Volume 3,
Number 2 (July 2006)
The Principle of Reversal
Hsiang (Kevin)
Hsu
(Doctoral
Student, European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland).
In the crystalline eye of the bird
sitting crowned on the steeple,
With stealth he retraces his steps
and effaces them all.1
I. Principles and Paradigms
Theoretico-empirical
failure of thoughts of difference to seize or want to master
opposition without reducing it to itself, or diffident insurgency of
the one from more-than-one rather than its trailing the later, calls
for something that does not divagate in vicarious sociality/guilt,
lecture on naïve dialectics or yearn for postmortem systematicity. A
contemporary genus of “redescriptors” (and predescriptors) dare to
ask whether totality still exists and dissemble theories in return
for phenomena: either conditions must expand or theories must
change. It is my hope that the theories of Jean Baudrillard are an
antidote to the cant of subjective critique. This paper attempts
more a “redescription” of Baudrillard’s theories and claims nothing
more or (it is hoped) less.
To define reversal in
its hypothetical status delimits its operant function in immanently
constructed paradigms (philosophy, poetry, cinema, photography). To
articulate an hypothesis or principle in a paradigm (“Baudrillard”)
or nested paradigms, effects a silence. Dual signification denoting
presence and connoting absence – the ascendance of the example to
its excepted ineffability – intelligible and unintelligible,
knowable and unknowable. Here and now a frame’s tacit self-testament
between the intractable and the specular.
II. Baudrillard or A “Theory”
A photograph is a
monograph, indifferently obsessive and poignantly obscene. Roland
Barthes invoked Sartre: “In the image… the object yields itself
wholly. …I can say nothing about this photograph”.2
Meaning and judgment do not occur in elision or suspension but
“fascination” as superfluous signification, which signifies
imperially something like a death of romance (“Love’s a bluff!”).3
An absolute light – photographic in the literal sense – demanding
not to be looked at, but rather, that we close our eyes to it and
the inner darkness it enfolds.4
Montaigne once said to
philosophize is to learn how to die, and it is not surprising he
reversed his thesis.5
Fascination of death, “reversion of death”.6
The unbinding of energies is,
however, the very form of the current system, which consists in a
strategic drift of value ...For the system is master: like God it
can bind or unbind energies; what it is incapable of (and what it
can no longer avoid) is reversibility.7
This is the beginning, contraption
and conception, of reversal. Death. What is at stake is
reversibility of reversibility (“reversality”8),
a single reversal itself. To learn how to die is to follow death, to
death.
Jean Baudrillard’s
“theory” is the surreptitious parade. “Theory” is most imperial,
sans multitude, so annihilates itself, signifying duplicity. For
this duplicity it appears interchangeable with thought. Lyotard
countersigned:
Why can’t he see that the whole
problematic of the gift and symbolic exchange, as he receives it
from Mauss, with or without the deflections of Bataille, Caillois
and Lacan, pertains completely to imperialism and Western racism –
that is the good savage of ethnology, slightly libidinalized, whom
he inherits with the concept?9
The problem with libido is exactly
it is never libidinal – only lascivious, maybe. Here the good savage
“puts on” again and again, incapable of giving in return. Libidinal
economics is the anticlimax of difference, secondary or incidental
imperialism. It does not supersede reversal. It only reverses it.
This is the first lesson of Baudrillard’s symbolic theory.
The second and perhaps
prima facie exposition is inaugurated by the move to spectacle. The
most epigrammatic (perhaps summary) critique to date of this theory
is Jean-Luc Nancy’s, which traces the move10:
it is not really (and cannot be) a critique of Baudrillard but
rather of theoria via rent of praxis
(sense-signification or signal-sign11.
Again neither praxis nor system supersedes reversal. Both
precede and phenomenalize (“signal” or “signify”) it. This leads to
the principle of exchange.
The principle is not at
all primary, nor inexchangeable, merely inexorable. Baudrillard:
We must see that the symbolic
processes (reversibility, anagrammatic dispersal, reabsorption
without residue) are not at all mixed up with the primary processes
(displacement, condensation, repression). They are mutually opposed,
even if together they are opposed to the logical discourse of
meaning ...A radical theory can be based neither on their [Marxism
and psychoanalysis’] ‘synthesis’ nor on their contamination, but
only on their respective ex-termination’.12
Symbolic processes are degree zero
(of) primary and secondary processes: they are kept by their
impossibility (hence reversal of symbolic exchange in Impossible
Exchange – things cannot be exchanged because they change and
interchange: exchange never takes place because it is always already
taking place); primary and secondary processes only confuse things:
“to take the side of the primary process is still a consequence of
secondary processes”.13
Exchange can only be symbolic: reversal of impossibility.
Symbolic processes do
not play secondary processes off against primary ones: they are
their abolition. Similarly Giorgio Agamben says, “For an intention
to refer to itself and not to an object, it must exhaust itself
neither in the pure absence of an intentum nor in its presence”,14
which one could augment: for an intention to refer to itself and
to an object, it must exhaust itself in either the pure
presence of the object or its absence. One could also say
this is the nothing that haunts (all) nothing. Only it does not
irrupt but reverses.
One sees the other
extreme, reduction of “the radical theory of ambivalence to a theory
of intertextuality and the ‘plurality of codes’”.15
Baudrillard: “There is no materialist reference in the symbolic
operation, not even an ‘unconscious’ one: rather there is the
operation of an ‘anti-matter’”.16
Finally “radical ambivalence [symbolic exchange] is non-valence
[impossible exchange]”.17
“Radical” non-valence is bivalence (exchange “proper”) again in the
actualization of codes.
And in a physical
sense: reversal is not metaphysics’ scion (good “versus” evil).
“...[W]hat science senses now ...is
...a possible reversibility of physical laws ...not some
ultra-formula or meta-equation of the universe (which the theory of
relativity was ...not only particles into anti-particles, matter
into anti-matter, but the laws themselves)”.18
This is also what Baudrillard means
by “everything is seduction, and nothing but seduction”19
– pure “physical” status, whether of objects, appearances or any
intermediary vocation or lot. One thus finds the grace to enter that
state of concrete difference, the state of reversality.
III. First Order or Reversals
Une transparence en verre
dépoli.20
In the currency of difference is
not indifference maximized and exhausted in circulus?21
The ultimate lesson of theoria: annihilate difference, reduce
difference to itself. Return of concrete difference – even to
difference itself.
