ISSN: 1705-6411
Volume 2, Number 2
(July 2005)
From the Subject of
Desire to the Object of Seduction: Image – Imagination – Imaginary1
Christoph
Wulf
(Professor, Interdisciplinary
Centre For Historical Anthropology, Free University of Berlin,
Germany)
Translated by:
Maggie Rouse
(Berlin, Germany).
The same illusion of
progress occurred with the appearance of speech and then colour on
screen: at each stage of this progress we moved further away from
the imaginary intensity of the image. The closer we supposedly
approach the real or the truth, the further we draw away from them
both, since neither one nor the other exists. The closer we approach
the real time of the event, the more we fall into the illusion of
the virtual.2
I. Intoduction
The ability to interpret the world around us into our
inner world in the form of images and to remember these, while at
the same time being able to produce aspects of the imagination in
the material world is a condito humana. The Greeks called
this fantasy, which the Romans translated as imagination which was
translated into German by Paracelsus as the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft)
and as a result of the influence of French authors is often referred
to as the “imaginary” today. Tangible only when expressed in
concrete terms, it is one of the most puzzling human energies
present throughout the human world manifesting itself in different
ways. Constantly withholding the key to its identification, fantasy
makes it possible to perceive images, even if that which is depicted
is not present. It defines the possibility of internal sight and
planning future actions.
If one examines Baudrillard's works looking for the
energies that link his manifold areas of interest, it can be argued
that common themes in many of his works involve the imagination and
the imagery. This can already be seen in his works such as Kool
Killer, Agonie des Realen, The Consumer Society,
and Fatal Strategies which were published at a relatively
early date in Germany.3
The central role of imagination and the imagery in Baudrillard's
thinking becomes indisputable in The Transparency of Evil,
The Illusion of the End, and The Perfect Crime.4
Rather than definitions of the imagery, we find figurations and
descriptions of the articulation and effects of the imagination in
his works. His work shows that not even perception is possible
without imagination. Every perception is characterised by a
historical and cultural context and direct access to the world of
things is not possible. Baudrillard constantly reminds us, as
Heidegger anticipated, that the world has become a realm of images
for mankind, and new images are constantly required to reinforce
this world of images. A world beyond images is not possible. Images
have a mimetic relationship to other images. They allude to each
other and are changed by this. An immense variety and mixture of
images arise in the currents of desire but “...when
the true loses it opposite energy, that of the imaginary, the
outcome is simulation, the lowest degree of illusion. ...All
categories give way to a kind of hyper syncretism, homeostasis and
indistinction.“5
This paper traces thinking about this vitally important human
capacity of imagination before and after Baudrillard. Baudrillard
takes us as close as anyone to an understanding of a radical
imaginary and in doing so points to aspects previously unseen by
many.6
II. Imagination Before Baudrillard
Dietmar Kamper writes that the image has the purpose of
uncovering the wound from which mankind originated. He adds however
that this aim is unattainable and every surrogate memory reminds us
of something. Therefore every image is by nature "sexual" even if it
is deeply religious. For this reason, he continues, the image can be
titled the “Death of the Person” to use Roland Barthes formulation.
Expressed through fear, the image plays the main role in deflecting
human desire:
It takes
the place of the experienced equivocation of the origin. It takes
the place of the ultimate evil. It maintains the hope that the voice
of the mother will continue to resound through all ambivalence. It
sees the sacred become the banal. After all the second chapter in
overcoming fear is reproduction. The image is intended to be lost in
images and this is not possible.7
There is no escape from the world of images – images create image
prisons. Dissolved in the flow of imagination, they swallow up
perception, put it in a tailspin and ultimately lead to a
dissolution of the senses.
The image as technical simulation as diagnosed by
Baudrillard (see next section), may be differentiated with the
“image as mimetic representation” and the “image as magical
presence.” Although these types of image have many things in common,
such a differentiation enables different, in some cases
contradictory, features to be identified.
The image as mimetic representation
In Plato's works, images become representations of something they
are not. They represent something, express something, refer to
something. According to Plato, artists and poets do not produce like
God produces ideas or like craftsmen make everyday objects. They
create the appearances of things, in doing this artists and
poets are not restricted by the artistic representation of the
objects but by the artistic representation of appearances. The aim
is not the representation of ideas or the truth, but the artistic
representation of phantasms. For this reason painting and mimetic
poetry can in principle make appearance visible. This involves
mimesis that creates images and illusions. The difference between
the model and the picture becomes unimportant during this process.
