collective memory, supporting the global effort to stop the commission of new crimes against humanity.⁶⁷

Conclusion

Many Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have been established over the past few decades by various governments in different parts of the world to investigate a variety of crimes against humanity. I have argued that China ought to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with an emphasis on gender-based violence. While a TRC in China may be difficult to accomplish given that by this stage, all comfort women survivors have passed away, their living relatives may wish to get involved in order to preserve these women's history and memory for future generations.

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“ODIOUS IN THE SIGHT OF GOD”

WITCHES, THEIR BODIES AND EARLY MODERN EUROPEAN FEAR

SOPHIE BRADY

Early modern Europe was an uncertain time of constant change and transition. Technological advancements, major religious reformation, and the development of capitalism shifted societies in early modern Europe. This caused a great deal of uncertainty and anxiety among communities. In particular, fear surrounding people's understanding of the natural world, nighttime, and the unknown were exacerbated. Further, the changes surrounding religion caused fear regarding sin and damnation to become more prevalent in people's lives. The devil was everywhere and so were his servants. It is in this context that witches became a major concern for the people of early modern Europe. Though the crime of witchcraft had been familiar for centuries in early modern Europe, witch hunting truly became a craze. Major public witch trials became more commonplace, and neighbours accused

neighbours of covenants with the devil. However, these were not real witches; no one was seduced by the devil. The bodies and behaviours of witches were fabricated by early modern European anxieties and became manifestations of those anxieties as well. Misunderstandings of the natural world, fears of the dark, and anxieties surrounding religious purity created the witch and as such she displayed all the things which early modern Europeans were afraid of.

Early modern Europeans' fears and misunderstanding of the natural world created their association with witches and abnormal relationships with the natural world. These fears were manifested in the connection between witches and bestiality. Though men were the ones typically tried for bestiality, women were often accused of it in the context of witchcraft allegations and the keeping of familiars.¹ The concept of a woman having a close and unnatural relationship with an animal was linked in the popular imagination with the horrors and witchcraft and bonds with the devil.² In one witchcraft confession, a woman named Elizabeth Francis revealed that she worked with her cat to do such malicious acts as arranging her lover's death, aborting a fetus, arranging a marriage for her, and killing a young child. The cat, named Satan, was said to have been “clearly acting almost as a pimp or a bawd to Francis and so a

strong sexual element was present in her relationship to the feline.”³ During the period of state-sanctioned witchcraft accusations in England, sixty-six witchcraft pamphlets were published. All but five of those pamphlets represented the Devil as a familiar spirit. These familiars were said to have been “small, tangible, domestic, or common animal who formed a pact with the witch.”⁴ It was also believed that witches possessed an extra nipple through which to suckle her familiar. Crimes such as bestiality and sorcery were perceived as unnatural and linked to the devil. They were seen as particularly horrible and “odious in the sight of God and a perceived need for exemplary retribution which would dissociate the Christian community from such wickedness and cleanse it of guilt.”⁶ The passing of statutes associated with witchcraft in early modern England can be seen as a way to show commitment against crimes considered detestable and unnatural, rather than real evidence of the occurrences. Instead, it can be seen as a way to self-sanctify. In other words, a way for a regime to assert its morality in the uncertain times of the Reformation. These unnatural relationships with animals, or the devil in animal form, were unsettling to early modern Europeans. The post enlightenment minds of early modern Europeans were vulnerable, stripped of the “medieval certainty of faith” and anxiety ridden about the now uncertain foundations of their natural world.⁸ Early modern Europeans were afraid of

witches due to their unnatural relationships with nature, however this originated in Europeans fears and misunderstandings of nature. The witch was created by fear and became an object of fear.

Early modern Europeans fear of moral impurity was manifested in the physical impurities of witches as well as their inherent sexuality. This fear of threatening female sexuality was shown in the idea that witches make a covenant with the devil through sex. Following the Reformation, representatives of those reformed religions had little tolerance of the folklorized Christianity that had become standard in the lives of most people in the Middle Ages.⁹ This caused a renewed spiritual militancy in many rural areas of Europe,¹⁰ making society much stricter on anybody who seemed to associate with the devil. The idea of the witch as a sexual servant and member of a large devil-worshipping cult became even more frightening than the witch’s power to perform malicious acts.¹¹ The spiritual impurities associated with sexual relations with the devil and sin in general manifested physically in the witch of early modern Europe. In many witch trials a physical examination of the accused took place in order to check for any impurities that could be seen as a so-called witch’s mark or witch’s tit, physical evidence of a connection with the devil. These marks could be any wart, mole, or skin growth.¹² Such physical representations of spiritual impurity were also often

associated with women's genitals. Demonological experts warned judges that women often bore the devil's mark on their "shameful parts," "on the breasts or private parts," warranting diligent and careful search by a witch trial official.¹³ These associations between witches' bodies and spiritual impurity were created by religious militancy connected to the reformation. Early modern European fears of the impure were created by their underlying anxiety surrounding impurity and religious consequences in the uncertain times of religious reformation.

Early modern Europeans associations of witches and the nighttime are manifestations of their fear of the night and the unknown. During this period, the night was widely believed to be a time when the Devil was at his most active and most dangerous and the time he used to tempt potential witches away from God and into his clutches.¹⁴ This can be seen in the idea of the nightmare apparitions. In many witch trials women confessed that the devil had come to them in a dream. A woman named Joan Prentice described how her familiar spirit, a ferret who introduced himself as Satan, often appeared to her at night and sucked blood from her body.¹⁵ Many early modern sources highlighted how people came to fear the devil at night. Such as Thomas Nashe, an English pamphlet writer who wrote "When hath the devil commonly first appeared unto any man

but in the night?"¹⁶ This association with the nighttime and demonic temptation stemmed from a culture "in which the night was thought of as a time when temptation was at its greatest" and as a metaphor for evil.¹⁷ Midnight was understood in early modern Europe to be a liminal and transitory space that could draw you closer to God, but also a time when the devil was most active. Along with people's understanding that sleep was a dangerous and vulnerable time, this exacerbated people's fear of witches attacking at night.¹⁸ The idea of the witching hour and the devil's appearance at midnight shows that witches were viewed as a key manifestation of the dangers of the night.¹⁹

In conclusion, witches in early modern Europe as well as their bodies and behaviours were fabricated by the anxieties of early modern Europeans and are instead manifestations of those fears. This can be seen in the association of witches and their unnatural relationship to the natural world as being a projection of Europeans misunderstanding of the natural world. It can also be seen in the projection of early modern Europeans spiritual anxieties onto witches' physical impurities and inherent sexuality. Finally, witches' association with nighttime is a clear manifestation of Europeans fear of the dark and the unknown. This shows that witches were created by fear and as such are manifestations of the fears of early modern Europeans.

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THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION AND SOVIET ANTI- IMPERIAL POLICY IN KOREA

1945-1953

PARIS KILBOURNE-OLIVER

In 1951, amidst the Korean War, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) sent a delegation to Korea tasked with investigating the reported suffering of Korean civilians, especially women, at the hands of United Nations-aligned forces. Addressed to the United Nations (UN), their final report, *We Accuse*, detailed accounts of extraordinary and illegal violence "perpetrated by [United States] soldiers and officers, or else on [their] orders."¹ It was therefore necessary for those responsible, in particular the United States Supreme Command and government, to withdraw and be held accountable, and that self-determination be granted to Koreans. The report garnered heavy criticism, particularly from the US government who degraded it as Communist propaganda and further proof that the WIDF were Soviet puppets. Less than two years earlier, the House Un-American Activities Committee had

'revealed' that the organisation was not formed to "deal primarily with women's problems...but rather to serve as a specialised arm of Soviet political warfare." They used 'women's rights' as a ploy to lure gullible women into a peace cause designed to render the United States and other "democratic" countries "helpless" against Soviet "world conquest."²

While this lasting reputation of the WIDF as a 'Soviet front' excluded it from much scholarship on inter and trans-national women's organisations despite being one of the largest and most influential, over the past decade studies have increasingly worked to retrieve the WIDF from scholarly oblivion. Much has been done to counteract the homogenisation imposed on the Federation by the US, exploring the diverse biographies of the women involved and their wide range of activism within and without the WIDF.³ However, in this process there is at times a tendency to 'overcorrect' the narrative that the WIDF were not 'genuinely' interested in advancing the status of women by obscuring their Communist and Soviet ties. This is problematic for it furthers the Cold War paradigms originally imposed on the WIDF that placed socialism in opposition to women's rights and gives validity to the anti-Communist rhetoric used against them.

It is important to remember that broadly speaking, the women of the WIDF did not see a contradiction between women's rights and socialism, but viewed socialism, unlike capitalism, as a viable structure with which to advance their status. Though they may have at times downplayed Soviet contribution for the

benefit of prospective members,⁴ they more often espoused the Soviet Union's policies and declared them as a model for equality. This is especially the case regarding the Soviet Union's anti-imperial policy which identified imperialism as an extension of capitalism, manifesting in colonial territories where the people therein were thus exploited. The WIDF promoted this framework and applied it to their understanding of colonised and formerly colonised countries, where they investigated the discriminatory impacts of imperialism.

The WIDF was founded November 1945, by leaders of the communist-dominated Union des Femmes Françaises (UFF), an organisation which had been formed by the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) a year prior.⁵ Eugénie Cotton, president of the UFF, led the initiative to continue the anti-fascist fight that she, and many other women present, had conducted as armed resistance fighters during World War II. The founding goals of the WIDF were anti-fascism, women and children's rights, and global peace.⁶ Subsequently, they aligned themselves with the growing Soviet and Communist-led peace movement that advocated for the disarmament of world powers, as well as self-determination and national liberation for unequal nations. Furthermore, they followed the Soviet line that linked peace with imperialism, forwarding that imperial nations were inherently anti-peace, as their imperialist tendencies encouraged conflict, especially at the expense of colonised countries.

At the opening of the Cominform in 1947, Andrei Zhdanov formalised this post-war

Soviet anti-imperial foreign policy, dividing the world into two distinct ideological camps: "the imperialist and anti-democratic camp" commanded by the United States of America and "the anti-imperialist and democratic camp" led by the Soviet Union. Supporting the US were Great Britain, France, countries that owned colonies, countries with "reactionary, anti-democratic regimes," and countries "politically and economically dependent on the United States." They had aggressive ambitions, aiming to create more war to expand their influence and control.⁸ Thus, the Soviet Union frequently levelled the accusation of 'war-monger' at the United States—ad nauseum for US representatives fielding these epithets. But Soviet delegates were performing their duties as defenders of peace. Indeed, the purpose of the camp they led—made up of those who had abandoned imperialism for democracy—was to "resist the threat of new wars and imperialist expansion."⁹

This dichotomous rendering of imperialism and peace, chiefly represented by the United States and the Soviet Union, was reaffirmed by the WIDF at their Second Congress held in 1948. Nina Popova, a vice-president of the WIDF, declared the necessity of intensifying the fight against Western imperialists alongside the Soviet Union who "fights unceasingly for peace." Unlike the Soviet Union, she said, who had begun to demobilise their military at the end of the last war, the United States and Great Britain had increased militarisation to foster imperial enterprise. President Eugénie Cotton illustrated this contrast further with a table entitled "Seek those who profit from the war and

you will find the war-mongers.” Where the US had “0 cities destroyed” in World War II, the USSR faced “71,710 towns and villages destroyed or burnt.” The numbers were clear: “70 million dollars” gained for the US and “679 million dollars” lost for the USSR. At last, the WIDF reiterated what Zhdanov had essentially laid out as the Soviet’s answer to America’s effort at a peace-policy in the Truman doctrine. It was “impossible,” they determined, “to be an enemy of the Soviet Union and at the same time to declare oneself a defender of peace: enemies of the Soviet Union are enemies of peace as well.”¹⁰

Predicted consequences of imperialist expansion eventually appeared to materialise with the outbreak of the Korean war. Ostensibly a civil war fought between North and South Korea, it was widely understood that the Soviet Union and the United States backed either side. Afraid of a direct war with the US, the Soviet Union did not make their military involvement with North Korea explicit,¹¹ however they loudly gave words of support and denigrated their opponents—the South Korean Army and allies made up of United Nations-aligned forces which included the United States and Britain. Primarily, they characterised the conflict as one of American imperial aggression. Within weeks of North Korea’s invasion of the South, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko framed America’s decision to militarily intervene as an effort of imperialist expansion that violated peace and self-determination for Korea and went against the American people’s wishes by dragging them into a “new war.” According to Gromyko, the US aimed to “deprive Korea of national independence,

to prevent the creation of a single democratic Korean state, and to establish by violence in Korea an anti-national regime which would allow the ruling circle of the United States to transform that country into their colony and to use Korean territory as a military base in the Far East.”¹²