The order of concrete
difference contains and sets up reversals. This first order is the
primal (“symbolic”) order of reversality and primality of the order
of reversals, which contain primal concrete difference. This is
difference itself: nothing is outside or inside it, only itself –
not a void but transcendental emptiness contained in nothing. Only
then reversals “take over”. Contrast Deleuze’s difference in
itself:
...[I]s it not rather the only
extreme, the only moment...? The difference ‘between’ two things is
only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only
extrinsic. However, imagine something which distinguishes itself –
and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish
itself from it ...Difference is this state in which determination
takes the form of unilateral distinction.22
Deleuze wished to tame the cruel
monster into a docile companion or invoke, bring out and to
surface, the “animal-self” always already teras. Again
secondary or incidental imperialism: “[d]ifference must leave its
cave and cease to be a monster; or at least only that which escapes
at the propitious moment must persist as a monster, that which
constitutes only a bad encounter, a bad occasion”.23
This is the primal concrete difference, indissoluble for all
it is worth: pet (domestication) and monster (interiorization) not
imminently reversible but immediately reversed. Reversal is the only
extreme and engenders infinite oppositions.24
It is true, as Deleuze
pointed out, “[i]t is not difference which presupposes opposition
but opposition which presupposes difference”.25
What it presupposes – “a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free,
wild or untamed differences” of “the original, intensive depth which
is the matrix of the entire space and the first affirmation of
difference”26
– is primal concrete difference – difference, which cannot be
represented qua representation, for it must be contained,
suppressed, mercantilized, by differences, concrete differences in
general (“[d]ifference must be shown differing”).27
It is this paradoxical limit, limit of all limits, the liminal,
which gives itself to opposition. The “epiphenomenon” of
opposition, reversal, has so re-turned to difference, returning
it, returning difference to itself and itself to itself.
Opposition absolves difference, meanwhile reabsorbing itself without
trace by letting itself be dissolved in difference, which always
already “engenders” oppositions, the first-born being concrete
difference, zero-opposition. Reversal rises from and against
difference and always already wins “over” it via the double agent of
exchange and opposition.
Contrast Jacques
Derrida’s différance:
First, différance refers to
the (active and passive) movement that consists in deferring by
means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour,
postponement, reserving ...Second, the movement of différance,
as that which produces different things, that which differentiates,
is the common root of all oppositional concepts that mark our
language, such as, to take only a few examples,
sensible/intelligent, intuition/signification, nature/culture, etc.
…Third, différance is also the production, if it can still be
put this way, of these differences, of the diacriticity that the
linguistics generated by Saussure, and all the structural sciences
modeled upon it, have recalled as the condition for any
signification and any structure ...From this point of view, the
concept of différance is neither simply structuralist, nor
simply geneticist, such an alternative itself being an ‘effect’ of
différance.28
“Différance is the non-full,
non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences.
Thus, the name ‘origin’ no longer suits it”.29
Différance is not “play” of difference (this would be too big
an investment, too vulgar a stake) but absconding to indifference –
concealment.30
Nancy’s nice metaphor:
The coming is infinite
...the inconclusiveness of its coming – and of the ‘going’ that
corresponds to that coming ...The coming (but is there ‘the’
coming, and not rather a ‘to come’ that comes without allowing of
substantialization?) demands something else, and no doubt, first of
all, a letting-come and a letting-overcome, an aptitude (necessarily
inapt) for the surprising of sense, and also for its letting-go.31
“Surprising”, never calculation or
calculus (if such a totally inapt one) – no matter how (much) one
“plays” there is never surprise, for even its most apt stand-in,
chance, is calculated into the game. A romantic notion,
différance. Agamben again:
Nevertheless, it would be the worst
misunderstanding of Derrida’s gesture to think that it could be
exhausted in a deconstructive use of philosophical terms that would
simply consign them to an infinite wandering or interpretation
...Derrida enters into the Paradise of language, where terms touch
their limits. And ...he ‘cuts the branches’; he experiences the
exile of terminology, its paradoxical subsistence in the isolation
of all univocal reference.32
It would indeed be the worst
misunderstanding of différance to think that it could
be exhausted in play; it is always already exhausted in it. It is
always too full or empty (or not full or empty enough). He
continues:
[T]he apparent aporias ...instead
express the complexity of the messianic task that is allegorized in
...[them] ...The concept ‘trace’ is not a concept (just as
‘the name différance is not a name’) ...Grammatology was
forced to become deconstruction in order to avoid this paradox (or,
more precisely, to seek to dwell in it correctly) ...The
experimentum linguae that is at issue in grammatological
terminology does not (as a common misunderstanding insists)
authorize an interpretative practice directed toward the infinite
deconstruction of a text, nor does it inaugurate a new formalism.
Rather, it marks the decisive event of matter, and in doing so it
opens onto an ethics.33
Différance
is neither deferral nor deferral of
deferral but immediate referral; neither coming nor coming of coming
but cyclic becoming; neither name nor name of name but immanent
nomenclature; neither matter nor matter of matter but anti-matter;
neither ethics nor ethics of ethics but conscienceless guilt. In
“opening onto” it is subject to reversal: “[o]ne cannot say ‘Here
are our monsters’ without immediately turning them into pets”.34
Baudrillard warns:
But take care! Out of this private
and asocial universe, which does not enter into a dialectic of
representation and of transcendence towards the universal, out of
this involutive sphere which is opposed to all revolution from the
top and refuses to play the game, some would like to make a new
source of revolutionary energy (in particular in its sexual and
desire version). They would like to give it meaning and to reinstate
it in its very banality, as historical negativity. Exaltation of
micro-desires, small differences, unconscious practices, anonymous
marginalities. Final somersault of the intellectuals to exalt
insignificance, to promote non-sense into the order of sense. And to
transfer it back to political reason. Banality, inertia, apoliticism
used to be fascist; they are in the process of becoming
revolutionary – without changing meaning, without ceasing to have
meaning. Micro-revolution of banality, transpolitics of desire – one
more trick of the ‘liberationists’. The denial of meaning has no
meaning.35
The denial is the first step to
invest nihilism as a fresh face of totality (nihilism seems to have
fulfilled its promise just making itself over ex nihilo):
As we know, the effect of force is
always the effect of repression, as the effect of reality is always
the effect of the imaginary. We must write the ‘Mirror of Desire’ as
we have written The Mirror of Production.36
However it is not enough reversals
detour by way of the signifier (negativity “is not” nothing); they
must absolve and resolve both signifier and signified, dissolving
linearity in all forms, except the linear,
...dead-end of difference. The
problem of difference is insoluble, for the simple reason that the
terms involved are not different but incomparable. The terms we are
used to setting in opposition to each other are quite simply
incompatible, which means that difference has no meaning ...This
goes for all traditional oppositions ...They are not on the same
plane, and it is an illusion to oppose them ...The whole effort will
be to reduce this antagonistic principle, this incompatibility, to a
mere difference, to a well-tempered play of opposition ...All that
seeks to be singular and incomparable, and does not enter into the
play of difference, must be exterminated.37
Thus reversal is extreme planarity.38
As for causality, “...it is not indeterminacy that is opposed to
causality, but obligation. The latter is neither a linear chain,
nor an unchaining ...it forms a reversible chain”.39
On seduction:
...seduction is more intelligible
than love...it operates at the level of a higher form, a dual form,
a perfect differential form. Sex, of all differential forms, is the
one where difference matters least ...It is not the dual form of
seduction that is mysterious, it is, rather, the individual figure
of the subject tracked by his own desire or in quest of his own
image.40
Seduction does not begin with
distance but immediacy or fascination. It is not de-severance.