The aim is not similarity, rather the semblance of that which
appears. Plato views art and aesthetics as one discipline. The
artist or the poet is the master of this discipline. The artist or
poet does not have the ability to produce, unlike philosophy, it is
not subject to the need for truth which is a fundamental principle
of the "Republic". This frees art and aesthetics from the demands of
philosophy, its search for truth and knowledge and its striving for
good and beauty. The price paid for this is the exclusion from the
Republic which does not accept the incalculable character of art and
poetry.
The process of
artistic creation therefore is aiming towards creating an inner
image that the painter or poet has in front of his eyes. The plan
that leads to the created work dissolves to an ever increasing
extent into the image, that arises in a different medium to the
imagined plan. As part of this, alterations, omissions, additions
and other similar changes occur, meaning that similarity is only
present to a limited degree. In most cases the models to which the
pictures and sketches of the artist relate are unknown as they
either never existed or are no longer existent. The image is the
focus of the creative process. It contains references to models and
was created in a process of transformation.
The (mimetic) creation of representations is one of the
elementary anthropological abilities and one of its central themes
is the human body. In the portraits of the Renaissance and the
photographs of the present, the human bodies pictured are understood
to represent humans. Photographs show humans in important situations
in their lives in the form of images of the body. Questions of human
self-understanding are linked to such forms and other forms of
representations. Without images of ourselves, i.e. representations
of ourselves, we are incomprehensible to ourselves. An understanding
of the image character of such representations is essential to
comprehend the restrictions of what is possible in terms of human
self-perception.
From a very early stage humankind began to create images
of the human body. These body images are human images just as
depictions of humans are always depictions of the body. The images
show the body in different ways although the human body has not
changed biologically in the historic era. A history of these images
is representative of a history of the human body. It is both a
history of human depiction and human images. Belting puts it this
way: Man is as he appears in his body. The body is itself an image,
even before it is depicted in images. The picture, concludes
Belting, is not what it claims to be – a reproduction of the
body. In truth it is a production of an image of the body which is
already conditioned by the self-depiction of the body. The triangle
of man, body and image is irresolvable unless one wants to lose all
three points of reference.8
The image as magical presence
The images that were created at a time when pictures had
not yet become works of art included statuettes, masks, religious
symbols and sacred images. Images where the gods are
given a magical presence and play an important role among these
images. These include early representations of goddesses of
fertility in clay or stone from archaic cultures. The material
existence of many idols, statuettes and masks of earlier times is
to prove the presence of the divine. Painted skulls and death masks
play a similar role.9
Skulls were painted as early as the Neolithic era and helped the
living to ritual understandings of dead ancestors. Death is the fate
of the community – the creation of painted skulls and masks is an
attempt to answer the terror of death – making images becomes a
reaction to death. Skulls and death masks serve to transform a
mortal head into an image and this presence serves to provide the
presence of the dead among the living. This transformation is
concluded during death rituals. The performance of these rituals
enables the community of the living to reassure themselves in the
face of death and also results in the skull and death mask becoming
sacred.
Even the worship of the Golden Calf as recorded in the
Old Testament involves a religious symbol in which god and image
merge and the presence of a god is embodied and symbolised by the
calf. While Moses was receiving the Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai
(in which it is explicitly forbidden to make images of God and to
worship such images), the people of Israel under the leadership of
his older brother Aaron fulfilled their need to worship an image.
Aaron represents the image-worshipping, iconophile, Moses the
image-fighting, iconoclastic position; these two positions are still
the fundamental positions when dealing with images. What they both
have in common is a conviction about the power of images. This
power, concludes Boehm, results from the ability to make present an
unreachable and distant existence and to give it such a presence
that can fill the whole of man's attention. The power of the image
is in its semblance – it creates an equality with that which it
depicts. The Golden Calf is the god (in the perspective of
the ritual) – the image and its content merge to the point where
they can no longer be distinguished.10
The cult of
relics in the Middle Ages required only the presence of a fragment
of the body ascribed to a saint to make the saint present. "The
bodies of many saints lie here" is the inscription over the
collection of relics in Conques. The saints are present, they are
not represented by their relics. They develop their healing power
for believers at the site where the parts of their bodies are
present – the relics heal the site and the participants of the
rituals. The rituals help to form the link between the relic as an
image representing the saint and the healing expected as a result of
the ritual which would be referred to as magical in other cultural
contexts.