Before the war, the WIDF had preconceived notions of Korea as a land bifurcated in an imperial struggle. At a WIDF conference dedicated to the creation of a peaceful Korea held in 1948, North Korea was described as a formerly colonised country that had been liberated by the Soviet Union, who consequently facilitated peace, democracy, and equal social, political, and economic rights out of reach under Japanese colonial rule. On the other hand, South Korea continued to be oppressed by US imperial forces, where the freedoms enjoyed by North Koreans were denied, especially for women. Similar to Gromyko’s interpretation, not only was America’s presence construed as imperial, but colonial: American delegate Muriel Draper drew South Korea as colonised by the United States with their military, naval, and air bases.¹³ This connection between the imperial and colonial aligned with Marxist thought which considered colonialism as the inevitable result of imperial expansion. In any case, it was understood that South Korea deserved emancipation from the oppression inflicted upon them by the United States’ imperial ambitions. Therefore, when the beginning of the Korean War saw outright American military intervention, the WIDF was quick to condemn it alongside the Soviet Union. Cotton denounced “the criminal military intervention of American

imperialism against the legitimate rights of the Korean people.” Moreover, “the provocation in Korea and the American intervention show that the warmakers will be driven back only by the united might of the peoples.”¹⁴

Cotton’s “united might” manifested in the WIDF’s mission to Korea at the invitation of the state-circumscribed Korean Democratic Women’s League (KDWL) one year later. Ho Chong Suk, leader of the KDWL and North Korean minister of culture, encouraged the WIDF to send representatives to Korea “so that they can see with their own eyes the inhuman cruelties the American barbarians have inflicted on our country.” Subsequently, twenty-one women representing the WIDF travelled to North Korea for a twelve day fact-finding mission. Since 1946, the WIDF had conducted such missions in order to ascertain the global status of women and connect with local groups. Communist leaders within the Federation proposed the missions as anti-imperial and anti-colonial projects: Jeannette Vermeersch first recommended to her co-vice president Nina Popova in 1946 that the WIDF form a special commission to visit colonial countries, resulting in the formation of the Commission on the Situation of Women in Colonial Countries a year later. Alongside her husband, the leader of the PCF Maurice Thorez, Vermeersch was a member of the PCF Central Committee, and a loyal follower of Stalin dedicated to the Party line.¹⁵ Popova was similarly committed, highly positioned in the Soviet Union, and responsible for the foundation and administration of several Communist domestic and international organisations, including the Antifascist

Committee of Soviet Women and the World Peace Council.¹⁶

The Commission’s primary goals were to help colonial or formerly colonised women gain economic and political rights, compile information on their lives, and strengthen ties with regional women’s, youth, and trade union organisations. Fundamentally, they hoped to uproot these countries’ capitalist systems in order to facilitate emancipation only possible through socialism.¹⁷ Thus, they expressed scepticism towards India’s independence after their mission to the country in 1948, criticising the “anti-worker” government because “the situation of workers did not become better with [their] coming...to power.” Without the introduction of socialist systems, the “crimes of British imperialism” persisted in their colonies as well as in other “so called ‘independent countries.’”¹⁸ At the Second Congress, speakers emphasised the necessity of such structural changes, proven by the success of female liberation in the Soviet Union, and the inability for women to attain “economic rights equal to those of men” within “capitalist countries,” such as Western powers and their colonial dominions.¹⁹ In contrast to her own country, American delegate Helen Phillips pointed to the model of “political, economic, and cultural” equality found in “the number of Eastern European countries where there now exist democratic regimes,” including Poland and Czechoslovakia.²⁰

This echoed Soviet policy which determined the subjugation of women and colonial peoples as a direct result of the “rule of capital.” Drawn from Marxist

theory, capitalism facilitated imperial and patriarchal oppression, stripping people of their economic, political, and social freedoms.²¹ Using a socialist framework, the Soviet Union restored their rightful freedoms in many ways, such as through the codification of equality in their constitution and laws, focused on family, marriage, reproduction, and property; as well as social welfare initiatives like state childcare. Female political participation was further institutionalised through the establishment of the *zhenotdel* (women's department) in the Communist Party. Furthermore, the WIDF's unequivocal promotion of the Soviet Union and other socialist states followed Stalin's line that the 'woman question' therein had been "solved." The *zhenotdel* was replaced with the *zhensektory* (women's section) in the agitation and propaganda department of the Communist Party, symbolically closing debate on the internal status of women.²²

In previous years, the Soviet government used the *zhenotdel* in Central Asia to challenge traditional practices deemed repressive to Central Asian women's liberation, in particular veiling. The Soviet Union considered their efforts to be anti-imperial in nature, an overcoming of their Tsarist heritage by freeing the region's colonised peoples and granting them class-consciousness and self-determination. Douglas Northrop argues that the campaign to unveil women in some ways "aimed to make Uzbeks into Soviet Citizens rather than simply imperial subjects."²³ Though the Soviet Union's efforts in Central Asia and the WIDF's in South and Southeast Asia have clear differences, the former nonetheless set an example for the WIDF in terms of linking imperial oppression

with that of women, and the liberating nature of socialism. Indeed, throughout the 1950s the WIDF would repeatedly and uncritically praise the progression of Central Asia from oppressive imperial colony, to liberated nationhood guided by the Soviet Union.²⁴

As discussed, the WIDF applied this framework to their interpretation of Korea's situation: a struggle between imperial, capitalist, (American) oppression and anti-imperial, socialist, (Soviet) emancipation. However, the mission to Korea during the war was not necessarily guided by defeating imperialism and promoting socialism. There is noticeably a lack of explicit anti-imperial and anti-colonial rhetoric throughout the report. Taewoo Kim has convincingly shown the veracity of the report's assertion that the delegation was made up of women from diverse political backgrounds united by the common task "to tell conscientiously and truthfully... the facts as we have seen them." Throughout the venture anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric was agreeably reigned in amongst the group in favour of objectively searching for the "truth."²⁵ Whether one considered the resulting facts of UN-aligned forces' atrocities as a consequence of imperialism was for outside the report.

Nonetheless, *We Accuse* did in several ways still reflect the WIDF and Soviet Union's narrative of American aggressors acting against peace-loving people. American troops were positioned as the primary source of violence, perpetrating the vast majority of atrocities and ordering allied forces to commit the rest. Only a very slim number of accounts were absent of American involvement.

As a result, the WIDF repeatedly specified American involvement in the preface, charging the US Supreme Command, including General Ridgeway and General MacArthur, and the US government with responsibility, while the remaining forces were left as "other." Forces which are entirely absent from their report are North Korean right-wing militia groups, despite evidence of their executing massacres against North Korean people, including the Sinchon massacre specified by the report. Only Kim has provided a possible explanation: that the North Korean translators provided by the government intentionally omitted mention of right-wing insurrectionists in the witness accounts so as not to betray the instability of their regime. Additionally, they appeared inclined to forward negative descriptions of the US, evidenced by the elimination of a relatively positive action by American troops in their translated version of the report.²⁶ Consequently, North Korea continued to be depicted as a peaceful country defending itself from American oppression.

Thus, despite the delegation's best efforts, the report inadvertently forwarded North Korean anti-imperialist policy which they had modelled on the Soviet Union's. The Soviet's direct and indirect influence on the North Korean government was significant. During their occupation, they intensely supervised the North Korean government, approved all actions at the highest level of the Soviet government, and implemented an "orthodox Stalinist system," that the North Koreans found "exemplary and beyond question."²⁷ The near lack of conflict regarding North Korea's

subordination is clear in the energy with which they took up the two-camp theory in 1948. Before the intensification of Soviet influence and anti-imperial policy in the late 1940s, pro-US sentiment flourished in Korea, even amongst Communists. Kim Il Sung, for instance, referred to the US as a "liberator."²⁸ Afterwards, North Korea waged a fervent domestic pro-Soviet, anti-imperial peace campaign which publicised America as a "war-inciter."²⁹ This top-down messaging was slower to catch on with the North Korean public, but by the time the WIDF arrived in Korea, when the Americans had already committed extensive scorched earth tactics and violence, anti-American imperialist sentiment had solidified at the grassroots.³⁰ Therefore, it is possible that not only were the North Korean translators influential in the report's focus on American atrocities at the expense of other perpetrators, but also the witnesses themselves.

After the publication of *We Accuse*, the Federation incorporated the report into their anti-imperial framework and continued to view the Korean war as one of American aggression at the expense of Korean independence. At the 1953 WIDF Congress held in Copenhagen, Korea was incorporated into discussions on the lacking state of women's rights in colonial countries as a result of imperial oppression. Hence, Andrea Andreen, a council member and vice-president by this time, began her speech by greeting "our sisters from Korea, Vietnam and Malaya who are fighting alongside their whole peoples to expel the aggressors, to defend their right to life, national independence and peace."³¹

Throughout the post-war Stalin era, the Women's International Democratic Federation developed their mission of international peace and equality using a Soviet anti-imperial framework, primarily with intention, but also without. When leftist women originally formed the WIDF following their anti-fascist resistance, shared the Soviet Union's anti-imperial policy that saw capitalism and imperialism as the chief causes of war and inequality. Subsequently, they promoted the USSR as a reference for success, and endorsed their position as leaders of the anti-imperial, pro-democratic fight against imperialist and anti-democratic nations, in particular the United States. This global two-camp theory formulated by the Soviet Union was positioned by the WIDF on a microscale in the case of Korea, a peninsula divided between USSR and US influence and occupation. Under the former, the yoke of Japanese imperialism was removed, allowing for democracy and equality in North Korea. In South Korea, the US replaced their former colonisers as a new oppressive imperial power, who sought to use South Korea as a stepping stone for expansion. When conflict occurred in 1950 between the two, the USSR and WIDF framed it as an act of US imperial aggression. The WIDF sent a delegation to Korea in order to study the devastation of the war, encouraged by their own legacy of anti-imperial investigations and the North Korean government's invitation. Though the politically-varied delegates purposefully curbed anti-imperialist rhetoric during the mission, *We Accuse* nonetheless echoed Soviet and North Korean anti-imperialist thought. Furthermore, the WIDF's non-

interpretative position did not extend to outside the mission, where they maintained that Korea was a region oppressed by imperialism.

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
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STALIN'S PENAL COLONIES

THE SPECIAL SETTLER AND THE RISE OF THE GULAG BETWEEN 1930-1936

ARTUR SHUT

“Comrades Chekists! At this historical period, when the remnants of the kulaks in alliance with hostile elements that have infiltrated the Party, are trying to prevent the final victory of socialism in our country, we are required to be especially vigilant, vigilant, timely in uncovering and mercilessly cutting off new maneuvers of the class enemy.” Yagoda, 1932.1

In late December of 1929, Stalin began a major shift in the USSR's internal economic and social policies in an aim to entrench socialism within the country. His target: the kulaks, a class of rich landowning peasants and farmers that had their roots in the Russian Empire.² This process of class warfare became known as dekulakization, and it would prove to be a decisive shift in both the USSR's internal politics and economics, as well as the Stalinist government's pursuit to reshape the fabric of Soviet Society. In the 1930s, Kulaks would be evicted from their various communities and amalgamated into a group that would be known as the special settlers. In a feat

of sleight of hand, the camps and settlements that were organized to house these deported Kulaks soon became an easy and intuitive way for Soviet leaders to keep track of and administer punishment to their enemies, all the while theoretically earning profit to finance the ambitious industrialization projects within the USSR. The mass movement of people was also intended to develop and colonize lands that are rich in primary resources. For the Soviet government, the process of dekulakization theoretically could solve most, if not all, of the Soviet Union's problems in the 1930s. In practice, forced and coerced resettlement set a precedent for violence becoming a solution to the USSR's problems.

After the forced migrations intensified, attempts to socially engineer society were faced with catastrophe and anxiety from Soviet leaders. Not all problems could be swept under the rugged canopy of Siberian forests. The system of dekulakization first began with secrecy and violence. Soviet officials, either on purpose or by incompetence, forced these settlers to construct camps in untamed territory, where survival posed a significant challenge. Entire families were resettled and transported in conditions that made disease and hunger rampant. The human cost of resettlement was massive. Resistance to Soviet coercion increased and soon became a problem that grew out of hand, and Soviet state security organizations were given responsibility to regain control and ensure stability in their local communities. As a response to all of these developments and chaotic events, the Soviet Government used the infrastructure of dekulakization to

radically get rid of all unproductive, hostile, and potentially damaging people in the Soviet citizenry – placing them in forced labor camps where they can be re-educated through labor.

The purpose of this work is to outline the Soviet officials' thought process and approaches to eliminating the kulak as a class. By looking at top-down documents from bureaus, committees, and leaders in the USSR and their considerations, needs, anxieties, and decision making in the 1930s context of social upheaval, we can further understand the reasonings behind the harder shift to authoritarianism, and the context behind the foundation of the institution which would become the infamous Gulag archipelago. By analyzing dekulakization from the top-down method along with a historical survey of the development of the Gulag as an institution, the massive consequences of dekulakization can be qualified and understood as a fundamental moment in Soviet history. Dekulakization will set a precedent that will characterize Soviet social engineering for generations, up until the arrival of *Glasnost'*. The brutality of exile in the early 1930s would water the seeds of authoritarianism in Stalin's government. By doing so, the leadership of the country created a cascade of forced resettlement which caused epidemic, economic devastation, and the rise of criminality throughout the Soviet Union, ultimately leading to the grim evolution from the special settlement to the Gulag.