Rather it throws around signs of distance, its non-constitution.
This is how it challenges and forecloses production and vacates
ontology, instituting iconology. Reverence. Enigma of the one.
Chung-tze: “Division is the same as creation; creation is the same
as destruction”.
IV. Second order or Reversal of
logic
Indifference:
The indifference of time ...space
...political indifference ...sexual indifference ...The individual’s
indifference to himself and to others is a mirror-image of all these
other kinds of indifference: it results from ...the subject’s being
inscribed in the order of identity, which is a product,
paradoxically, of the demand he be different from himself and from
others ...For this identitary individual lives on the hymning and
hallucinating of difference, employing to that end all the devices
for simulating the other. He is the first victim of that
psychological and philosophical theory of difference which, in all
spheres, ends in indifference to oneself and others ...We have
conquered otherness with difference and, in its turn, difference has
succumbed to the logic of the same and of indifference.41
As indifference is not different
from difference, reversal does not denounce difference; rather it
renounces it. It exhausts primacy and sovereignty of difference,
that is primacy of primacy, and gives it up to symbolic primal order
(as it must). As epiphenomenon it can adopt and adapt difference,
arrogate it as difference founds and is “useless” without it.
Indifference (objective not subjective) is re-nunciation and
reversal of difference. The recollected go forth to lives of
renunciation.
Jean-Pierre Faye’s
Langages totalitaires shows the immanent fear of total
renunciation beneath and amid all “oscillations”, that words have
themselves withdrawn from history, the world, even language: there
is nothing to renounce.42
“Prosodie du
récit, et de l’histoire même. Prosodie qui n’est pas «fixe»:
prosodie oscillante.
Qui annonce et apporte la mort, ici”.43
Confluence of totality
and totalitarianism: Faye seems to echo on the other side of Laozi’s
admonition (“Use words sparingly, then all things will fall into
place”) when he says, “[L]e langage est le plus
dangereux de tous les biens.
A travers lui, ici, le
danger de l’histoire peut
se voir”.44 Words are talismans, animals or
science. Oxymoron of sacred means. They are even revered and
resented in Eastern thought: “Language should be intelligible and
nothing more”.45
The reverse nature of language seems to be that of the world, become
perverse in politics, naive in philosophical thought: “[t]he poetic
is precisely the mutual volatilization of the status of thing
and discourse”.46
Jean Hyppolite said in
an outline of Hegel,
Nature and history are the
presentation of the Absolute in space and time, but this Absolute
thinks itself as the Logos; it knows itself. This Logos
is not a divine understanding which would exist somewhere else in
another world. It is the light of Being in human reality.47
But he then stated, “The ground of
self-consciousness is what, in nature, presents itself as
disappearance and death ...By apprehending death, man becomes the
supreme abstraction which was nature’s interiority, its
nothingness...” [emphasis added].48
Heuristic reversal, reverse heuristics, of epiphenomenon. “[A]nimals
die but know nothing of it”, same fate of god.49
“Immanence is complete” is nostalgic;50
logic becomes illogic, anti-logic, non-logic. Pure nostalgia Michel
Foucault foresaw: “[O]ur anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his
tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands,
motionless, waiting for us”.51
The closer one escapes the further he is sequestered, and Hyppolite
foreclosed Hegel, a gesture philosophers of difference would
rehearse and reverse (indeed reserve – logic of reserve?)
undecidedly in yearning and boredom. Schopenhauer: “Only those who
have been handed over to boredom are not pressed and plagued by
time”.52
May it not be necessary to replace logics of being, essence and
concept or sense with logic of reversal?
Do not be troubled by the fact that
languages ...consist only of orders. If you want to say that this
shows them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is
complete; whether it was before the symbolism of chemistry and the
notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated into it;
for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language.53
The necessary condition
of incompleteness makes possible supra-lapsus of completion.
Completion and incompletion are only orders. Wittgenstein: “That
philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea
of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the
idea of a language more primitive than ours”.54
He continued: “If language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this
may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not
do so.”55
Reversal of logic (in order) does not abolish logic if logic
reverses abolition (collapse of levels of reference). Is this
immanence? One is reminded of Louis Hjelmslev’s thesis: “Here
language is a means to a transcendent knowledge”.56
Abolition and immanence (“here”) are possible only in transcendence
(confluent with ascendancy) via language in reverse form.57
Logic and logion, logos, reverse logos, reversed by
logos, logic that is reversal, illogic, anti-logic, non-logic.
For all its metaleptic
bouts and discomfiting formalisms, peregrinations and pilgrimages,
linguistics has as its object non-language. Likewise reversal has as
its object nothing. One must upgrade the banality “There is no
metalanguage” to (because) “There is no language”. “Speaking” of
reversal founds reversibility (epistemic and epidemic of reversal).
In this sense it makes no sense to say x is a, y
is b et cetera except such a equals a', and
a' equals b or b equals -a, as preempted
play on the game board. There is no truth, only “very true”; further
it makes no sense to say x is quite beautiful, y is
extremely ugly – there is one extreme by definition. All logic
spires for the horizon.