In many works of modern art, nothing is represented
outside the work of art – rather only a presence is created.
Comparisons can be made between these works and the early
(religious) works before the artistic era began. Mark Rothko and
Barnett Newman explicitly refer to the images of sacred or numinous
(for example in the Rothko chapel in Houston, in which the colours
of the images leave the viewer in a diffuse state of suspension, and
in which "presence and diffusion" maintain a balance in a mysterious
way. Newman's pictures also confront the viewer with his/her limits
and allow him/her to experience the unconscious. The way Newman
understands him work, it is possible to experience the sublime here.
This, infers Boehm, marks the over-burdening of the cognitive
capacity by something outsize. According to Boehm, the marked
failure of these outsize aspects becomes an unexpected bonus, in
that Newman's picture does not want to show anything but
wants to affect or cause a reaction in the viewer. It
vanishes as an image the moment when it manages to do this.11
Fantasy has a chiastic structure in which the internal
and external intersect. Both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan have made
reference to this structure which is so vital for the perception and
production of images. A concept of vision which assumes that the
objects which are identical to themselves are in opposition to the
initially "empty" seeing subject is inadequate. Moreover, an
integral part of seeing is something that we can only grasp by
touching it with our gaze. The gaze shrouds the visible things, it
touches them and mixes itself in with them. It is as if there was a
pre-established harmonious relationship, as if it knew of them
before getting to know them, it moves in its hectic and imperious
manner. However the perceived views are not random, I do not see
chaos, rather things, meaning that one cannot say if the view or the
things have the upper hand in their relationship.12
It is not only when seeing but also when touching, hearing and in
principle also when smelling and tasting that such a cross-over
between the senses and the outside world perceived takes place.
Human perception is not without prerequisites. On the
one hand we perceive the world in an anthropomorphous way (i.e. on
the basis of the physiological prerequisites present in our bodies).
On the other hand our perception is affected by
historic-anthropological or cultural prerequisites. After the
invention and spread of writing, visual perception changed by
comparison to seeing in oral cultures. Our perception processes are
changing in a similarly drastic way as a result of the new media and
the acceleration of images that accompanies this. As research in
design psychology has shown, fantasy already has a role to play
during basic perception, for example, during the complementary
perception supplementation. The same applies for cultural references
which give the matters perceived their sense and meaning. Seeing is
always both simultaneously enabled and restricted historically and
culturally. As such it is subject to change, contingent and with an
undecided future.
When looking for a bodily basis for fantasy, one comes
across the following assumption from Gehlen:
[On the]
…basis of vegetative life, changed by dreams or time – during
childhood or contact with the sexes, especially there where the
forces of emerging life become visible – there seem to be certain
original fantasies among the widely varying images which sense in
themselves a tendency to increase formal height, or 'electric
power': but as a sign of vital identity, i.e. of an inclination
towards better quality or quantity that lies in the substantia
vegetans – this although the right to make such a differentiation
remains questionable.13
Gehlen saw fantasy as a project of excess of stimuli. However,
perhaps fantasy goes beyond excess of stimuli so that the urge to
live can create images of its own satisfaction within this fantasy.14
In Gehlen's view, fantasy is linked to man's status as a "deficient
creature" and his residual instinct and the hiatus between stimulus
and reaction. This means it relates to needs, urges and desires for
satisfaction. However fantasy is not exhausted by these desires.