Historiography

Within the historiography dekulakization, there exists an agreement that this

complex moment in Soviet history consisted of paradigm-shifting class warfare within the country, as well as the growth of a new institution of forced labor camps which resulted directly from the bureaucracy and policing of the collectivization effort. Historian Anne Applebaum probes deep into this Gulag system and provides a comprehensive survey of the social, political, and economic structures of the USSR's extensive system of imprisonment³ Applebaum provides a survey that takes the reader from the OGPU camp at Solovki, to the massive network of islands that became the organization of forced labor camps - the Gulags. Applebaum focuses on resettlement as an important moment in the formation of the Gulag, and makes a convincing argument. David Brandenberger and V. M. Zelenov argues that in order to collectivize peasant land, it was necessary in Stalin's eyes to free it for that purpose first, both in the physical sense as well its socio-economic justifications.⁴ The creation of a collective household required that all land would be owned by the peasants and exploited collectively, every person's land would be collected and organized into a plot that all locals could live on, and work on. However, the majority of arable land in the lands of the old Russian Empire was owned by a rich peasant class. Therefore, to fully collectivize all the land into communities that would share it, this peasant class would need to be eliminated. In addition, there was an implicit understanding in Soviet leadership that the kulaks would resist collectivization and any seizure of their property. The expectations of resistance and the disdain for the status quo of land

ownership made class war incredibly vital for the Soviet government and their efforts to build socialism.

David R. Shearer's work in *Policing Stalin's Socialism* presented a convincing argument as to how the police was used to reorganize the USSR's social order. Shearer's analysis into the police force is pivotal to understanding the social landscape of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Shearer sheds light on just how many social and bureaucratic problems plagued Soviet police organizations. The process of building socialism for the government became reliant on waging and winning the class war by using this force throughout the USSR, both in cities and in the countryside. The police would therefore become intimately linked with efforts to resettle and eliminate these class enemies, and arguably more importantly, to keep them confined in their resettled areas. Shearer's contributions equally show just how many reforms the Soviet government needed to implement in order to make their security organizations effective in the mid 1930s. In doing so, the police later molded them into tools for espionage and coercion in the form of the NKVD. With police comes prison, and Michael Jakobson develops multiple arguments on the structure and interrelations between prison agencies, Bolshevik views on crime, and prison self-sufficiency characteristics of the prison system used to carry out this mass repression of the population. Jakobson finds that there is an intimate link between dekulakization and social repression in Stalin's USSR, where state security forces worked in tandem with local and higher officials to participate in dekulakization and collectivization.⁵ This

work will focus on the particular anxieties that link dekulakization and the rise of the Gulag. To start understanding the particular social upheavals that characterized 1930 - 1936, first we must look at the process of exile of these Special settlers to Eastern Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan.

Stalin's Liquidation of the Kulak as a Class

On December 27th, 1929, Stalin declared in a speech to the agrarian-marxists conference that the kulak class was to be liquidated, sparking the movement to fully wage a war against the kulak as a whole and accelerating the process of collectivization within the USSR. This address was the inciting incident to the massive series of deportations that would see thousands of kulaks from various communities throughout the USSR to be exiled to remote Eastern Siberia and North Kazakhstan. Stalin's address is sequenced purposefully to implant the end goals of dekulakization in his audience's mind. Its purpose was to allow Marxist-Leninist theory to come to the forefront and in conjunction with economic thought, reminding the people of the goals of collectivization as an economic structure and further unifying the country in the construction of socialism. By declaring the liquidation as a necessary move to solidify the position of Marxist-Leninist economic policy, Stalin opened a new front in the Soviet Union's class war. In that same December speech, Stalin lamented that capitalist theory competed with Marxist-Leninist economic ideas. He perked his listeners up by then arguing that through preliminary dekulakization, the Soviet economy had already seen 'positive'

results, in conjunction with collectivization. The narrative is hard to miss. Stalin's rhetoric is clarified, he states that "we have shifted to a policy of liquidating the kulak as a class."⁶ In Stalin's words, this is "a decisive turn in all of our politics." Implicitly, he guides the audience to accept that to build socialism, the kulak must be removed entirely.

Stalin urged the Soviet leaders that if there ever was a time to build socialism, it would have to be now and stronger than ever, citing that the transition that the USSR was seeing in its economics was a real obstacle to the development of true Marxist-Leninist economic vision. For Stalin, the framework of the speech was focused intently on addressing the violent reality that liquidation meant. Rather than working with capitalism and the bourgeoisie, Stalin believed that the shortcomings of socialist visions was a naive approach to the class struggle needed to build it.⁷ Stalin drives his audience to consider the economics of production and contrasts it to the existing Soviet economy: the amount of goods produced is increasing, but this process is not well supported by old Imperial small-scale farms. The small scale farm in fact worked much better for the development of capitalist enterprises, which in Stalin's mind impoverished the peasant class. In order to mitigate inefficiency and to fit the USSR's economic system with Marxist theory, Stalin argues that the farms would have to be enlarged and collectivized. For Stalin's vision, the enlargement of the collectivized farms is what was truly needed in this moment to create a Marxist economic system and to finally

break away from capitalist tendencies in society. On another angle, Stalin approaches this speech from an assumption that the civil war is an ongoing project, as the very way of life found in the Russian Empire is treated as a diseased part of the Marxist Society that inherited it. Of course the obstacle to the collectivized farm became the kulak - the symbol of the old Russian imperial farm economy. Following his December speech, the resettlement and imprisonment of class enemies accelerated on Stalin's orders.

The need to move the kulak out of the economic sphere would rapidly change the nature of the USSR's economy and it created more torment for all involved. This decision to declare the elimination of an entire class from the USSR's society caused havoc in local communities across

the Soviet Union. Stalin's go ahead on December 27th would set the stage for the rise of a colossal series of deportations to Eastern Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan. Imprisonment did not always entail an armed security detail. These forced migrants were for all intents and purposes colonists who were sent to remote, often empty, lots with restricted travel.⁸ By the mid 1930s, there would be millions imprisoned in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Archangelsk, and other remote regions of the USSR.

Tragedies of Resettlement in 1930

The exile of kulaks into the regions of Eastern Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan were an effort of colonization. In a series of telegrams between Stalin and Andreev, we can see the process of settlement being

inherently unified with dekulakization. In a telegram to Stalin on the 16th of January 1930, Andreev, party member in charge of various affairs in Eastern Siberia and member of the Politburo, created a semi-detailed study of a plan to accommodate 20 thousand families in an effort to colonize North-Eastern Siberia.⁹ Andreev made a few key suggestions. First, he suggested that the eviction of the kulaks should be overseen by local Soviet-backed authorities in villages, likely to ease the strain on Soviet resources. He went on to suggest that since kulaks escape to cities and factories, "in order to tie them [the kulaks] to the ground, highlight the worst ychastkii [plots of land] possible."¹⁰ Andreev, just like Stalin, saw kulaks as a threat to security, and their resources needed to be limited. This was perhaps a request for Stalin and other Soviet leadership to approve harsher plot allocations for the state's political enemies. There exists a sinister tone in Andreev's study. He doesn't hesitate to propose harsher conditions for the settlers. He also doesn't speak of other considerations for food, medicine, and other logistical issues necessary for survival. His blindness, or willful ignorance of these facts likely contributed to the massive cost in human life. The Soviet officials who were in charge of colonization efforts saw the kulak as a tool for ambitious economic plans.

The locations marked for these settlers needed to be economically viable to the OGPU in order to support the central committee's ambitious economic plans. In particular, the lumber, coal, iron, and gold industries were a big target for the Soviet officials, as seen in Andreev's notes and studies.¹¹ Labor camps for

special settlers would be designated in areas rich with these resources. However, getting people to their marked zones proved to be difficult and mired with issues. During the deportations of January and February 1930, Andreev sent updates on his progress. On the fifth of February, he expressed confusion as to which directives to follow – as the OGPU and the NKPS¹² gave differing guidelines. Despite the confusion, Andreev reports that deportations began in the Northern Caucasus regions.¹³ On the seventh, Andreev further updated the central committee, stating that the deportations were going well, but directives changed every day – echoing his cries for organization on the fifth. Transporting these forced migrants was a universal problem throughout the USSR, as Andreev's telegrams show.¹⁴ However, the problems of resettlement, such as the lack of shelter, food, and medical infrastructure for the special settlers, was a constant and ongoing problem. It's this reality that would contribute to unrest and anger from the kulak class.

Equally as important was the confiscation of goods from kulaks in order to pay for their transportation and exile. Local organs working on the task of dispossessing allowed for the kulak's wealth to be appropriated by the state, in theory. In part, this wealth was used extensively to finance the resettlement effort. Andreev recommended the use of confiscated goods as a way to pay for the transport of these colonists to Northern Siberia. However, not all Soviet or local officials respected the directive, and incidents of looting and theft occurred during the chaotic evictions. For kulaks, this offensive came as a surprise and a

shock.¹⁵ This series of events is confirmed by Lupekin's anxious damage-control report. The chief of information and administration for the eastern Siberian region sheds light on the confusion on the ground of Stalin's dekulakization.¹⁶ In a note directed to the administrative Center Of Dispossession, Lupekin talks of how among the kulaks, even the poor and middle peasants were caught in the sights of the various groups in charge of resettlement. In a disapproving tone, Lupekin confirms that the harsh treatment of all involved, rich or poor, is causing unrest. In his careful choice of words, he chastises the violence and the danger that this can bring. He focuses on the *bedniaki*, the poor who were mistakenly resettled with the kulaks. By all intents and purposes, middle peasants and poor peasants were not explicitly targeted during the resettlement efforts yet they nevertheless got caught in the raids. From a propaganda standpoint, workers would be reluctant to accept the fact that poor peasants are being liquidated alongside the rich peasants. He refers to robbery, theft, looting, and other behavior as "agitating" the locals and causing a wave of discontent to spread within the population. Obviously, they were being robbed during their resettlement process. Other than stating the obvious, Lupekin condemns the gross dismissal of party orders during dispossession raids, suggesting that the officials placed in charge of it all were causing havoc and unrest throughout the operation.¹⁷ He follows up this claim by describing a sizable insurgency that was quelled by local forces before it could spring to action between the 15th and the 20th of

February, 1930. Lupekin was raising the alarm: the coercive nature of the resettlement is going to cause confusion, but potentially, a revolt. Lupekin's focus is on preventing mass panic. By keeping dispossession a secret, Soviet leaders attempted to prevent information leaking and letting kulaks jump to action. Despite their attempts, many kulaks fled, escaped, or gave up resistance when Soviet dispossession groups came to their homes. The first foray into forced resettlement can be characterized as utterly chaotic and violent.

The Bureaucracy of Repression

Stalin's rushed expulsion of the kulak to the distant reaches of Siberia and Kazakhstan faced bureaucratic issues that caused catastrophic effects to those caught in the wave of liquidation. The rapid resettlement of kulaks in the winter suggested that the funds for these large operations could logistically be released at the beginning of a fiscal year and throughout. After all, the Soviet Economy was planned and people needed to be paid somehow to be able to afford food. Common sense also dictates that the plans for these operations were likely in the works in the years before 1930. Either in sinister or disastrously near-sighted planning, thousands of kulaks would die from cold, starvation, and disease.¹⁸ In addition to poor timing, Soviet officials also simply didn't give enough time for land surveyors to make accurate land assessments.¹⁹ In order to meet quotas for the flood of thousands of special settlers these surveyors 'cut corners' and improvised solutions to time constraints.²⁰ As a result, the special settlers were not given land that was good for survival and they could only rely

on the food and equipment they brought with them. They relied heavily on shipments from the Soviet government. In other words, they were not as productive as the Soviet officials had hoped. To their dismay, the settlers that found their way to these locations found that the plots of land were also empty, and in hostile terrain.

The settlers would have to cut into the earth and build their own communal barracks, often fighting bogs and impassable terrain to build a home. This had a disastrous effect on sanitation, as disease quickly spread in these barracks and the settlers did not have sufficient supplies to fight epidemics. Plus, the overcrowding of these populations in monasteries, coupled with the Soviet government's decision to resettle entire families, made the population even more vulnerable. In makeshift barracks, and other scattered buildings, the children and elderly needed care. This requirement increased because of rampant overcrowding.²¹ By haphazardly deciding to proceed with dekulakization in horrible conditions and poor planning, Soviet officials unwittingly flooded remote regions with forced migrants that did not have enough food, medicine, space and shelter, or money to colonize them effectively or survive.²²

1933: Shifting responsibilities of the OGPU, and the early steps to the NKVD's Gulags.