Series of thought have
multiplied curves to delimit or trace the other side only to signify
the horizon. By a turn, be it dialectic (in the original use of the
word, as Gaston Bachelard’s philosophy of no),58
disastrous (catastrophe, Georges Bataille’s nonknowledge)59
or determined (recently François Laruelle’s non-philosophy),60
strains of thought have favored reversal and its reversal. They
surrogated antithesis, excess, “Stranger”,61
overlooking in reversal of logic the simple logic of reversal. They
are as Elias Canetti said “reversal crowds”, “...whose discharge
consists mainly in...[their] collective deliverance from the stings
of command...”.62
Baudrillard pushes
everything to the extreme: what is reversed is reversible; what is
reversible is reversed.
The hypothesis of this
reversibility has always been affirmed by the great metaphysical
systems. It is the fundamental rule of the game of appearance, of
the metamorphosis of appearances, against the irreversible order of
time, of law and meaning.63
It must be a fact of style.
“Reversal” must be metaphor, which ironically carries nothing,
educes nothing but an entropic abyss beneath two things.
Until now reversibility has in
effect remained metaphysical...But it may now be in the process of
disturbing the physical order and shaking it to its foundations.
With it disappears the rational principle that prevents the effect
from turning back on the cause to cancel it out; it prevents the
effect from being the cancellation of the cause – or prevents there
never having been causes, but a pure and simple chain of effects.
Reversibility kills any determinist (or indeterminist) principle of
causality in ovum, in the egg.64
“The game of the world is the game
of reversibility”.65
There is one level: rules are symbolized in game, cloned as laws, in
a turn of logic. Reversal of logic entails logic of reversal.
V. Third order or Logic of
reversal
Things in extreme must reverse. Is
the only gift as Derrida says that of time, that is non-gift?66In non-presence of time does not being-to-death reverse
(“dying-to-live”)? Does time itself not reverse (definition of
presence)?
Reversal is not “in
time”. It is too late or early. But the price of timelessness is
timeliness: such is the fate of the gift (and counter-gift that
renders and abolishes the gift). Counter-gift simulates the gift,
forecloses the symbolic and collapses itself.
Symbolic exchange has
nothing to do with the gift. As Lyotard said interpreting Marcel
Mauss so forecloses the essential positivity (circular essence,
circulation) of the gift, putting it to disuse.67
One can add to this the auto-impossibility of the interpretation
(there is nothing to suppose its impossibility, itself). Hence
criticisms of empire or utopia are irrelevant at best (or symbolic
themselves). Rather symbolic exchange is to borrow a term from
Laruelle “given-without-givenness” opposed to the gift.68
The always-already counter-gift. Reversibility in its true form.
(However Laruelle supplants “reversibility” with “version” – still a
banal, real version of science by fiat.69)
Slavoj Žižek
characterizes the gift:
...[T]he notion of an excessive
‘first move’ that founds the symbolic order...the notion of gift, of
a primordial ‘there is’ (il y a/es gibt: ‘it gives’),
introduces an aspect that is heterogeneous to the standard
‘Derridean’ problematic of différance-trace-writing. This
‘there is’ qua event names the counterpart to the movement of
différance, of the irreducible dissemination-deferral:
presence itself in its ultimate inaccessibility...The ‘there is’ of
the gift consists of the gesture of a pure Yes!, of an
accordance that precedes the movement of dissemination-deferral.
What forever eludes the subject’s grasp or the Logos is
eventually presence itself in its non-mediated, pre-discursive
‘there is’. The ultimate excess is that of the event of presence
itself.70
Subjectivity as fantasy-phantasm is
accessible to the real, but this is tautological, for what is
fantastic is really accessibility. The objective is (the) formally
inaccessible (for instance “private language”) and functionally
symbolic (language games, Carnap and logical positivism).
Objectivity has nothing to do with the real or its bastard reality.
Yet there is “a pure Yes!” and the analyst comes close to
acknowledging reversal functional, not just formal, to the symbolic
order. One should say instead a pure No! that “counters”
anti-logos, il-logos, non-logos and returns excess to nothing.
What differentiates language from a
natural entity or system is the presence in it of the element
designated by Lévi-Strauss the mana-signifier: the ‘reflective’
signifier that holds the place, within the system, of what eludes
the system, of its not-yet-signified. The ‘openness’ of a
symbolic system has nothing whatsoever to do with the pressure of
the ever-changing external circumstances that compel the system to
transform; in the case of a symbolic system proper, this openness
has to be inscribed into the ‘closed’ system itself in the guise of
a paradoxical signifier that represents non-sense within the field
of Sense...71
Pure negativity does not precede
sense, which always already internalizes and externalizes language
and reverts to non-sense in form of difference. The error is the
conception of mana-signifier, which is always already (super)nature
of pure positivity “Reversibility is the only source of enjoyment”.72
Baudrillard:
The gift, under the sign of gift
exchange, has been made into the distinguishing mark of primitive
‘economies’, and at the same time into the alternative principle to
the law of value and political economy. There is no worse
mystification. The gift is our myth, the idealist myth correlative
to our materialist myth, and we bury the primitives under both myths
at the same time. The primitive symbolic process knows nothing of
the gratuity of the gift, it knows only the challenge and the
reversibility of exchanges. When this reversibility is broken,
precisely by the unilateral possibility of giving (which presupposes
the possibility of stockpiling value and transferring it in one
direction only), then the properly symbolic relation is dead and
power makes an appearance: it will merely be deployed thereafter
throughout the economic apparatus of the contract. It is our
(operational) fiction, our metaphysics, the idea that it is possible
to accumulate stock-value in its head (capital), to make it increase
and multiply: this is the trap of the accumulation of capital. It is
equally our fiction, however, to think that we may relinquish it
absolutely (with the gift). The primitives know that this
possibility does not exist, that the arresting of value on one term,
the very possibility of isolating a segment of exchange, one side of
exchange, is unthinkable, that everything has a compensation, not in
the contractual sense, but in the sense that the process of exchange
is unavoidably reversible. They base all their relations on this
incessant backfire, ambivalence and death in exchange, whereas we
base our order on the possibility of separating two distinct poles
of exchange and making them autonomous. There follows either the
equivalent exchange (the contract) or the inequivalent exchange that
has no compensation (the gift). But both, as we shall see, obey the
same dislocation of the process and the same autonomisation of
value.73
Foreclosure of counter-gift, the
reverse originates the universe (as the only cosmology and its
obsolescence), premium exchange of matter and energy, and the dual
is foreclosed to the singular. Counter-gift founds exchange, and the
unilateral is unilateral qua bilateral. Reversal of one-every
level.