Human plasticity and open-mindedness are signs of the necessity of
their cultural formation. Fantasy plays such a central role in this
that man" can be defined as a creature of fantasy just as much as a
creature of reason."15
Fantasy resists rational categorization. Even images are
only to be understood as objectifications of the elementary forces
which are transitory and cannot be objectified. The three terms in
common use in German could emphasise different aspects without
making the differences definitive. As a preliminary idea, perhaps it
is possible to establish the following differences: Fantasy
refers more to the aspect of proliferation, imagination
refers to the world of images and the power of imagination to
the ability to suppose which creates something new. In terms of
fantasy, it is possible to differentiate between four aspects which
relate to different historic periods and cultural contexts. One
aspect of fantasy relates to the possible participation of man in
art. Another involves the understanding of the otherness of other
cultural and human worlds, which only fantasy can "recreate" so that
they can be understood. A third aspect relates to the relationship
between the unconscious and fantasy, in this, fantasy is the force
which takes effect beyond the scope of the conscious in forming that
are articulated in dreams and fantasies in the streams of desires
and vital forces. A fourth aspect is related to the desire and the
ability to implement desires in a counterbalancing manner. In all
four concepts, the aim of fantasy is to change the world, however in
a spontaneous, event-related and roving way rather than in a
strategic manner.16
Adorno sums up the discourse within society on the role of fantasy
in science, art and culture when he writes:
Writing
an intellectual history of fantasy which would explore the very
thing that positivism has forbidden would be well worth the effort.
In the eighteenth century, in the thinking of Saint-Simon and in the
Discours préliminaire by d'Alembert, fantasy is credited,
along with art, as productive work, it has a part in the idea of
freeing the productive forces, Comte, whose sociological thinking
changed direction apologetically and statically was the first to
become an enemy of the metaphysical and of fantasy. Its defamation
or cornering in a special kingdom of division of work is a typical
phenomenon in regressive bourgeois thinking but not as its avoidable
mistake, but in the course of a fatality which binds instrumental
reasoning as needed by society with this taboo. That fantasy,
objectified, abstractly contrasted with reality, is tolerated at all
is a burden to art just as it is to science, the legitimate is
desperately trying to pay its debts.17
There are also various differences of meaning between
the terms imagination and power of imagination (Einbildungskraft). A
look at the English history of ideas shows Locke defining
imagination as the "power of the mind" and Hume as a "kind of
magical faculty in the soul … which is however inexplicable by the
utmost efforts of human understanding."18
Coleridge defines imagination as a human capability or capacity and
differentiates between two forms. "The primary Imagination I hold to
be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as
a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in
the infinite I Am. The secondary I consider as an echo of the
former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical
with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing
only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It
dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where
this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it
struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital,
even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and
dead."19
According to this version, imagination is a part of the subject in
which it acts and with which it emulates the world. According to
Coleridge, imagination also encompasses the ability to release and
destroy connections and to create new ones by doing so. Whereas the
first form is conceived as being analogous with the force of nature
– natura naturans which creates everything, the second form of
imagination relates to the world of things which it destroys and
rebuilds. Added to this, there is another, third force – fancy – a
force which creates and combines things and relationships. These
three aspects of the capacity of imagination affect and interact
with each other. They create images, destroy them, combine their
element to form new images in constant oscillating motion.
Herder believed the power of imagination to be the
connection between body and soul, for Kant and Fichte it was the
bridge between reason and the senses. In Kant's famous formulation,
where feelings without ideas are blind and ideas without feelings
are dead, the power of imagination is recognised as being necessary
for every conceptual cognition. However, cultural development has
not adhered to this norm. Empty ideas and images without concept
have spread. In more and more areas of society, fiction has become
reality and reality has become fictitious. Under the heading "A New
Power of Imagination", Vilém Flusser attempted, from a more historic
perspective to differentiate between four stages of development of
the power of imagination in the context of human history: First, we
stepped back from the world to be able to imagine it. Then we
stepped back from the imagination to be able to describe it. The we
stepped back from linear written criticism to be able to analyse it.