The OGPU became central to the efforts of resettlement when it was given responsibilities crucial to the construction of labor camps in the north – these responsibilities stayed when the OGPU was incorporated into the NKVD in 1934. By examining the developments of the

OGPU in the time of Stalin's dekulakization, we can see how the internal structure of the Gulag is constructed. On April 20th 1933, the central Committee under Molotov gave a decree that granted the responsibility of organizing labor camps to a new committee named the "*Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei i trydovikh poselenii*"²³ however they later shortened it to *Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei*, or GULAG. The OGPU was in essence a bureau responsible for state security, which had this branch added to it in 1933. This committee, a smaller but equally powerful segment of the larger OGPU, would be responsible for organizing special settlers in Siberia and Kazakhstan, and other regions. However it was the decree in 1933 which gave responsibility to the OGPU in constructing housing, alimentary, and medical facilities for special settlers.²⁴ In the early to mid 1930s, dekulakization decisively shifted towards the implementation of the early Gulag system. This is the decisive moment that would transform special settlements in eastern Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan as infrastructure for dealing with all manner of enemies. Having a new special bureau connected to other pre established organs of state security allowed for the shift to better organized camps where special settlers could be detained along with enemies of the state. This move was likely extremely effective. The dekulakization efforts had multiple objectives vital to the ongoing economic plans, and ensuring that the efforts were efficient and safe was the main goal of this directive from Molotov. When the OGPU would be absorbed into the NKVD in 1934, so too would the early proto-Gulag organization come with it.²⁵

Molotov and the party's decree in 1933 to the OGPU allowed them to target the following groups to ensure state security; kulaks, saboteurs of collectivization, "city elements" who were refusing passportization, "unnecessary [unproductive?] elements," kulak escapees.²⁶ First, the implementation of a passportization system was a way of identifying a kulak and a worker. Since many kulaks fled to cities after escaping from their resettlement zones, they would have to be eradicated from within, however this would be difficult without issuing documentation to the population. Passports became increasingly important to policing Stalin's economic reforms and to ensure their security.²⁷ The NKVD equally had a duty to arrest escapees in order to prevent wider unrest. This harkens back to Lupekin's 1930 report. The kulaks by all means could take up arms against the state if they would band together. It was in 1934 where the OGPU, a bureau which normally dealt with criminals, would be repurposed for dealing with both criminals and the special settlers under the new Gulag system. Throughout the early 1930s, the Soviet leadership was consciously moving towards these labor camps as an effective way to deal with the unwanted members of society. Preserving the revolution was the priority, and keeping enemies of the revolution in camps became necessary.

Not Just a Settlement: Socially engineering the foundation of the Gulag. In April of 1930, Shirvindt, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, weighed in on a proposal about the project of "controlling and containing kulak

settlements" which reveals the preliminary theory to contain the kulak and to prevent unrest. His theory is closely analyzed with developing penal theories on reeducation which would be appropriated in the Gulag system. Shirvindt outlines the carefully thought out manner of monitoring the special settlers on their new economical assignments. His issues with the plans reveal the structural approach Soviet officials faced with the tasks of resettling these special settlers. Given that the report was issued in April, Shirvindt most likely had laid his eyes on reports from these special settlements. He proposes stricter measures to keep these kulaks in check, perhaps in response to growing unrest from these exiles. He suggests that there needs to be a central governing force representing the party at the heart of every special settlement to "protect the revolutionary order."²⁸ The language used by Shirvindt reveals the importance of restoring social stability to the Soviet officials. Allowing special settlers to join together in unity was a major and recurring problem that would lead to chaos and resistance. Policies that gave opportunities for kulaks to join together were therefore discouraged severely. He suggested reducing the size of special settlements to curb potential for revolt. After all, less agitated people meant that even less guns would be pointed towards the struggling Soviet police force in the event of a kulak revolt. Shirvindt also asks that an OGPU body be in charge of keeping an eye on the activities of a village commandant. He equally suggests that any meeting or organization of "household groups that will assist the commandant in resolving economic and cultural issues" should be

unacceptable. Shirvindt is laying the foundation for a forced labor camp, not a collective household like the by-now institutionalized *kolkhoz*.

However, kulak revolts were commonplace – the Soviet government was already dealing with revolts in many communities. In a special message to the state security bureau in 1932, a report by Molchanov examines how a group of kulak women led a daring raid on the in a collective household's barn, breaking in and stealing 82 pouds (3000 pounds) of grain.²⁹ Molchanov notes that it was the kulak's sons that incited the revolt. On top of kulak rebellion, in certain regions, especially in Eastern Siberia, police forces were corrupt and ineffective.³⁰ On top of this endemic problem with Soviet police administration, bandit gangs of exiled kulaks and the poor peasants often had more weapons and operated with some relative impunity in these smaller regions. Therefore, localizing these unwanted populations could create a damaging insurrection. Such a situation put an increased strain on the Soviet Economy. Since 'correcting' the population was one of the main goals of dekulakization and the rising institution of the Gulag, there is no reason to discount the fact that the escaped kulaks would be found among counter revolutionary gangs. This is perhaps the reason why efforts were intensified to curb the rise of unrest in the country. What's worse than bandits with more guns than you, are bandits that can convince your population to rise against you. Since western Siberia also served as a gateway to the special settlements into Eastern Siberia as well as all of criminality in the 1930s, there was a massive potential for an alliance.³¹

People exiled as prisoners had a high chance of escaping. So too did kulaks. As a massive population of kulaks was thrown into the remotest areas of the USSR, criminality was intermixed with it. Soviet officials' solutions to social problems were to sweep them under the dense canopy of Siberian trees, however – what if they came back to haunt them? The OGPU turned NKVD's goal was to ensure state security, and more and more, the rising tensions due to resettlement and dekulakization created agitated people who resented and loathed the state.

We'll Make Them Work.

The exile of a large population of the USSR to these remote areas came with a social promise. Prisoners who worked for five years in hard labor in a gold mine, or three in a platinum mine, would be released– their reeducation deemed complete. The people that were sent to these camps were exactly those that were either not productive enough. Beginning in 1931, free workers who were considered unproductive were often arrested and sentenced to prison.³² This meant that the systems created in 1930 to deal with dekulakization directly link themselves to major social repressions and social engineering. Justices began to measure the success of its reeducation efforts by a prisoner's productivity. By 1933, Stalin's initial call for dekulakization seemed distant as the efforts were now complemented by efforts to remove dangerous elements of society via the internment camp. By beginning to utilize these camps to deal with criminality, dekulakization becomes the elimination and coercion of a population that isn't helpful to Stalin's big break. Given that it was often difficult for

Soviet officials to tell who was a kulak, and who was a worker, the confusion and massive movement of populations as a result of the central committee's efforts created the necessity to constantly revise the purposes of these newly built camps.³³

The Soviet Government's response to mass unrest had obvious connections to collectivization and dekulakization. The measures to control the population naturally evolved alongside the population's resistance. In the mid 1930s, the Soviet government found itself fighting fire with fire. The rise in criminality due to the horrible conditions placed for these special settlers, many of whom sought a life away from these desolate and poorly zoned areas in remote Siberia and Kazakhstan, was a cause for Stalin to blame 'the remnants of the capitalist system' in Soviet society as a force that was coming to take its revenge. His authoritarian policies sought to undermine the capitalist threat. In a sleight of hand, the population was targeted more and more, while the workers were appeased. Siberia and Kazakhstan, for now, were fulfilling their role as a banishment ground and as a rising economic provider.

Conclusion

Stalin's decision to launch the dekulakization of the Soviet Union began to ruthlessly pave the way for the USSR's dream of true socialism and further economic security. Their massive movement of populations were destined to allow Marxist-Leninist economic principles to dominate the Soviet Union. However, the haphazard and unprepared nature of the deportations led to

catastrophes that mired the history of Stalin's reign and pushed the country deeper into authoritarianism. Dekulakization paved the way for the NKVD to take control of the process of managing the exiled kulak as well as other undesirables in the country. By being given the task of administering their camps and settlements, the institutionalization of the Gulag became easier and worthwhile to the government. Once that transition was made, all people deemed enemies had a potential destination.

Soviet officials, as a response to major social unrest caused by dekulakization, actively increased security measures, policing, and social engineering in the mid 1930s. The mass-migration of people, while eventually manifesting itself as a boost to the Soviet Economy through increased exploitation of natural resources, became Stalin's islands of forced labor colonies. They turned into a convenient place to put political enemies and others who would impede the progress of socialism. The quasi-imperial aspirations to colonize the north was the main goal of dekulakization, and the dream of having these settlements become self-sufficient was a kind of holy grail. Yet with the disruption and disorganization of an entire economic class in the Soviet Union, the government continued to create instability which necessitated a response. This is the tragedy of the birth of the Gulag. Like a self-reinforcing cycle, the misery of dekulakization accelerated the violent response to enemies of the state. It would be deemed that the places where socialism would be built, the cities and communes of the USSR, would

never be internally subverted by the kulak and the revolution would continue.

Without a doubt Stalin would use this Gulag system as a way to preserve his power during the time of the terror. Those that helped build the Gulag, in their efforts to preserve the socialist ideal, ultimately suffered from the power that it permitted to Soviet government officials. In an ironic twist of fate and a historical development shaped by anxiety, aspiration, and unwavering belief in the future – Stalin's authoritarianism was allowed to ascend and socially engineer the USSR. In looking at the historical developments, it is evident that not all people in the Soviet Union blindly accepted the government's directives, given the stories of revolt among the population and initiative to resist Soviet coercion are extremely commonplace. Scholars must focus more on these movements of resistance to capture more of the pressures that affected the USSR's social body in the 1930s. The movements of resistance to dekulakization hold more answers to the anxieties and assumptions that Soviet officials perhaps dared not inform their leader, and reshaped the Soviet Union in many more avenues that we may have not considered yet.

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HISTORY ON ONE'S OWN TERMS

JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY AND THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY ON EDUCATION

EMMA MCCULLY

“G uixiang, don't cry. You need to bury your grandma. How do you want it to be?”, were the words spoken to a young Chinese woman, whose grandmother had been brutally killed by Imperial Japanese forces, directly following the Rape of Nanking in 1937.¹ This massacre, however, was not the only form of suffering inflicted on the Chinese people by the Imperial Japanese forces. They were also guilty of a number of decidedly unethical and inhumane actions towards a multitude of East Asian countries, “including murder of innocent, unarmed civilians, forced prostitution, rape, lootings and biological experimentation on human subjects.”²

The problem, in this case, is one of accountability, specifically on the part of the Japanese. It is not so much the war crimes themselves, but how the Japanese have chosen to deal with their past aggression towards China and its people in the public sphere, particularly in the educational realm. The Japanese History Textbook Controversy of 1982 marks a moment where “the Chinese

Government officially blamed Japan's Education Ministry for a move to 'distort' Sino-Japanese history by watering down and glossing over past war atrocities in the process of screening Japanese school textbooks of history.”³ A certain bitterness towards the Japanese lingered among the Chinese people even after the end of the Second World War, specifically due to a lack of acknowledgement of their hardships, which was demonstrated perfectly by what the Japanese government had decided to teach its young people in regards to their war time criminality.⁴

The Japanese History Textbook Controversy was used to criticize the behavior of the Japanese, since their hesitance to acknowledge the truth of their actions, akin to censorship, was an example of historical whitewashing that could only be described as disrespectful towards those they had caused to endure a great deal of suffering.⁵ This controversy also called into question the integrity of not only their textbooks, but the way the Japanese were educating their young people about the past.⁶ The withholding of certain elements of Japan's military past in China was indeed something to find fault with, and the associated lack of impartiality was what led to “the word “aggression” in the textbooks [being] replaced by the milder word “advance” but whole descriptions about the “Rape of Nanking” [...] being toned down.”⁷

These purposeful omissions on the part of the Japanese only served to “have driven deeper into the Chinese a repressed hatred” and further solidified

the anti-Japanese resentment that existed among the Chinese population.⁸ Both the Chinese and the Japanese harbor a strong sense of national identity, and the way the history textbook controversy unfolded is an example of how national identity is a crucial element when it comes to the interpretation of events, because those interpretations, of the same events, can differ drastically depending on which side of the conflict one finds themselves on. Knowing this, it can be said that the Chinese felt particularly targeted by the Japanese History Textbook Controversy because of the Japanese being unwilling to take accountability for their war crimes committed against the Chinese people, and that both countries' responses were fueled by their sense of national identity and their differing understanding of events.

Before having a discussion about the depictions of war crimes, it is important to understand what those crimes actually were as well as the scope and scale of the damage done to the Chinese by the Imperial Japanese. The Nanking Massacre has already been mentioned, but there is still plenty to be said about the behavior of the Japanese troops and their mindset regarding the atrocities that were committed. These troops descended upon Nanking, at the time the Chinese capital city, in December of 1937, with the intention to capture it and take out its military infrastructure.⁹ In doing so, however, they also committed a series of atrocities against not only military personnel, but unarmed civilians and prisoners of war (POW). There were a multitude of Imperial Japanese officers

committing unsavory acts of violence towards Chinese soldiers and civilians in Nanking, since "Most of the Chinese soldiers who had been interned in the safety zone were shot in masses. The city was combed in a systematic house to house search for men having knapsack marks on their shoulders or other signs of having been soldiers. They were herded together and executed."¹⁰

One of the more controversial examples of their methods is that of the Nanking 100 Man Killing Contest, in which two Imperial Japanese officers, Toshiaki Mukai and Takeshi Noda, allegedly competed "in a friendly contest to see which of them will first fell 100 Chinese in individual sword combat before the Japanese forces completely occupy Nanking."¹¹ Both men were executed following them being tried as war criminals, each having supposedly killed over one hundred noncombatants and POW's with their swords, despite their pleas of not-guilty.¹² While the historical accuracy of the contest itself is hotly debated amongst historians, the outcome was the same for the alleged perpetrators, and it spurred conversation amongst the Japanese public about their "knowledge of the Atrocity and raised their awareness of being victimizers in a war of imperialist aggression despite efforts to the contrary by conservative revisionists."¹³

There is also the matter of Unit 731, "a biological warfare research organization that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army" based in several locations, but had a pivotal

compound, Ping Fan, in the city of Harbin in Manchuria.¹⁴ The facility was run by Ishii Shiro, and, along with his team of researchers, he conducted a variety of inhumane experiments on non-consenting Chinese civilians in Manchuria, the result being that “over 3000 human subjects died in Unit 731’s Ping Fan compound in Harbin alone, and thousands more were killed by Ishii’s collaborators in other biological weapons facilities.”¹⁵ Unit 731 “vivisected hundreds of human subjects. Others were intentionally infected with disease, deprived of food and water for the purposes of collecting data about time to death and staked as human targets for weapons testing. Thousands of others died from the testing of fleas weaponised to spread the bubonic plague.”¹⁶ The cruel and sadistic methods of Unit 731 resulted in many Chinese casualties, since they were treated more as disposable resources for research than as actual human beings. In accordance with the way the Japanese have been treating their other wartime atrocities, Unit 731 is severely under-represented in their historical memory, since the suffering inflicted has significantly less coverage in the Japanese history textbooks than the suffering caused to the Japanese by more aggressive nations than themselves.¹⁷

Now that it has been established the kinds of war crimes the Imperial Japanese were guilty of prior to and throughout the Second World War, it is time to discuss how the Japanese national identity informed how they depicted certain events, and how these interpretations conflicted with the public, not only in China, but in Japan as well.