He continues:
We must emphasize that it [symbolic
exchange] stands opposed to the entire liberal or Christian humanist
ideology of the gift. The gift is the source and even the essence of
power. Only the counter-gift, the reversibility of symbolic
exchange, abolishes power.74
Everywhere reversal is banalized,
especially in phenomenology, Jean-Louis Chrétien’s response
(countered by Pierre Clastres’s Society against the State)
for example,75
but epiphenomenon stands above and opposed to phenomenon:
epiphenomenology.
Ambivalence awaits the most
advanced systems that, like Leibniz’s binary God, have deified their
functional principle. The fascination they exert, because it derives
from a profound denial such as we find in fetishism, can be
instantaneously reversed ...Things must be pushed to the limit,
where quite naturally they collapse and are inverted ...Simulation
must go further than the system ...The only strategy against the
hyperrealist system is some form of pataphysics, ‘a science of
imaginary solutions’; that is, a science-fiction [anastrophe,
palindromology] of the system’s reversal against itself at the
extreme limit of simulation, a reversible simulation in a hyperlogic
of death and destruction.76
One gives what he can.
To the question of
philosophy – why did Socrates die?—Deleuze gave an incisive answer:
...[A]s a consequence of searching
in the direction of the simulacrum and leaning over its abyss, Plato
discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not
simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very
notations of copy and model. The final definition of the Sophists
leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from
Socrates himself—the ironist working in private by means of brief
arguments. Was it not necessary to push irony to that extreme? Was
it not Plato himself who pointed out the direction for the reversal
of Platonism?77
One now cannot distinguish
simulacrum from its simulation. This is eternal return,
even this moment ...[t]he eternal
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again.
..[H]ow well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to
life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate
eternal confirmation and seal?78
Not a doctrine of simulacrum but
“simulacrum of a doctrine” as Pierre Klossowski said.79
In Difference and
Repetition Deleuze wrote return in terms of excess:
A single and same voice for the
whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the
drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings: on the condition
that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of
excess...80
But there are (as Baudrillard
points out) as Octave Mannoni said “apparent constraints of a
discourse that always tends towards the univocal, even though it
exploits the equivocal”,81
by strategies of difference and repetition in simulacrum of a
“mobile cusp”,82
which returns (to) logic of reversal, thinking extreme in terms of
difference when it is reverse, error of relations and relations of
relations (difference, opposition et cetera) – self-managing
end of philosophical reduction, before (or after) duality.
[The void of logical reason is
reduplicated exactly in order to be destroyed, and it is in the void
thus created that laugh and enjoyment burst out (not, however, in
order that this void ‘emerges from its subsoil and establishes
itself’ – Lyotard). Freud puts this extremely well: Entfesselung
des Unsinns – the unleashing of nonsense. But nonsense is not
the hidden hell of meaning [sens], nor the emulsion of all
the repressed and contradictory meanings. It is the meticulous
reversibility of every term – subversion through reversal.83
Return to Nietzsche: “Looking
away shall be my only negation”.84
(Only musical analysis suits Nietzsche, music the image of
philosophy.) Amor fati, the fatal against the fractal,
becoming against change,85
opposite of Nietzsche’s Eternal
Return ...Today’s Eternal Return is ...the obsessive repetition of
things on a microscopic, inhuman scale [statistics, stochastics,
calculus] ...the expression of our bad conscience about the
irresistible and fundamentally immoral development of our sciences –
a development which has brought us to this point and to which we
secretly consent, while supplementing that consent with the moral
delights of repentance.86
Where is that constellar sign of
immutable consecration of a black sun?87
Not forage into symmetry (Roger Caillois),88
exhaustion of opposition for Darwinian mixology (Gabriel de Tarde)89
or psychocosmology (Jung)90
– these are local.
Dual, duality, dualism.
The dual (not the two or dyade which grounds all philosophy) is
primal (one cannot say these or those are dual, particularizing or
universalizing it in ontico-ontology). The dual is dual
definitively. It constitutes the eccentricity or eccentricities of
levels or level of reference (rather than eccentricity being a
property of it), essences of something or essence of everything.
However the dual is only evinced by duality, primary level of
reference (in addition to secondary, tertiary, quaternary et
cetera, for instance difference, opposition et cetera);
this is how one can speak of the dual, in terms of duality, and
duality in difference, and opposition and so on. Dualism is any
philosophy, theory or thought of the dual. Reversibility and
reversality (thought of reversibility, vice versa) are
absolute epiphenomenon to the dual, as science, the science (theory,
cosmic principle, whatever) of nothing (opposed to absolute
phenomenon of (n)one-all). More singular than singular by
definition, absorbing itself and everything else so without trace.
The dual reverses the different and total. (Yet the dual does not
exist, that is without reversibility or reversality.) “The
simulacrum will be ahead of us everywhere”.91
(Synonyms extreme, extremity, extremism.)
The logic of reversal
is geometric whereas that of difference is “calculous”, between
earth and stone. Reversal is generally but incorrectly expressed
propositionally as p (p`) v p`(p ): this is partial, unilateral,
transferring remainder subject to extension of the other term,
relation of relay not reversal. Disjunct exclusion and disjoint
expression of cogito, problem of transcendence. Reversibility
is p <> -p. The particular problem: p <> -p cannot also be
quantitative. It is singular but single, problem of immanence, which
must be supplanted with the problem of transcendence to close the
circle of quality and quantity as (n)one-all. The new relation is p
R –p, which transformatively supplants the problem of transcendence,
p r p`, instead of with inordinate, unwarranted conjunction, which
serializes reversal, no better than effective recursion-regression
of difference. Minimal immanence, which is contained. Metamorphosis:
reversible relation of reversal, p r p`, reverse relation of
reversibility, p R –p. Finally empty form: p (R, r). (Suppression of
q, empty in q (p), equals de-serialization: rather than serializing
reversal, reverse the serial.)
Curves loop; loops
curve (loop of loops), amounting to irreversibility, which is
irreversible. Matter of subsumption. Level “one” corresponds to
duality, then difference, opposition, negation, contradiction,
consistency, complementation, identity, tautology and outermost
reversal “level”. Reversal is the dual seen from vertiginous height,
cosmic or un-thought thought (not in Maurice Blondel’s reserve sense
but sufficient and evacuated or more accurately “invacuated”). It is
(homeless) objectivity to borrow from Alexius Meinong (not
empiricism and its mirrors). Its logic is pure antagonism, beyond
dualism and monism, certainly pluralism.