Finally we project synthetic images from the analysis thanks to this
new imagination. In other words, concludes Flusser, the challenge we
face is to jump from the linear level of existence into the zero
dimension (into “nothing”).20
Another concept arises in the context of the imaginary
in the French discussion of this issue which adds yet another
dimension of meaning. Jean-Paul Sartre defined the imaginary as the
"irrealist" function of the conscious, within which the conscious
creates absent objects, makes them present and by doing so creates
an imaginary relationship to its objects.21
For Jacques Lacan, the imaginary belongs to a pre-linguistic bodily
condition in which the individual is not yet aware of his limits and
his deficiencies.22
According to this, the imaginary has its origins in the
identification of the infant with the mother which is so strong it
cannot imagine itself as being "different" from her. The infant's
fascination is being impressed by the bodily unity of the mother. As
if looking in the mirror, the mother's bodily completeness enables
the child to feel its own intactness and power. However the
experience of the wholeness of the mother leads to an endangering of
our own "completeness" and to an experience of incompleteness and
dependency on others. This experience of our own incompleteness and
finite nature is also the origin of the sexual subject. According to
Lacan, the imaginary and its world of images precedes the symbolic
and its world of language. Cornelius Castoriadis examines this
position further and defines the relationship between the two as a
relationship where the imaginary has to use the symbolic, not just
to “express” itself, but also it needs the symbolic to “exist at
all”, to become something that is not just merely virtual. He adds
that the most elaborate madness, just as the most secret and
outrageous fantasy is made of “images,” however these images have
another meaning and therefore have a symbolic function and in the
opposite direction, symbolism requires capacity of imagination (capacité
imaginaire), as it involves the capability of seeing one thing in
another or seeing a thing in a different way from what it actually
is. To the extent that the imaginary can be traced by to its
original capability of using imagination to summon up a thing or
relationship that is not present (which are not observed or were
never observed), we can speak of a last or radical imaginary
as the common root of current imaginary or the symbolic.
It involves the elementary capacity which can not be traced back any
further of calling up an image.23
This takes us into the work of Baudrillard.
III. Baudrillard’s Contribution
We are going to end up
looking for imagination in places further and further from power –
from any form of power whatever – (and definitely far removed from
cultural power, which has become the most conventional and
professional form their is). Among the excluded, the immigrants, the
homeless. But that will really take a lot of imagination because
they, who no longer even have an image, are themselves the
by-products of a whole society’s loss of imagination, of the loss of
any social imagination. And this is indeed the point. We shall soon
see it is no use trying to locate the imagination somewhere. Quite
simply, because there no longer is any. The day this becomes
patently obvious, the vague collective disappointment hanging over
us today will become a massive sickening feeling.24
For a long time Jean Baudrillard was perceived as a
"cult author" whose analyses and feelings had a lasting influence on
the way of life of a whole generation of young authors. Today, he is
an established author whose assessments of the current era can
scarcely be ignored. At first, Baudrillard appeared, especially to
those influenced by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, as an
outsider whose thoughts and views were most easily dismissed by
labelling them as having too little scientific basis. It is
Baudrillard's courage in taking unusual standpoints that attracted
and continues to attract much interest from those who are looking
for an understanding of our time. As in his early career,
Baudrillard is still an author unwilling to compromise, who
formulates his thoughts, hypotheses and views without offering
conventional scientific reasoning for them, who sees developments,
describes tendencies and overemphasises that which he regards as
being characteristic. He is not an author of criticism, who – as
Adorno correctly observed – unwillingly affirms the object of
criticism, he is beyond the scope of conventional scientific
analysis. Baudrillard diagnoses new developments, creates new
scenarios and sees relations, the legitimacy of which remains
controversial. He formulates points of view and meanings that
require the reader to accept their fundamental terms in order to be
able to follow them and it is difficult to avoid being drawn into
his ideas. There are not many other authors who divide their readers
into those for and against as Baudrillard does. The radical nature
of his thinking and models tends to polarise opinions but it is very
important to a contemporary discussion of imagination.
Building on the Agony of the Real, Baudrillard
develops his understanding of the erosion of the difference between
reality and the signs of reality.25
Reality is replaced by signs of reality. This results in a
duplication which creates the hyperreal which can no longer
be separated from the real and the imaginary. The hyperreal creates
simulation; it questions the possibility of differentiating between
"true" and "false" and "real" and "imaginary"; it points to the
erosion of the distinction, of the lack of reference of images and
signs, to the loss of equivalence, representation and the sign as a
value. Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that the real America
is itself a Disneyland. According to Baudrillard, the imaginary of
Disneyland is neither right nor wrong, it is a machine of
dissuasion, a stage to reanimate the fiction of the real. Thus the
debility of this imaginary, its infantile degeneration. He describes
this as an attempt to conceal that the real infantility is
ubiquitous and that even the adults play children here to allow
their real infantility to appear illusory.26
In a similar way, the Watergate scandal is interpreted as the
simulation of a scandal with the aim of creating morality. The logic
of simulation has nothing to do with the logic of facts. Simulation
destroys differences and causes an implosion of reason. Attempts to
stop the erosion of the real, its disintegration into images and
signs and the continuing immaterialisation of mankind are futile.