The Japanese have quite a righteous approach to national identity, with Tanaka Kotaro, the former Minister for Education of the Empire of Japan, saying, in 1952, that “Japan possesses her own characteristic moral convictions and fine social traditions which are a legacy from Buddhism and Confucianism. Of these she must preserve all that is good.”¹⁸ The Japanese tend to be obstinate in their moral approach, and since their military aggression in China during WWII was swept under the rug for as long as it had been, “self-styled “progressive men of culture” waxed eloquent about pacifism in the media, but did so from a narrow sense of Japanese wartime victimization.”¹⁹

The full scope of the damage done had been avoided, and this was, from a conservative point of view, a way to avoid slandering Japan in their own historical material.²⁰ To do so “prohibits Japanese children from taking pride in their country’s history and does not allow them to foster a sound nationalism.”²¹ So, one could argue that the goal of the omissions from the textbooks about particular events is not to explicitly deny them, even if that is what is happening outwardly. The idea is to try and maintain a national identity that would be otherwise wounded. This also lines up with the definition of a “self-glorifying myth”, constructed by Japanese elites to justify the content of the student’s textbooks.²² These types of elite-driven national myths “explicitly incorporate inflated or false claims of national virtue and competence; these include myths of victimization that form a “cult of national

martyrdom," endowing a nation with moral superiority."²³ When the Chinese ask for an apology from the Japanese government in regards to their quite public dismissal of things like the Nanking Massacre, they are asking for an admission of guilt, which is a tough ask when a nation's pride is on the line. It is a sure thing that, after examining the way that Japanese elites practiced self-glorification and historical whitewashing in order to protect their righteous national identity, and the kind of history shared in Japanese textbooks, that politics and education, in this context, are inextricably linked.

The Chinese, on the other hand, harbored a certain resentment towards the former Empire of Japan, and this comes through in their own understanding of history. While this frustration was present, accompanied by the presence of xenophobia directed at the Japanese, there was also trouble brewing within China itself, even without projecting outwards onto Japan. At the time of the textbook controversy, there was a fair amount of instability internally, since the Chinese government, led by Deng Xiaoping, was struggling "under great pressure as a result of the mounting social crisis and domestic political disunity."²⁴ Deng was under the impression that if he pushed the anger and confusion from the inside towards the outside, it would help to stabilize the political climate of the country. With this in mind, Deng decided that in "lashing out at Japan's amnesia about its past aggression toward China, Beijing could depict Japan as an immoral "other" and thus restore the internal cohesion of the

"self," the Chinese nation, and assuage public resentment toward the government."²⁵ The idea here was to attempt to redirect frustrations towards the outside, in this case Japan, and add fuel to a pre-existing fire, so to speak. Since there was already anger to exploit, Deng was under the impression that it could be directed away from him and his associates, and instead aimed at those who had, comparably, caused irreparable harm to the Chinese public.²⁶

However, Deng's attempts were met with mixed success, this due in part to the fact that the national identity of the Chinese people was already in the process of changing. Unsatisfied with his regime, "Popular resentment against what they saw as the unfair, corrupt and incompetent state was so intense that it sparked numerous mass demonstrations and even violent riots."²⁷ With this civil unrest at the forefront of the political spectrum at the time, there emerged a certain understanding that the Chinese people were not completely averse to Western technology, but they were resolute in the idea that there was a status quo to be maintained in terms of culture.²⁸ It was then, after the unrest had dialed down, that an altered national identity emerged in China, one that was "often using the "othering" of the Western out-group to glorify the Chinese in-group. The dual nature of the official nationalism was aimed at raising the national spirit while retaining the benefits of the economic open-door policy."²⁹ This new policy of "othering", in line with this new national identity fostered by the Chinese people, was the perfect stage to

reinroduce resentment towards Japan in a way that Deng Xiaoping was unable to do, since as “A country that had invaded and humiliated China in the past, and whose historical amnesia was notorious, Japan became an easy target of China’s assertive nationalism.”³⁰

As the Japanese make their attempts to avoid discussion of past misdeeds altogether, especially in regards to the education of the nation’s children, the Chinese are attempting to push these under-represented events into the limelight, and to place blame on the Japanese, demanding retribution. Both countries, it would seem, are on the defensive in this situation, with the Japanese trying to defend their national honor by keeping the details of such events as the Nanking Massacre close to the chest. The Chinese, on the other hand, are trying to ensure that their national identity remains uncorrupted by false recollections of the past held in the hands of the Japanese history textbook writers and associates. Both countries are grasping at their sense of moral authority that is out of reach, and so they make choices in order to defend their national pride.

In conclusion, it can certainly be said that the Chinese felt singled out by the Japanese History Textbook Controversy, since the war crimes committed against them were not receiving their proper acknowledgement from the part of the Japanese. This essay has explored two examples, the “Rape of Nanking” and the human experimentation of Unit 731, but those are just two of many examples of atrocities committed against the Chinese by the Imperial Japanese troops during WWII, and the details are being

purposefully omitted. It can also be understood that these omissions, as well as the anger on the part of the Chinese, were caused in part by the attempts of both countries to preserve their respective national identities. For each of them, the Japanese History Textbook Controversy was about more than the books themselves, but about national pride. The Japanese were, in fact, guilty of historical whitewashing, but for the purposes of maintaining their “self-glorifying myth”, and to ensure that the children of Japan were not exposed to learning material that was “self-tormenting.”³¹ For the Chinese, it was more about projecting internal conflict outward, so that they could preserve their process of “othering” that would allow for China to also maintain its process of self-glorification. Within the context of the Japanese History Textbook Controversy, there was a certain yearning for acknowledgement of suffering from the side of the Chinese, but from both the Japanese and the Chinese, there was also this necessity to protect the national identity they had each established for themselves.

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THE FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE TO UPHOLD THEIR CHARTER

JACOBUS VOORNEVELD

The Olympic Games are one of the most celebrated sporting events in the modern world. While they were initially held in Ancient Greece, the current version of the Games first took place in Athens in 1896, and have been held every four years since, other than during World War Two.¹ In addition to the Summer Olympics, the Winter Olympics' first incarnation took place in Chamonix in 1924.² The organization responsible for overseeing the modern games is the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In addition to overseeing the Olympics themselves, the IOC is also the body responsible for the oversight of the 206 recognized National Olympic Committees.³ The IOC was founded in 1894 and has a charter which sets in place the missions that the organization hopes to achieve through the Olympics.⁴ The National Committees all essentially have the goal of bringing the most Olympic glory to their own nation, be that

through Olympic success or the prestige that comes along with hosting the Olympics. The IOC is supposed to make sure that the Olympics are conducted and run according to the codification set out in their charter. However, in recent years this task has proven difficult to accomplish. **The IOC and the Olympics have fallen away from the positive goals outlined in their charter and allowed themselves to become corrupted by national interests, as well as their personal financial gain.** First, the IOC says that it will use sport to promote peace, yet constantly associates itself with oppressive and authoritarian governments. Second, the IOC have a history of being very lenient with, if at times even outright ignoring, athletes who use performance enhancing drugs, despite their mission to ensure the integrity of the sport and fair play. Third, the IOC endeavors to keep the Games free from politics, however they have an incredibly inconsistent track record for when they decide to not allow political statements at the Olympics.

Firstly, the IOC says that their mission is to place sport at the service of humanity in order to promote peace, however they have often associated themselves with violent authoritarian regimes. For reference, this goal is stated in the fourth point of the "Mission and role of the IOC" section of their charter.⁵ It should be also noted that in this point, the IOC also say that they will only cooperate with competent authorities.⁶ Yet, their track record is filled with instances where they have not adhered to this goal. One of the main reasons why this part of their mission has been ignored is that the IOC benefits financially from associating themselves with these types of

governments as they are often more successful than democracies in raising the money necessary to host the games. Countries with democratic governments tend to need the consent of the people in order to host the Olympics.⁷ This factor makes it much more difficult for them to become the host nation, since the majority of their population needs to support the idea.⁸ This fact has resulted in very few democratic countries seeing their bids all the way through to the end.⁹ Authoritarian regimes on the other hand do not have this problem, as they will be able to make the decision of whether to host or not while consulting very few people.¹⁰ It should also be noted that the Olympics have a very high cost for the hosting nation.¹¹ In fact, the cost for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics has been estimated at \$6.4 billion, while London 2012 was estimated to cost \$14 billion.¹² These high price tags have created a situation where democratic nations are much less likely to want to raise the money than authoritarian ones. This point can be clearly presented through the fact that every country other than China and Kazakhstan withdrew their bids for the 2022 Winter Olympics.¹³ In other words, the only countries that were willing to play host to the Olympics were authoritarian regimes.¹⁴ Every single democratic nation dropped out of the race to host, which left the IOC with no choice other than to select a non-democratic nation. We can see that the high costs associated with hosting the Olympics have been pushing the IOC to associate themselves more and more with

authoritarian nations. The IOC rely on the Olympics for nearly all of their revenue, so the financial concerns in recent times have led them to associate themselves with many undemocratic governments.¹⁵ However, it should be noted that this phenomenon is not one that is not unique to recent times. The IOC has been willing to associate itself with these types of governments for decades, as demonstrated by the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City. The Mexican government won the bid to host the games in 1963, beating out competing cities such as Detroit and Lyon, France.¹⁶ Part of the reason that Mexico's bid went through so smoothly is that the government was undemocratic, and controlled by the authoritarian Institutional Revolution Party.¹⁷ Therefore, the national government was able to successfully see their bid through to the end without any objections from local authorities.¹⁸ However, the Mexican government would receive backlash from some of their people. Mexico ended up investing \$176 million in hosting the Olympics.¹⁹ While this sum might not be comparable by today's standards, it should be noted that Mexico was still a developing nation back in 1968.²⁰ This fact meant that they were not rich, and therefore had rural and urban development projects that could have used the money, rather than having it be spent on hosting the Olympics.²¹ The use of funds in this way became one of the driving forces behind student led protests that broke out before being violently suppressed by the government just days before the Games were set to begin.²² More than 200 protesters were

killed by the army on October 2nd.²³ The tragic incident would become known as the Tlatelolco massacre.²⁴ Even though this event occurred just days before the opening ceremony, the Olympics proceeded as normal.²⁵ The IOC's president at the time, Avery Brundage, assured the public of this fact.²⁶ In other words the IOC had absolutely no problem associating themselves with authorities that would kill their own people just because they were protesting the government. Mexican authorities were easily able to raise the funds necessary to host the Olympics, since they were authoritarian and therefore did not have to get the consent of the people to take this money away from other areas of spending. From this example, we can clearly see that the IOC does not care about the will of the host country's people. Their main concern is securing their own financial well-being, even if it is at the expense of less fortunate people. We can also see those actions taken by a country's government are of very little importance to the IOC, as even brutally massacring student protestors will not cause any type of reprimand on their part. The IOC say they will use sport to promote peace but are willing to associate themselves with governments who massacre their citizens if it means they will get the money that they need. In other words, making money is more important than upholding their mission of peace. While the IOC benefits financially from these relationships, it is also important to note the benefit that the authoritarian regimes get out of the exchange. The Olympics are internationally covered, so by hosting they are able to present an outwardly positive portrayal of their country to the

global community. In other words, the governments of unfree nations are able to portray life in their countries as being better than the reality. Hosting the Olympics can make a country appear more modern than in actuality, as was the intent with the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games.²⁷ However, it can also allow for a government to divert the attention away from the atrocities that they are committing against their people. This instance can be clearly seen through the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. The Olympics were originally granted to Berlin in 1931, when the Weimar Republic was in charge of the country.²⁸ However, by 1933 Adolf Hitler's Nazi party had taken over the government.²⁹ These games were characterized by Hitler's desire to show the world the strength of the Aryan race.³⁰ This idea of supremacy included the exclusion of Jewish people from German life.³¹ This idea did not sit well with some members of the Olympic community, who started considering to boycott the games.³² Certain nations, including America, wanted there to be at least one Jewish member of the German team.³³ Hitler was initially opposed to this idea, before eventually allowing fencer Helen Mayer, whose father was Jewish, to compete.³⁴ It should be noted however that her inclusion in the games was only allowed in order to placate the nations who had considered not attending.³⁵ It was merely a publicity stunt so that Germany would seem more inclusive, when in reality, every Jewish athlete had been removed from athletic club that was eligible for national championships events.³⁶ It should be noted that athletes