Transversals are scions
of the East. The total self-reference of Western universe forecloses
transversals. It has only reversals even in transversals.
VI. Reversality
The scientistic legacy
of the Occident (for example dialectics as science), and its
relentless search and demand for questions and ways to ask them (a
grand inquisition), now only takes on a gnostic vocabulary, which
has no significance or consequence when answers are no longer wanted
or needed, desperately reasserting its own possibility in form of
metastasis and self-annihilation (exaltation and practice of
masochism for example), parody of eternal return reduced to
subjectivity (which pre-stages its transcendence or transference so
– in the Greek drama). Only answers are radical by the fact there
are none (or if there is one!), necessitated by questions, answers
objectively as/to/from/in/of/for nothing. But as soon as answers are
reified as such into radicality the radical becomes simulacrum (or
reveals it has only ever been simulacrum) as Plato was puzzled, even
disappointed, at Socrates in the end as philosophy bleeds into
sophistry. So again radicality dis-appoints (itself).
Philosophy, as
everything else, ends positing its possibility. If the end of
history is not reached because the end of science is not,92
one must ask in a Kantian fashion what is science’s hypothesis of
its own end? (How do means justify ends?) In art, as in “ignorant
art”, the same happens: ahistoricism closed on, devoured, itself,
its history, as ouroboro.93
Nietzsche: “Why hast thou stolen into thyself, thyself”?94
Saying “medium is message” still confers message on medium, vice
versa.
It seems naive to call
illusion real because one does not want to be deceived (or realize
he cannot but be, similarly fight the system “from within”, “donner
droit de cité à l’inhumain”, or Cassirer’s Homo symbolicum).95
Is poetry confined to theorizing difference? Radical openings,
communities without communion, original ethics – last makeshift of
philosophers. On one hand “(re)turn of philosophy itself”,96
the other non-philosophy,97
rigor mortis; one gestures end of beginning, the other beginning of
end.
To be in a spell, or
hypnosis.
And though
it is noon on the nail where the weathercock sleeps,
In the
crystalline eye of the bird sitting crowned on the steeple,
With
stealth he retraces his steps and effaces them all.
From the
wall, silence falls,
From a
trapdoor of stone, obscure exit-hole,
The silence
of ghosts of victories returns...
Death and
glory ever ticking, and the charcoal drumsticks roll:
The mygale
lands flat upon the faces of the Drums.98
Hsiang (Kevin) Hsu
lives in Austin, Texas and Taipei.
He is a doctoral student at the European Graduate School in
Saas-Fee, Switzerland. He holds a B.Sc. in Molecular biology from
the University of Texas. This paper is the result of an encounter
between his thinking since his bachelor’s thesis and an encounter
with the thought (and teaching) of Baudrillard.
Endnotes
1
Alfred Jarry. Black Minutes of Memorial Sand – Collected
Works of Alfred Jarry Volume I: Adventures in Pataphysics.
London: Atlas, 2001:117.
2
Roland Barthes. Camera Lucida. New York: Hill and
Wang, 1981:106-7.
3
Nagisa Oshima. (Director): In the Realm of the Senses,
1977. ASIN:
6305049378.
4
Jean Baudrillard. Impossible Exchange. New York:
Verso, 2001:142.
5
Michel de Montaigne. Complete Essays of Montaigne,
Stanford University Press, 1958:56-8. The reversal has
nothing to do with hope or hopelessness; rather it is pure
experimentation that inscribes those things, hence
“Essays”.
6
Jean Baudrillard. “Preface” to Symbolic Exchange and
Death. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 1993:5.
8
“Reversality” is a neologism and its relation to
reversibility is the topic of this paper.
9
Jean Francois Lyotard. Libidinal Economy.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993:132.
10
Jean-Luc Nancy’s “Dialogue I” of Sense of the World
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997:164-5):
“But
what if ‘worldliness’ were in fact nothing but the
indefinite extension of appearances, wherein the universal,
displayed without depth, gives itself the spectacle of
itself, so ubiquitously diffused that you take it to be
‘sense’, whereas it is nothing but the general simulation of
a circulation of sense?”
“In
saying this, your only mistake is to believe that the
general representation that the worldly indeed gives
(itself) of itself is still a representation, but a
dissimulating rather than an expressive one, and one that
dissimulates its own lack. You still expect the world to be
a sign of something other than itself. Moreover, you are
missing the point of worldliness: for the very idea of a
spectacle of the world can only be an occidental idea. It is
not only the case that there is no spectacle for all those
whom famine and misery do not grant the leisure to be
spectators. Further, of those who are watching, at
the other end of the world, the world show of
multiplied screens, you do not have the right to presuppose
that they are lost in the stupefied alienation you imply by
your use of the world spectacle. You have neither the
right nor the means to presuppose the sense that they are
perhaps in the process of giving to practices of which you
have only a nihilistic interpretation. At a given site, the
world spectacle can constitute a breach in a system of
interdictions, at another site, it can provide an
opportunity for speaking together; at another, it can give
rise to the kinds of unprecedented things that nourish
invention. You are tetanized by ‘images’ – an old occidental
reflex – and you are unaware of all the praxis that
has already laid hold of them...”
“But
finally, the spectacle signifies only itself: is this the
whole ‘absent sense’ in which you take so much pleasure?”
“Yes,
the spectacle signifies nothing but itself, and this is
indeed the end of all the senses of the world that we have
been able to signify up to now. But this very end addresses
us anew to sense and situates it very clearly: no longer
outside signification, but along the surface of the world
and its significance.”
“But it
is still a matter of sense: and sense must always, in
one way or another, be signified, or else you are just
playing with words.”
“Certainly. I would even say that sense must be signified in
all possible ways, by each and every one of us, by all
‘individual’ or ‘collective’ singulars.”
“By all
subjectivities?”
“You can
choose whatever words you wish, along with the sense you
give them. As for me, I would say: by all that can make
someone somewhere expose him/herself to sense, to making
sense, to receiving sense, to leaving sense open”.
“What
you are describing, then, is “dialogue”, the quintessence of
good intentions, so-called ‘openness’, ‘mutual enrichment’:
the lowest form of spectacle.”
“You are
not wrong. But I am talking about something else. Dialogue
is the rhythmic interruption of the logos, the space between
the replies, each reply apart from itself retaining for
itself an access to sense that is only its own, an access of
sense that is only itself...”
“But
that belongs to none...”
“Yes.
And to all”.