The real does not efface
itself in favour of the imaginary; it effaces itself in favour of
the more real than the real: the hyperreal. The truer than true:
this is simulation. Presence does not efface itself before
emptiness, but before a redoubling of presence... Nor does empty
space before the full, but before repletion and saturation...
Movement does not disappear as much into immobility as into speed
and acceleration – into the more mobile than movement, so to speak,
which pushes it to the limit while stripping it of sense. Sexuality
does not fade into sublimation, repression and morality, but fades
much more surely into the more sexual than sex: porn, the
hypersexuality contemporaneous with the hyperreal. More generally
things visible do not come to an end in obscurity and silence –
instead they fade into the more visible than visible: obscenity.27
Communication becomes communication for communication's
sake. The scenery and its reference points are destroyed, and the
screen and inter-connectivity take their place. There is no
transcendence or depth any more, they have been replaced by what
Baudrillard believed to be the immanent surface of operations
unfolding, the smooth and functional surface of communication.28
The imaging of the world is helped to progress by the
abstraction, acceleration, miniaturisation, ubiquity, destruction
of time and space and the commercial character
of images and electronic encephalisation. Images
of the everyday world are transmitted by orbiting satellites. The
satellisation of the real is inescapable and results in a
tendency to transpose body and actions in electronic commands. The
private sphere is disappearing along with the public sphere.
According to Baudrillard, obscenity begins precisely when there is
no more spectacle, no more scene, when all becomes transparence and
immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to the harsh and
inexorable light of information and communication.29
Sexuality becomes obscene in a way that is all too visual. It is the
obscenity of a world which completely becomes information and no
longer hides any secrets. Baudrillard defined obscenity as a
condition where all secrets, spaces and scenes abolished in a single
dimension of information.30
It is not only the sexual but also cold communication which
degenerates into obscenity. The absolute immediacy of things, the
overexposure caused by the transparency of the world
encourages this development. The sexual becomes a mere ritual of
transparency.31
The sexual has the task of hiding the what is left of reality and by
doing so takes on something of this incorporeal passion. The bodies
become immaterial in the imaging – they become transparent.
Baudrillard believed that the obscenity of our culture resides in
the confusion of desire and its equivalent materialized in the
image; not only for sexual desire, but in the desire for knowledge
and its equivalent in “information,” the desire for fantasy and its
equivalent materialized in the Disneylands of the world, the desire
for space and its equivalent programmed into vacation itineraries,
the desire for play and its equivalent programmed into private
telematics.32
It is this promiscuity and the ubiquity of images, the viral
contamination of things by images. This is compounded by an
insurrection of the signs which accelerate and transcend the
images, which become independent and intermix with each other.33
The rituals of transparency provide clarity, control and
hygiene, they imply the eradication of germs and the battle against
bacteria and viruses. Its aim is a human being that is immune to the
outside world, who only wants to resemble himself and who is not
aware of any distracting external influences and who meets
ubiquitous reproductions of himself. According to Baudrillard,
similarity no longer relates to others, more it refers to the
unlimited similarity of the individual with himself when it is
reduced to its constituent elements. The meaning of difference
changes along with this. According to Baudrillard, it no longer
exists between two subjects rather it refers to the unlimited
differentiation within the same subject, fatality finds itself in a
drunken state, splitting into the identical, in the "narcissistic"
belief in its own signature and its own formula. He described this
as being alienated from oneself, from one's multiple clones, from
all these little isomorphic “I”s.34
Fatality encompasses the relationship of the internally split,
individual resembling itself for whom the sexual and social horizon
of others no longer exists. It also determines the relationship of
mankind to the world of objects. Today, the Sphinx no longer asks
man the question: "What is human?" rather it is man who asks the
Sphinx "what is non-human?" Do we still encounter the non-human and
if so, how does it react towards us? However, the Sphinx, i.e. the
world of objects, yields few answers. A few times it breaks the
rules of silence and gives secret answers to the conundrum of what
the non-human might be. Baudrillard studied the world of
signs, simulacra and simulation – the world of symbolic exchange –
for a long time in which death was the position from where the
reversal of all distinctions and oppositions started. Later,
however, it was the world of objects of appearance and
seduction that interested him more and more. This
involved a double spiral, which Baudrillard saw as turning to the
world of signs, simulacra and simulation in an all encompassing
manner and exists in the irreversibility of all signs and in the
shadows of availability and death and that these alternate in the
paradigms in the course of the spiral, without giving up their
antagonistic positions. On the one side – political economy,
production, the code, the system, simulation – on the other –
potlatch, expenditure, sacrifice, death, female, seduction" and
finally the fatalist.35
There is no place for symbolic references in seduction
any more, no object that has vanished and no desire.