were not the only Jewish people being targeted by the Nazis. By 1933, people of Jewish heritage had been removed from nearly every occupation in Germany.³⁷ In other words, even before the Olympic Games, Nazi Germany was a society that was systematically oppressing a specific ethnic group and committing human rights abuses. However, no boycott occurred, and the Games carried on as intended.³⁸ In fact Germany even received praise from the international community for their hospitality in hosting the Olympics.³⁹ It should also be noted that German newspapers had been directed to soften their harsh anti-Jewish rhetoric during the Olympics in order to promote a more peaceful image of the country.⁴⁰ Therefore, we can clearly see that the Olympics were being used as a way for the Nazi government to present a more peaceful image of themselves to the outside world. The Olympics put Germany at the center of the international stage, and the Nazis used this opportunity to create a positive reputation for themselves. The Olympics allowed for the focus to be taken off Germany's anti-Jewish policies. By allowing the Games to continue even when these exclusions were very public, the IOC was saying that they were not of great importance. The games were allowed to continue even though the Nazis were keeping an entire people, other than one, out of competition and out of society in general. It is also important to note that the Olympics helped the world to see this violent and racist government in a more positive light thanks to the fact that hosting the Olympics in Germany allowed for the

government to portray themselves as more tolerant by lessening their discriminatory policies while the international community was focused on them. We can see that the Olympics truly do allow authoritarian regimes to present themselves positively to the world. By allowing these types of nations to host the Games, the IOC is condoning this practice, which comes at the expense of the people these governments hurt, such as the Jewish people in 1936. This use of the Olympics clearly goes against their goal of promoting peace, but they continue to allow it to happen. In summary, the IOC associates themselves with authoritarian governments, which does not adhere to their mission of using sport to promote peace, this being for financial reasons, as well as image motivations from the regimes.

Secondly, the IOC's charter claims that their mission is to promote fair play and ensure the integrity of sport against doping. However, there have been a multiple instances of cheating throughout Olympic history. Most of these incidents have been motivated by the global prestige that countries receive following Olympic glory. The ninth point of the IOC's mission says that they will fight against doping, as well as act against all forms of manipulation of competitions.⁴¹ This failure to follow their mission is firstly made evident through the fact that when cheating is uncovered it often will go unpunished and is easily excused. We can see this occurrence through the example of the Men's 100m race at the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul. This event saw Canadian Ben Johnson win

the gold medal, while American Carl Lewis took silver and British sprinter Linford Christie came away with bronze.⁴² However, only a few days after the race, Johnson tested positive for a banned substance and was stripped of his medal.⁴³ Following his disqualification, the gold then went to Lewis.⁴⁴ While it may appear in this situation that the IOC had done the right thing, it is important to consider Lewis's history with using banned substances. In fact, he had tested positive for three banned stimulants only two months before the games, but he was still allowed to compete.⁴⁵ He managed to avoid being banned from competing by claiming that he had accidentally ingested the substances through an herbal supplement that he was taking.⁴⁶ Third place finisher Linford Christie found himself in a similar situation. Following the race, he tested positive for pseudoephedrine, a stimulant and banned substance.⁴⁷ However, he was able to avoid being stripped of his medal by claiming that he had ingested the substance through a ginseng tea.⁴⁸ Christie was given the benefit of the doubt by the IOC.⁴⁹ In other words, all three of the original medalists in the race had likely cheated, but only one was punished. Johnson said following his ban that he had only cheated because everyone else in track at the was also doping.⁵⁰ While this argument does not justify his own use of performance enhancing drugs, we can see that he may have had a point to the widespread use of doping among Olympic competitors. In fact, out of the eight 100M runners in Seoul, only 2 of them went

their entire careers without being involved in a doping scandal.⁵¹ Through this example we can see how the IOC is often very easy on doping offenders. They are able to offer excuses to explain away any positive tests. From the examples of Carl Lewis and Linford Christie, it is apparent that their stories are often believed. The IOC has a doping problem largely because it allows athletes to explain away any positive tests for banned substances. They do not enforce the integrity of the sport against doping when they dismiss positive tests as accidents. They allow athletes to make excuses in order to get away with cheating. In other words, the IOC have helped to exacerbate the current doping problem through their lack of enforcement when athletes are caught using performance enhancing drugs. The IOC's lack of enforcement of their doping policy can also be seen through their ineffective control of global anti-doping policy, which essentially allows governments to self-regulate. Following the numerous accusations of doping in the late twentieth century, the IOC realized that they need to put a more effective structure in place to test for performance enhancing drugs. In order to accomplish this goal, the IOC established the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999.⁵² This organization was set up to be in charge of global anti-doping regulations, and enforce the World Anti-Doping Code, the document which harmonizes anti-doping policies worldwide, with funding coming from the IOC and national governments.⁵³ While WADA is a good idea in theory, its real world application has tended to often be ineffective. Individual countries control their own

testing through WADA accredited laboratories.⁵⁴ In other words, nations are in charge of checking their own athletes. Therefore, WADA needs all competing countries to be honest in their testing in order for it to function properly. This fact can cause a problem, as governments tend to use international organizations like WADA to serve their own specific goals.⁵⁵ The organization cannot be effective in fighting against doping in sport if some nations decide that their medal count is more important than preserving the integrity of sport against doping.⁵⁶ If a national government were to willingly conduct improper testing of their athletes, they would likely be able to get away with cheating. We can see this occurrence through the example of the Russian doping scandal. This event was a scheme carried out by the Russian government through which they allowed certain elite athletes to dope undetected through the manipulation of test results and bribing international officials.⁵⁷ It occurred at least between 2011 and 2016.⁵⁸ The Russian WADA affiliate, RusADA, would also provide athletes with advanced notice for when doping tests would be scheduled.⁵⁹ Russia was able to keep its cheating quiet, and only ever got investigated thanks to allegations made by a whistleblower from inside RusADA.⁶⁰ WADA was also very slow to investigate these allegations, as they were first brought to their attention in February 2010, yet it took them until December 2014 to act on them.⁶¹ In other words, it took WADA over four years to do their supposed job of

preventing doping in sport. It is also important to note that the president of WADA at the time was also the vice-president of the IOC, Craig Reedie.⁶² As a member of the international Olympic community, he had close relationships with Russian officials that he did not want to hurt by investigating their doping practices.⁶³ In fact, Reedie even said that WADA would do nothing to hurt the relationship that they had with Russia.⁶⁴ From this fact, we can see that conflicts of interest from within the IOC contributed to inhibiting the investigation against Russia. The organization that was supposed to punish countries if they broke the rules did not want to do so for fear of offending Russia. As late as 2015, Reedie was hesitant to investigate Russia, and only did so because news of the allegations had been exposed to the public, which pressured WADA to act.⁶⁵ From this evidence, we can see that the framework put in place to stop doping is not being effectively utilized. We can see that the IOC has at times sabotaged WADA by not investigating or covering up scandals. Therefore, the IOC is directly hurting the integrity of sport against performance enhancing drugs, as they cover up instances of cheating. This point is articulated by former WADA president Richard Pound, who said that the framework necessary to effectively regulate doping was possible, but that there was a general unwillingness to execute it.⁶⁶ One of the main problems is the lack of authority given to WADA, as they required the IOC to act in order to sanction the parties who had been found guilty of doping.⁶⁷ We can see that

WADA is kept intentionally weak and ineffective in order to allow doping to continue. Diverse complex international interests make it so that IOC members do not even want to investigate allegations. We can see that the organization also has to deal with non-compliance from governments, such as in the case of Russia. We can clearly observe that the IOC has not adhered to their mission of combatting doping in sport. They have allowed nationwide doping scandals to occur, while placing their relationships with individual countries in a position of priority over ensuring the integrity of sport against doping. In summary, we can see that the IOC has allowed to continue in sport through leniency towards athletes who tested positive and implementing a weak structure to detect systemic doping from nations.

Thirdly, while the IOC's charter calls for political neutrality, the Olympics have become increasingly politicized, to the point where politics are now a main aspect of the Games. We can see this concept articulated in the fifth point of the IOC's mission, when they say that all organizations within the Olympic Movement should exercise political neutrality.⁶⁸ However, history demonstrates that politics have thoroughly infiltrated the games. The nation that provides the venue is able to showcase their country and their ideals, which has resulted in instances of bribery and corruption during the selection process. It is the IOC's duty to select the nation that will host any given Summer or Winter Olympic Games.⁶⁹ As the chief authority for the Olympics, they have total control over deciding where the Olympics will take place.⁷⁰ This fact has often

resulted in IOC members being given expensive gifts by representatives from potential future hosts.⁷¹ We can see this occurrence clearly from Nagano, Japan's bid for the 1998 Winter Olympics.⁷² While they did end up hosting, it is important to note that the city spent \$14 million entertaining IOC officials when they visited the city.⁷³ Their visit to the city included first-class flights, five star accommodations, and luxury gifts, including a samurai sword, that were all paid for by the city.⁷⁴ However, Nagano's attempts to secure themselves the Olympics did not stop after the IOC's visit. The IOC mandates that the election for the Olympics' venue must take place in a city that is not aspiring to host.⁷⁵ The election that year was held in Birmingham, England.⁷⁶ Nagano officials treated the IOC members to luxury sushi dinners only a week before the vote at an English estate.⁷⁷ It is also important to note that the head of the Japanese Olympic Committee gathered millions of dollars in corporate donations to build a new Olympic museum in Switzerland for the IOC during the bidding process.⁷⁸ It is also important to note that city officials had the financial records detailing their spending to secure the Olympics burned shortly after they were announced as hosts.⁷⁹ From this evidence, we can see that bribery was heavily prevalent in selecting the host for the 1998 Games, and likely was a deciding factor in Nagano being chosen. It should be noted that this occurrence was in no way an isolated incident, as shown by the bidding process for the 2002 Winter Olympics. These Games were awarded Salt Lake City, Utah.⁸⁰

However, the president and vice-president of the Salt Lake Bid Committee were both indicted on charges for bribery during the selection process.⁸¹ It is alleged that they gave money to the IOC members in a multitude of different ways, ranging from paying for their child's tuition to handing them large sums of cash.⁸² It is important to note however, that all of the payments were made in ways that would be untraceable, so as to not appear on the Bid Committee's financial records.⁸³ During the bidding process, IOC officials received as much as \$320,000 each from the Salt Lake City officials.⁸⁴ It should also be noted that bribery has really become the norm for selecting the Olympic host, as IOC members will even solicit bribes from candidates.⁸⁵ This phenomenon happened to 2004 Summer Olympic potential host Rome, as well as Anchorage, Alaska when they bid for the 1992 and 1994 Winter Olympics.⁸⁶ All of these events clearly show that the selection process has been corrupted. Countries want to host the Olympics for the positive exposure it gives to their nation, so they are willing to pay for them. The IOC also knows how playing host can increase a nation's prestige on the global stage, so they will try to extract benefits for themselves. If they were truly committed to following the IOC's mission, they would have refused these benefits, and selected hosts based purely off the location's merits. Instead, they have exacerbated the issue by requesting bribes themselves. They have monetized the prestige that comes from hosting the Olympics. We can therefore see how the

IOC has not done its job in upholding neutrality in the selection process, as they have used national interests for their own financial gain. The failure of neutrality at the Olympics is also apparent through the IOC's inconsistent enforcement against the appearance of political messages during the Games. Their charter directly says that they will endeavour to protect the political neutrality of the Olympic Movement.⁸⁷ However, they have been rather inconstant in deciding who to punish for political expression at the Games. A notable example that illustrates this point is the previously discussed 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin. As previously discussed, these Olympics saw the Nazi party hide their oppression of the Jewish people from the outside world. These games were also propaganda to support Hitler's idea of Aryan supremacy.⁸⁸ As such, they were heavily politicized by the Nazi party.⁸⁹ The athletes being given center stage by Germany were those who had blonde hair and blue eyes.⁹⁰ The entire event was set up to glorify the National Socialists' message of superiority to the world.⁹¹ It is also important to note that for the entire length of the Games, swastikas were absolutely everywhere.⁹² It should also be noted that in other words, the entire competition was a huge political event to display the greatness of the German people. The Olympics was used for political motivations. In retrospect, the games have been referred to as the "Nazi Olympics", due to the incredible amount of propaganda that was present at the

Games.⁹³ However, even though they were heavily politicized, Germany received no type of punishment. In fact, the decision was made to not boycott the Olympics in an effort to keep them separate from politics.⁹⁴ In other words, Germany was allowed freely to politicize the Games without being challenged by anyone. The Nazis' politicization of the Games was allowed to continue unchecked. From these Olympics, we can see that the IOC does not always enforce its mission of upholding political neutrality. The Nazis were able to freely spread their message of Aryan supremacy totally unchecked. While this extreme example of politicizing the Olympics was allowed, there are still some instances throughout the Games' history where the IOC stepped in to punish actions they deemed political. One notable example of this phenomenon occurred during the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City. As previously discussed, these Games saw the Mexican government massacre student protestors just days before the opening ceremony.⁹⁵ Still, the Olympics proceeded as if nothing had happened.⁹⁶ The event from 1968 that was punished by the IOC was the Civil Rights protest by African American sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos.⁹⁷ Five days into the Olympics, Smith won the gold medal in the Men's 200m sprint, while Carlos took the bronze medal.⁹⁸ When they were on the podium being presented their medals, they each raised a fist in a "black power salute" to protest racial injustice and the unequal treatment of African Americans in the United States.⁹⁹ In other words, they engaged in a silent and peaceful protest.