One can
pit Baudrillard’s words from “No Pity for Sarajevo” in
Screened Out, New York: Verso, 2002, 46, 47-8, 50,
against this:
…[T]he
worst of slogans: ‘We have to do something. We can’t just do
nothing.’ But doing something just because you cannot not do
it has never amounted to a principle of action or freedom.
Merely a form of absolution from your own impotence and
compassion for your own fate…[O]ur entire society is
embarked on the path of commiseration in the literal sense,
under cover of ecumenical pathos. It is almost as though, in
a moment of intense repentance among intellectuals and
politicians, a moment related to the panic currently
surrounding history and the twilight of values, we had to
replenish the stocks of values, the referential reserves, by
appealing to that lowest common denominator that is human
misery, restocking the hunting grounds with artificial game,
as it were…A victim society. I suppose all it is doing is
expressing its own disappointment and remorse for an
unthinkable violence against itself…[T]he major objection to
the bad-conscience offensive…is that, by perpetuating the
image of…a Western conscience racked by its own impotence,
it provides a cover for the real operation by lending it the
spiritual benefit of the doubt.
11
Gilles Deleuze. Logic of Sense, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990, 261-262:
The
signal is a structure in which differences of potential are
distributed, assuring the communication of disparate
components; the sign is what flashes across the boundary of
two levels, between two communicating series... All physical
systems are signals; all qualities are signs...There is
always, no doubt, a resemblance between resonating series,
but this is not the problem. The problem is rather the
status and the position of this resemblance...It matters
little whether the system has great external and slight
internal difference, or whether the opposite is the case,
provided that resemblance be produced on a curve, and that
difference, whether great or small, always occupy the center
of the thus decentered system.
As
Jean-Jacques Lecercle and others such as Slavoj Žižek noted,
Deleuze’s philosophy falls back to a “plain” (see Lecercle,
Deleuze and Language, New York: Palgrave, 2002;
Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and
Consequences, New York: Routledge, 2003; see also Alain
Badiou. Deleuze: Clamor of Being, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999, for a thoroughly
political rendering.
12
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death.
London: SAGE, 1993:237-8.
13
Jean Francois Lyotard. Libidinal Economy,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993:132.
14
Giorgio Agamben. Potentialities: Collected Essays in
Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford, 1999:212.
15
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death (c
1976). London: SAGE, 1993:220.
18
Jean Baudrillard. Fatal Strategies. London: Pluto
Press, 1999:163.
19
Jean Baudrillard. Seduction. New York: St Martin’s
Press, 1990:83.
20
Jean Baudrillard. Cool Memories IV, Paris: Galilée,
2000:137. The translation is “A frosted-glass transparency”
(Translated by Chris Turner, New York: Verso, 2003, 108).
Borrowed from medical terminology en verre dépoli as
in aspect en verre dépoli (“ground-glass pattern”,
referring to the common radiographic marker of certain lung
diseases) can mean “in ground glass”. Compare verre,
verse (pouring), renvers (overturning,
re-pouring, knock over, spill, fall backward) and revers
(reverse). It reminds one of the “drink of water” in Zen
– as one pours in he pours out, re-pours, de-poured to no
container.
21
Editor’s note: The Latin word for “circle, ring”;
formerly often used in Anatomy, Astronomy, and other
sciences; also as a technical name of various instruments in
Surgery, etc.; a tool for cutting circular portions of
glass, also “for cutting off the necks of glass-ware”
22
Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994:28.
24
Laozi wrote of the Great Extreme, which engenders two forms
(yin and yang), which engender four images (or phenomena),
which engender the eight trigrams (of I Ching, or
bagua), which engender sixty-four hexagrams of I
Ching, which engender “ten thousand changes”.
25
Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994:51.
28
Jacques Derrida. “Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse”,
and “Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia
Kristeva” in Positions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982:8, 26.
29
Jacques Derrida. Margins of Philosophy, Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1984:11.
30
Heidegger’s alētheia, for example, reversal of
concealment and revelation.
31
Jean Luc Nancy. Sense of the World. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997:35, 36.
32
Giorgio Agamben. Potentialities: Collected Essays in
Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford, 1999:209.
33
Ibid.: 174, 213, 219. There is a interesting note on
positivism: “As Reach showed for Carnap’s attempt to name
the name through quotation marks ...the logicians’
expedients to avoid the consequences of this radical
anonymity of the name are destined to fail” (213-4). This is
the worst misunderstanding of the positive project, which
was never on “naming” (a philosophical project) but
“observing” (scientific one). The effect of “nomic form”
(“basic law”) is subject to experiment, which is “ahead” of
nomination (as reversal to difference), so does not fall
back to it but is it in a vain cycle: “If we wish to study
causality, we can do so only by examining those laws, by
studying the ways in which they are expressed and how they
are confirmed or disconfirmed by experiment” (Rudolf Carnap.
Philosophical Foundations of Physics. New York: Basic
Books, 1966:212-3, 277). Positivity is the strict nemesis
for objectivity, evincing the nihility of description,
general language.
34
Jacques Derrida. “Some Statements and Truisms about
Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small
Seismisms” in States of Theory, New York: Columbia,
1990:80. “In-ethics” is closer to ethics qua ethics
than itself.
35
Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities,
or, the End of the Social and other Essays. New York:
Semiotext(e), 1983:40-1.
36
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death.
London: SAGE, 1993:37.
37
Jean Baudrillard. The Perfect Crime. New York: Verso,
1996:122-3.
38
For example Lyotard’s reversal of Leibniz’s compossibles,
and reversal of this reversal to differends (see
Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud. Just Gaming.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985; See also
Jean-Francois Lyotard. Differend: Phrases in Dispute.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
39
Jean Baudrillard. Seduction. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1979:148. He continues:
In
Deleuze’s pure, nomadic chance, in his ‘ideal game’, there
is only disjunction and dispersed causality. But only a
conceptual error allows one to dissociate the game from its
rules in order to radicalize its utopian form. And the same
intemperance, or the same facility, allows one to dissociate
chance from what defines it – an objective calculus of
series and probabilities – in order to turn it into the
theme song for an ideal indeterminacy, an ideal desire
composed of the endless occurrence of countless series. But
why more series? Why not a pure Brownian movement? But then
the latter, though it seems to have become the physical
model for radical desire, has its laws, and is not a game
(149).
40
Jean Baudrillard. Fatal Strategies. London: Pluto
Press, 1999:107. Insofar as there is Baudrillard against
production, the social, culture et cetera one might
posit him against seduction and fatality.