However, the IOC expelled them from the Olympic village and suspended from the U.S. Olympic team because of this action.¹⁰⁰ While Smith and Carlos' protest was deemed to be too political, it should also be noted that the IOC president, Avery Brundage, had absolutely no problem with South Africa entering an all-white team in the Olympics that year.¹⁰¹ From this evidence, we can see how the IOC is clearly biased when they decide what constitutes as politicizing the Olympics. The Nazis were allowed to spread their propaganda unchecked, but when two African Americans attempted to protest for their equal rights, that event is the one that the IOC deemed as violating the Games' neutrality. The overt racist politics of the Nazis and apartheid era South Africa were of no issue to the IOC, but the Civil Rights Movement is where they drew the line. From this information we can see that the politicizing the IOC took issue with came from minorities, while they were fine with the politics of white supremacist nations. Smith and Carlos were also showing dissent towards their government that they viewed as racist. In other words, the politics of white nationalism were of no issue to the IOC, but minorities protesting for their rights constituted a problem. In summary, the IOC has failed at upholding their mission of preserving political neutrality at the Olympics, both as a result of their allowing the bidding process for the Games to be corrupted by bribery, and their inconsistent application of punishment for politicizing during the Olympics.

In conclusion, the International Olympic Committee has not adhered to the goals outlined in its charter and allowed the

Olympics to be corrupted by nationalist interests, as well as their own financial gain. First, the IOC has failed to promote peace by constantly associating itself with authoritarian governments. Second, The IOC has failed at preserving the integrity of sport against doping. Third, the IOC has failed at preserving political neutrality during the Olympics.

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THEY YASSIFIED THE NIGHT

THE QUEER EXPERIENCE THRIVING FROM DUSK TO SUNRISE

JUSTIN GOBEIL

This essay will address why queer experience and history is closely linked to night studies. When looking at key aspects and events of the individual and communal queer experience, it is easy to see how many of them take place at night, so much so that to not include queerness in night studies would be a missed opportunity. Therefore, this paper will highlight three key elements of queer life that happen at night. First, the new British TV show *Heartstopper* will be analyzed in regard to its accurate portrayal of self-discovery in the queer youth experience. Then, Laura Grantmyre's work on female impersonators in midcentury Pittsburg will be addressed. Finally, police raids of queer spaces in Canada, especially in Montreal and in Toronto, will be analyzed. These three events of self-discovery, community celebration, and fight for equality in the queer context are undeniably part of night studies.

Rooted in the queer experience is a series of self-discoveries. From the first time that someone discovers that they are not interested in what the heteronormative society has pushed them to like since they were children up until they figure out what their sexuality is, they will live a series of experiences that will help them in this self-discovery journey. Although different from person to person, this journey still has some similarities, especially considering its confidentiality. Since publicly affirming that someone is doubting their sexuality could bring in its load of complications and problems (bullying, bad reaction from family, colleagues and peers, safety issues to only name a few), this process of deconstructing this imposed sexuality or gender identity is, therefore, lonely and hidden. The new TV series *Heartstopper* released on Netflix in April 2022 perfectly illustrates this. Based on the critically acclaimed graphic novels by Alice Oseman, the show was praised for its accurate representation of today's queer youth experience and to finally put on the screen a queer story that is not solely a coming-out story or one depicting queer life in a sad or negative way. The series follows Nick Nelson (Kit Connor), a very sporty rugby player high schooler and Charlie Spring (Joe Locke), a shy, nerdy high schooler who has been outed one year prior to the events of the show. Charlie quickly starts developing feelings for Nick, despite all of his friends telling him that he is obviously straight.

Meanwhile, Nick, on the other hand, also starts developing something for Charlie, which confuses him. In the very poignant opening scene of episode three¹, Nick gets out of bed to do some internet research about his sexuality. Many web pages can be seen on his screen, from the classic “5 signs that you might be gay” articles to more serious ones about queer discrimination, homophobia, conversion therapy and opposition to marriage equality. Throughout the series, Nick often uses the night as a liminal space where his mom is presumably asleep to stay up and learn more about his bisexuality. For many queer people questioning their sexuality, the peacefulness and sanctity of the night offer a place where long research can be done out of sight and away from societal judgment and pressures to conform. Many other events in Nick’s self-discovery journey take place at night, such as his desire to hold Charlie’s hand or later on, their first kiss. Night is a time that Nick is allowed to be comfortable being himself and discovering this new part of himself.

Although self-identification is crucial, defining your label is only the first step in one’s queer experience. It is of utmost importance to live and celebrate it. Although the LGBTQ+ community now enjoys many privileges and rights, it was not always the case. Many had to hide and were putting themselves in danger by living the way they wanted to. But this

will be addressed at a later point. Let’s be positive first! In “They lived their life and they didn’t bother anybody”: African American Female Impersonators and Pittsburgh’s Hill District, 1920–1960,” Laura Grantmyre makes a case study of a neighbourhood of Pittsburgh, the Hill District, where a lot of female impersonators, and later on, drag queens, could perform and be part of the community. In a well-sourced paper, Grantmyre explains how, through the concept of the “interzone,” which was first brought up by Kevin Mumford, female impersonators, along with other vice factors such as sex workers, were pushed out of city centers and relegated to outside neighbourhoods, primarily inhabited by African Americans. The Hill, with its strong racial and ethnic diversity, revealed itself to be a welcoming environment for the queers and drag queens. As one drag queen performing in the 1960s at the Hill, Connie Dorsett, said: “Everything used to go on in that Hill, so nothing was unusual.”² A resident even said that “they’re your cousins. They’re your brothers, [...], the boys you went to school with.”³ The female impersonators were therefore a part of the community. Although most of them would perform at night, what is interesting with the case of the Hill District is that female impersonators could also be seen in broad daylight. It is interesting that these characters, born into the night, in bars, out of repression, and from a

need to protect themselves, could go out in the alter ego's clothes for their daily activities such as going to the hairdresser, or even be celebrated on a parade float. The safe space of the night in the Hill gave them the opportunity to freely live their queerness.

Although some nights were full of fun and celebrations, others were a bit rougher. Police repression of the queer community was common before the gay liberation movement. The Stonewall raid of 1969 is the event that most people have in mind, but police raids also took place in Canada. In 1976, the Truxx, a popular gay bar in Montreal, was raided by the Montreal Police. It was a "misunderstanding" of the bar as a bawdy house that brought the police. Although Prime Minister Trudeau famously said in 1969 that there is "no place for the state in the bedroom of the nation," the Truxx was not a bedroom: queers were still subject to discrimination in the public sphere. About 150 men were arrested that night simply because they were in a 'bawdy' house. They, along with other clients, were brutalized, verbally harassed and humiliated. Raids often happened at night, not only because they were happening in nightclubs, but also because the night offered the policemen the possibility to be more brutal without bringing in too much attention from the public and the media. Once in prison, they were forced to undress and pass an STI test⁴. This raid, along with many others, was for Mayor Jean Drapeau, a

way to 'clean the city' of vice before the Olympic games came to Montreal. But Montreal was not the only city trying to repress the queer community. In December 1978, the Toronto police raided the Barracks Bathhouse, also under the motive that they were in a bawdy house. The customers were treated in a similar way to in Montreal, this was the standard for police raids of queer spaces. One thing that is important to understand is that by attacking the bars and clubs, the police were attacking one of the few places that the LGBTQ+ community could live their queerness, since they could still not be out in public. It also explains why just like Stonewall in 1969, following the raids, gays, lesbian and other members of the queer community would unite to either fight back in the form of a riot, foster the community, or demand more equality on the government level. In Toronto, following the Barracks raid, gay businessmen and gay activists, got together, and turned what was the Toronto Gay ghetto into a commercial and safe space for the community⁵. In Montreal, following the raid, the *Association des Gaies* protested in the streets, so the Lévesque Government intervened. The progressive government (also motivated to protect two members of the cabinet that risked being outed if they ever were found in a bar during those raids) added in November 'sexual orientation' to the list of illegal motives to discriminate in the Quebec *Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms*⁶. It is as a

result of being attacked in their safe nighttime spaces, the queer community fought back to protect their rights to exist as queer people.

In conclusion, it is undeniable that the queer experience is tightly tied to the study of the night. This was explained through three clear examples that proves that the night plays a vital part in queer life, either by providing a safe space fit for self-discoveries and learning, or by being a time where the community comes as a whole to live and celebrate their queerness. The night also played an interesting role historically for the LGBTQ+ community. Many bars, nightclubs and bathhouses were raided at night by police forces, in order to repress the community. Instead, these attacks were met with riots, protests and political actions from a united community that had enough of being marginalized and demanded more equality. Many other key elements of queer life happening at night could have been deployed, such as the first sexual relationship, the significance of cruising spots (and their repression by local authorities), and the emergence of queer spaces such as bars or the hookup culture that are particularly present in the community. However, running out of lines to explain in great details all of these only further highlights this point: the Queer history is a history in its own right, but also intricately tied with night studies.

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BLOODTHIRSTY, *BUT* SUPPORTIVE PIRATE WIVES

MICHAEL CARRIER

The portrayal of the Golden Age of Piracy in the media often involves gender fluidity. That women in the 18th century rejected gender norms by boarding pirate ships is a widely accepted fact. An example of this is the cross-dressing of famous female pirates, Anne Bonny and Mary Read. Thus, should we expect the blurring of gender roles in other aspects of pirate life? Did other female pirates cross-dress, or were the aforementioned an anomaly? Through the examination of women's histories in piracy during the early 18th century, evidence may come to light of them in fact following their gender roles and any examples of gender fluidity might be a coincidence.

Scholarship tends to point to the age of piracy as a chance for those to abandon the status quo. Those at sea rejected typical laws and rules that were assumed on land. Crews did not conform to only one nationality or race, and did not follow a hierarchy expected during the era. Members on board were seen as equal,

including those who were former slaves, at times. Thus, the accounts of female pirates dressing as men fit neatly in this narrative. In Christina Mae Hernandez' 'Forging an Iron Woman,' She sees gender as one of the many social constructs that become flexible when out at sea. Hernandez stated the 'open ships allowed for equally shifting identities of the men and women.'¹ Other scholars, like Nicolae Bobaru, credit this understanding to the influence of the collection of biographies in 'A General History of the Pyrates,' written in 1725.² As the book does have plenty of confirmed facts, certain parts might be written with a poetic license. To get a clearer picture of the behavior taking place on these pirate ships, such as cross-dressing, we need to examine sources that had not been romanticized like the book 'A General History of the Pyrates.'

To have a complete understanding of women in piracy, it is necessary to compare how often the gender norms were strayed from to the frequency with which it was followed in accordance with the early 18th century' viewpoint. Some accounts of female pirates from this era demonstrate they never cross-dressed, engaged in battle, nor expressed any other types of masculine-assumed behaviour. Pirates like Mary Farley, Rachel Wall, and Ingela Gatenhielm, joined their husbands at sea.³ Would not

the fact that they followed their husbands fit better the gender role that was expected of their time? Is it possible that Anne Bonny and Mary Read are the exceptions rather than examples of a norm? In their biographies, many examples can be found of cross-dressing even before their pirate days. Mary Read's mother had her dress as a boy to impersonate her brother who died at a young age. Anne Bonny's father dressed her as a boy at a young age as well, to avoid revealing he had an illegitimate daughter.⁴ The fact that both of these pirates had a cross-dressing past proves that the world of piracy was not the underlying cause. It is true that these women did play large masculine roles, like captaining a ship, or leading a fight, but it might be rarer than it is portrayed. After collecting the data of all women in piracy during the Golden Age of Piracy, and comparing the total number of gender role-breaking acts, it might tell a different story.

What first needs to be established is the gender norms of the early 18th century: Reasons a woman would be on a ship, how rare it was, what tasks they performed on board. Then, by examining public records, like depositions, indictments, and trial proceedings, the individual actions of each woman pirate can be pieced together. The knowledge of what crimes they were tried for, what witnesses said about them, and what these pirates said in their defense, their genuine disposition will be revealed. It is

important to clarify what role they played in the piracy, on a scale from complicit with the crime to being the main culprit. These particular women could have married their husbands before a life of crime, and then later got dragged into it. If they stayed with their husbands due to love, or to be supportive in their endeavours, this potentially points to them fulfilling their traditional duties as a wife.

A possibly good example of this, ironically, is Anne Bonny, who had a romantic relationship with the Captain of their ship, Jack Rackham. Her account, at first sight, does seem to fit the idea of gender fluidity. She dressed as a man, she was assertive, she gave orders, and she showed readiness to fight even when on her own.⁴ Even so, she only became a pirate when she started her relationship with Jack Rackham. Anne Bonny might have been the one wearing the pants (pun intended), but she did this as the captain's wife, as a supportive person. This is why it is important to scrutinize the raw data, and avoid modern pop culture, to see if these women pirates were trying to break gender norms on their own volition, or if it was a consequence of them following their husbands in this dangerous life.

The research will definitely show many examples of non traditional gender behaviour, even outside Anne Bonny and Mary Read. What will be important to do is recognize the entire context before

pinning it as a fact of the pirate world. Just as these two famous pirates have a history of cross-dressing before they became pirates, maybe other female pirates will have a history of breaking gender norms before they sailed under the Jolly Roger. We need to determine whether individuals who identify as gender-fluid are more likely to be attracted to the pirate lifestyle, or if the pirate lifestyle tends to result in a greater expression of gender-fluidity. Witnesses describing their surprise that there were women on a ship might make it sound rare, but is their opinion accurate? How rare was it for a woman to be on a ship? If they were seen fighting, was it for the sake of survival than that of expressing masculinity? Was cross-dressing simply a way to deter unwanted male attention in a male dominant environment? It will be necessary to analyze the witness accounts with a grain of salt and keep in mind their own opinion might influence their testimonies, just as 'A History of the Pyrates' influenced this already easily mystified topic. A good example of this is what Dorothy Thomas said when she retells her story of meeting Anne Bonny and Mary Read. Thomas confirmed that they were dressed as men, but she knew they were women for the "largeness of their breasts." She also shared that "they wore men's clothes and at some times, women's clothes."⁵ Testimonies like these shed light on the magnitude. The fact that they did not conceal their gender with a complete effort, and that they

sometimes wore women's clothes, tells a different story than that of women breaking gender norms.

As much fun as it is to see Geena Davis star in a swashbuckling film, it might not accurately depict women in the early 18th century. Even if the politics of ships out at sea might have permitted gender-fluidity, it might not be the main reason why these women were on board. By examining the public records, like the trial proceedings, and witness testimonies, we can piece together the individual stories of these female pirates. From there, we can figure out if they were seeking to break gender norms, done so with liberty of the pirate ship environment, or if they actually had traditional goals in mind. I expect to find many stories that will resemble a conscientious effort to be masculine, but it will be viewed in the entire context of the person's history, and not assume pirate life to be the determining factor.

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VAMPIRIC MANCHU- IZATION

DEVELOPMENT OF QING VISUAL TRAITS IN JIANGSHI MEDIA POST-QING DYNASTY

KIERAN MICARI-LAWLESS

Vampire media's explosion over the past century has disseminated originally Slavic and Eastern European notions of "the vampire," and cemented it into Western culture's contemporary mythos. The root of the most popular vampire movies, like *Nosferatu* (1922), *Dracula* (1931) and *Twilight* (2008), is the vast repository of Central and Eastern European oral histories that make up our modern conception of "the vampire."

With a cultural lens that recognizes a vampire by its traditionally Slavic characteristics, Westerners have characterized many other global mythical creatures as vampires that share characteristics with figures like Dracula. A 2017 article published by the travel company Culture Trip entitled "How Do Vampires Differ Around the World?" exemplifies this trend, categorizing creatures like the Indian *Brahmaparusha*, the Mesoamerican *Chorti* and the

Chinese *Jiangshi* as vampires¹. The last of these three is widely known in the West as the "Chinese hopping vampire," – a quick Google search of the term *Jiangshi* brings up images like these two:



These *Jiangshi*⁴, or "stiff corpses," are most often described as individuals who

have been raised from the dead and prey upon the living⁵. Interestingly, however, a hallmark of visual depictions of *Jiangshi* is the attire of a Qing Dynasty official, with a Manchu-style hairstyle, a *qingdai guanmao*⁶ (a Manchu bowl-shaped hat) and a *changshan*⁷ (Manchu official robes). However, this trait is not reflected in the source literature that establishes the *Jiangshi* as a mythical creature. As Katarzyna Ancuta writes in "From Revenants to Vampires: The Transmedia Evolution of The *Jiangshi*," "Despite the cinematic tradition of dressing the *jiangshi* in the robes worn by Qing Dynasty officials, the corpses in Yuan Mei's stories [some of the first mentions of *jiangshi*] wear all kinds of clothing."⁸ Thus, the *jiangshi*'s depiction as a Manchu/Qing official reflects a later development in the narrative of the creature⁹. In this paper, I will attempt to bridge the gap between original source material regarding the *jiangshi* and more contemporary depictions that employ Manchu visual traits by tracing the history of anti-Manchu sentiment in China, and thus demonstrating a strong undercurrent of historical ethnic conflict in the propagation of the contemporary image of the *jiangshi*.

Folkloric monsters reflect broadly accepted societal fears and ideologies within the context of their respective

cultures. Medieval Europe's conception of incubi and succubi, for example, reflects Christendom's sexually repressive culture as well as misogyny and fear of the possibility of female insubordination. Godzilla embodied Japan's newly legitimized terror at the prospect of nuclear warfare post-WWII, and the Homeric sirens exemplify male fear of powerful women with the idea that an archetypical seductress could manipulate and overcome an otherwise powerful man. However, it is not simply the monsters themselves that reflect broader societal fears and ideologies, but also the manner in which they develop.

Take, for example, Bram Stoker's *Dracula*. Due to the endeavours of Hollywood cinema, the *Dracula* we might envision today is quite removed from his character in Stoker's original novel. Originally, *Dracula*'s character is quite clearly based on antisemitic stereotypes popular during the turn of the century in the United States and Great Britain. As Peter Dan describes in his article "How Vampires Became Jewish"¹⁰, Bram Stoker incorporated physical characteristics associated with antisemitic perspectives of Jewish people at the time. *Dracula*'s long nose, pale complexion, and short fingers were all hallmarks of much of the West's view of Jews at the time. During the era in which Stoker's novel was written, Eastern European and Jewish immigration to the United States and

Britain skyrocketed, bolstering prejudicial attitudes towards said newcomers. More recent Jewish immigrants were often considered dirty or rat-like, a trait exemplified in Dracula's foul-smelling home and rat infestations. Additionally, Jewish people who were well-off often found themselves characterized by the broader population as greedy or money-grubbing, siphoning off others' earnings for themselves¹¹; these characteristics are also demonstrated in Dracula, as the titular character is wealthy and literally sucks the life from his victims, mirroring the prejudiced view that the Jewish population is fundamentally greedy and thieving. Dan writes, "One can draw many parallels between the antisemitic stereotype of the Jew and the image of the vampire: both are parasitic and drain the life force out of the host – in the case of the vampire the victim and in the case of the Jews an unwitting nation."¹²

As societies have evolved since the turn of the century, however, the vampire has evolved alongside them. And while retaining some of the less savoury characteristics of the literary Dracula or vampire more broadly, it has adopted numerous traits that veer away from a specifically antisemitic image. With the advent of more contemporary vampire media, the vampire today is not limited to a specific set of traits. Rather, vampires have permeated multiple facets of the culture, with their depictions ranging from glistening and noble individuals in *Twilight* to comedic buffoons in *What We*

Do in The Shadows to the "sexy vampire" costumes one might find at a Halloween store.

In contrast to this broader trend of Western vampires' shift from an ethnic mascot to a more human and relatable figure, the Jiangshi seems almost to have developed in reverse. Originally a more generalized character, the creature has since become most easily identifiable by specific sartorial ethnic markers: those of Manchu nobility during the Qing Dynasty.

Some of the earliest mentions of jiangshi can be found in Yuan Mei's *Zibuyu*, published in 1788. An anthology of anecdotes surrounding ghosts and mythical creatures, *Zibuyu* contains various different descriptions of the jiangshi, none of which coincide with contemporary Manchu visual characteristics of the creature. In fact, one jiangshi is described as being dressed in Tang Dynasty fashion. Another describes the "stiff corpse" as a man with withered, sunken black skin, wearing paper money folded in the shape of silver ingots, a common grave good. Two other stories tell of stiff corpses being covered in white hair, one of which also describes the creature as possessing bright green pupils.¹³ In fact, one of the first Western documentations of Chinese mythology and folk religion, J.J. M. Van de Groot's 1892 book *The Religious System of China*, mentions the jiangshi in a similar manner:

“In China a vampire generally breaks out of its coffin during the night, as the powers of evil spectres are paralysed by daylight ... Its body is said to be covered all over with long white hair, and its nails are exceedingly long, which reminds us of a belief, also prevalent amongst Europeans, that the hair and nails continue to grow after death.”¹⁴

None of these creatures possess the modern ethnic markers of the modern jiangshi. Where, then, did the modern conception of Jiangshi as Qing/Manchu nobility come from? While scholarly research in this area is lacking, popular theories abound on the Internet. Several Quora submissions, for instance, postulate that film studios in Hong Kong (the principal source of Jiangshi films) simply had low budgets and a surplus of Qing Dynasty costumes. Another ridicules the previous idea and states that during the Qing Dynasty, people simply wanted to be buried in lavish clothing. Yet another argues that Qing-era rituals intended to commune with and control the dead are to blame for this specific dynastic depiction of jiangshi¹⁵.

While these online claims are spurious,, another popular media website, TVtropes.org, offers perhaps a more compelling argument: that jiangshi are depicted in Qing-style robes because of Qing Dynasty resentment towards the Manchu ruling minority¹⁶. I found this assertion, while on the face of it

simplistic, particularly interesting. Specifically, this idea (whether purposefully or not) employs a methodology especially conducive to the study of history and culture: that is, looking at monsters as living representations of societal fears, norms and ideologies. It's certainly likely that the Manchu depiction of jiangshi is the result of ethnic conflict during the Qing Dynasty; anti-Manchu racism helped to fuel popular uprisings, like the Boxer Rebellion, around the turn of the century¹⁷.

Still, this thesis neglects the fact that much, if not all, of the original source material surrounding the Jiangshi – which first appeared in literature during the Qing Dynasty – does not employ Qing/Manchu-style garments as a visual hallmark. The fact that this depiction has persisted in the media today is also not examined. By the time most films featuring Jiangshi came out, popularizing their visual depiction, the Communist Party had already ruled China for decades. The image of a jiangshi as a Manchu noble has persisted for over a century after the fall of the Qing Dynasty.

Historiographically, I've found inquiry into this subject quite difficult. As mentioned before, research around jiangshi is scarce, and much more so in relation to their dress. Additionally, I am limited by lack of access to, and ability to understand, many Chinese-owned and

Chinese language sources, rendering my research challenging and often unfruitful. Nonetheless, the information I was able to gather supports a different explanation for the persistence of the seemingly outdated ethnic caricature: persistent Han nationalism in contemporary China.

Ishihawa Yoshihiro writes in his analysis of the development of social science in China, “... anthropology in modern China which was initially expected to play a political role, in its subsequent development could not break away from a sense of the superiority of the Han Chinese over other minority nationalities including the Manchus.¹⁸” China, from the turn of the 20th century to the contemporary era, has retained a strong tradition of Han nationalism. This is not to say that the people of China are prejudicial; rather, undercurrents of Han supremacism have permeated cultural and political institutions in the country, in a manner perhaps comparable to anti-black racism and white nationalism in the United States.

Kevin Carrico, in describing a conversation with a blue-collar worker in Shandong Province, notes the man’s unapologetic support for racial/ethnic hierarchy in China, explaining, “That’s what we want to do— promote Han racial nationalism.¹⁹”

Xi Jinping, the long-serving current president of China, a fervent Han

nationalist, has implemented numerous legal ethnic reforms in the past decade. for instance including 56 Chinese ethnic groups into the official “Han” ethnicity, and enforcing Han culture-based education reforms over alternative ethnic practices. Harsher Han nationalism has also recently led to widespread ethnic violence and suppression, namely against the Muslim-majority Uighur people of Xianjiang.²⁰ The 20th century also witnessed the advent of state-sponsored cultural exoticism or romanticism in the context of Chinese ethnic minorities. For instance, as one Chinese studies professor opines, “[China] has feminized ethnic minorities to show the superiority of Han culture.²¹” Rather than overtly stating that minority ethnic groups are somehow inferior to the Han, much of Chinese media and politics have relied on a much more culturally-based campaign of “Han-washing” propaganda (as well, of course, as covert and often violent ethnic suppression under the guise of “re-education²²”).

Thus, via the methodology that views folkloric monsters as a manifestation of real-world societal values and fears, the persistence and prevalence of depicting the jiangshi as Manchu (and therefore a Chinese ethnic minority) can be explained through equally persistent, if not growing, Han nationalism in China. Specifically, China’s ongoing and increasingly frequent practice of bolstering the Han reputation through cultural propaganda parallels the popularization of the jiangshi as a

negative non-Han ethnic caricature. Similarly to the inclusion of Jewish stereotypes among Western vampires, the jiangshi as a Manchu correlates with continued, if not increasing, Han nationalism and prejudice towards Chinese ethnic minorities. As China, along with the world, develops, this characterization may change—after all, societal values and conventions are fundamentally in flux.

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