41
Jean Baudrillard. Illusion of the End, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1994:108-9.
42
Jean-Pierre Faye. Langages totalitaires. Paris:
Hermann, 1972. Consider also Martial Guéroult’s
Dianoématique (Paris: Aubier, 1979). History thus is not
without ceasing to be philosophy and forever sets itself up
as its agonist.
43
“Prosody of narrative, and of history likewise. Prosody that
is not ‘fixed’: oscillating prosody. That announces
and brings death, here” (Ibid.:9).
44
“Language is the most dangerous of all goods. Through it,
here, the danger of history can show” (Ibid.:10).
45
Attributed to Confucius.
46
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death (c
1976). London: SAGE, 1993:235.
47
Jean Hyppolite. Logic and Existence. New York:
S.U.N.Y Press, 1997:178. The Absolute has two absolutes:
that it must (necessity) and does not have to (possibility).
One will return to this absolute of reversal.
50
Ibid.: 176. Hyppolite in conversation with Georges
Bataille seized his phrase “Seeking your own nothingness” as
world-historical moment of logic and experience, whereas it
seems to the author Bataille was less like say Max Stirner
in the statement “...I cannot know the unknown. I have only
really spoken about myself” as solipsist of action
and apathy or indifference than nihilist on a different
level of valorization and curse or suffering (Georges
Bataille. Unfinished System of Nonknowledge.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001:73, 157;
see also Max Stirner, Ego and Its Own, New York:
Cambridge, 1995).
51
Michel Foucault. Archeology of Knowledge. New York:
Pantheon, 1982:235.
52
Arthur Schopenhauer. Parerga and Paralipomena. Volume
2, New York: Oxford, 1974:292.
53
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations,
London: Basil, 1981:8.
56
Louis Hjelmslev. “Study of Language and the Theory of
Language”. Prolegomena to a Theory of Language,
Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1961:5.
57
See François Jullien. Procès ou création. Paris:
Seuil, 1989.
58
See Gaston Bachelard. Philosophy of No. New York:
Orion, 1968.
59
See Georges Bataille. Unfinished System of Nonknowledge.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.
60
See François Laruelle. Dictionnaire de la non-philosophie.
Paris: Kimé, 1998
62
Elias Canetti. Crowds and Power. New York: Noonday,
1984:58-9.
63
Jean Baudrillard. Fatal Strategies. London: Pluto Press,
1999:163.
65
Jean Baudrillard. Ecstasy of Communication, New York:
Semiotext(e), 1988:80.
66
See Jacques Derrida. Given Time: Counterfeit Money.
Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994.
67
See Jean-Francois Lyotard. “Desire Named Marx” in
Libidinal Economy. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1993. Lyotard described his relationship with
Baudrillard as “co-polarized and synchronized” (104).
68
François Laruelle. Dictionnaire de la non-philosophie.
Paris: Kimé, 1998:56-8. He is one of the most
interesting (non-)philosophers (even allegorists) but wrong
situating reversibility in (non-philosophy.
70
Slavoj Zizek. Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on
Women and Causality. New York: Verso, 1994:195.
72
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death.
London: SAGE, 1993:232.
73
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death,
London: SAGE, 1992:48-9 n.25. The critical passage has often
been overlooked.
75
See Jean-Louis Chrétien. Hand to Hand: Listening to the
Work of Art, Bronx: Fordham, 2003; and Pierre Clastres.
Society against State: Essays in Political Anthropology.
New York: Zone, 1989.
76
Jean Baudrillard. “Preface” to Symbolic Exchange and
Death. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 1993:4-5.
77
Gilles Deleuze. Logic of Sense, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990:256.
78
Friederich Nietzsche. The Gay Science, New York:
Random House, 1974:273-4.
79
Pierre Klossowski. Un si funeste désir. Paris:
Gallimard, 1994:226.
80
Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994:304.
81
Octave Mannoni. Clefs pour l’imaginaire. Paris:
Seuil, 1985:46.
82
Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994:304. Perhaps Deleuze was
aware when he wrote: “Returning is thus the only identity,
but identity as a secondary power; the identity of
difference, the identical which belongs to the
different, or turns around the different” [emphases
added]’. Here he is close to acknowledging (in fact having
acknowledged) the “power” of epiphenomenon, essence of
reversal. He was able to continue: “Only the extreme forms
return – those which, large or small [so the error], are
deployed within the limit and extend to the limit [extend
the limit] of their power, transforming themselves and
changing one into another. Only the extreme, the excessive,
returns; that which passes into something else and becomes
identical” (‘Difference in Itself’, 41). Hegel’s
end-means-object spread is rendered virtual; the
world-historical moment is precession of simulacra.
83
Jean Baudrillard. Symbolic Exchange and Death.
London: SAGE, 1993:232.
84
Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science, New York:
Random House, 1974:223.
85
Jean Baudrillard. Impossible Exchange. New York:
Verso, 2001:78.
86
Jean Baudrillard. Screened Out. New York: Verso,
2002:200-1.
87
As Licius said “unseen of sight, unheard of hearing, having
no elusion, even said as change still which banks no form” (Perfect
Book of Highest Virtue and Emptiness). Unpublished in
English, my translation.
88
See Roger Caillois. Dissymétrie. Paris: Gallimard,
1973.
89
See Gabriel de Tarde. Opposition universelle. Paris:
Germer, 1897.
90
See Carl Jung. Synchronicity. Princeton: Princeton,
1973.
91
Jean Baudrillard. Simulations, New York: Semiotext(e),
1983:5.
92
Francis Fukuyama. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of
the Biotechnology Revolution. New York: Picador, 2003.
93
“The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has
not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its
organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed
to cope with the elemental forces of society” (Walter
Benjamin. Illuminations. New York: Schocken, 1969:
252). It is not as Benjamin thought, dialectic intertwining
of art and politics, but their esoteric polarization.
94
Friederich Nietzsche. Ecce Homo. Mineola: Dover,
2004:179.
95
Lyotard’s 1988 call to “give the inhuman citizenship”.
96
Alain Badiou. Manifesto for Philosophy. Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1989:113-38.
97
François Laruelle. Dictionnaire de la non-philosophie.
Paris: Kimé, 1998:56-8.
98
Alfred Jarry. Black Minutes of Memorial Sand – Collected
Works of Alfred Jarry Volume I: Adventures in Pataphysics.
London: Atlas, 2001:117.