The imaginary was the
alibi of the real, a world dominated by the reality principle.
Today, it is the real that has become the alibi of the model, in a
world controlled by the principle of simulation. And,
paradoxically, it is the real that has become our true utopia – but
a utopia that is no longer in the realm of the possible, that can
only be dreamt of as one would dream of a lost object.36
The objects themselves take the initiative and are the seducers.
Their fate and not the desire of the subjects has become the focus.
In the course of this development the objects have transcended their
boundaries and can no longer be regarded within the framework of a
critical theory. According to Baudrillard, instead of this, there is
a need for a fatal theory which is not transcendent, but
immanent. He believed our banality was immanent in the manner in
which the indifference of the effects is their own cause and that
banality had again become something great – the fatality of the
modern world and a fatal vision of the banal was required to
counteract the banal (conventional and religious) visions of the
fatal.37
The term "fatality" does not refer to something fatalistic or
Apocalyptic. It refers to processes of change which can no longer be
explained in terms of the order of cause and effect, which are
neither deterministic nor aleatory, but which are subject to a chain
of higher necessities, which drive matters to a point of no return –
into a spiral that does not lead to their production, rather their
disappearance. Everything that links together outside of the
subject, i.e. on the side of disappearance, is fatal.38
To some extent these thoughts seem to touch on those of
Heidegger and Adorno, however the differences soon become apparent.
They are gaining in plausibility as a possible scenario for current
and future development patterns when they are viewed within the
scope of Baudrillard's theory of seduction. According to
this, seduction never involves exact symbols but empty, nebulous,
arbitrary and unpredictable symbols.
Modern unreality no longer
implies the imaginary, it engages more reference, more truth, more
exactitude – it consists in having everything pass into the absolute
evidence of the real. ...Absolute repression: by giving you a
little too much one takes away everything.39
Seduction is not about a process of exchange but a
duel-like moment and all of the superficiality that accompanies it.
Seduction causes things to take on a condition of pure appearance
and to be consumed in this condition. Seduction according to
Baudrillard is only that which puts the appearance of secrecy into
circulation and motion.40
It does not target desire but appearance and
disappearance. It uses the subtle delight that beings and things
feel when they themselves remain secret in their sign whereas the
truth uses the obscene force which coerces the sign to reveal
everything.41
Seduction targets the transgression of mankind and things, not their
production. It is not uncommonly the place where the spheres of
making things appear and disappear meet. Seduction encompasses a
game in which performance, withdrawal, camouflage and pretence all
have a part. Whereas the thinking of Baudrillard which relates to
one side of the double spiral and which can be grouped together
using terms such as simulation, obscenity and
transparency have been received in Germany (albeit not without
controversy), the thinking relating to the other side of the double
helix which focuses on terms such as seduction, fractality
and fatality has not been as widely understood. Few have
dared to confront its radical nature which requires us to take a new
view of the relationship between subject and object and a
re-evaluation of their relationship.
Baudrillard has not spoken directly of a “radical
imaginary.” However, in his multi-faceted work, he points to what we
might refer to as the radical imaginary as few others have managed.
In the course of doing so, he discovered interactions that few
before him have understood:
Unlike the discourse of
the real which gambles on the fact of there being something rather
than nothing, and aspires to be founded on the guarantee of an
objective and decipherable world, radical thought, for its part,
wagers on the illusion of the world. It aspires to the status of
illusion, restoring the non-veracity of facts, the non-signification
of the world, proposing the opposite hypothesis that there is
nothing rather than something, and going in pursuit of that nothing
which runs beneath the apparent continuity of meaning.42
For Baudrillard, in our increasingly simulated environments we are
moving further away from the imaginary into the lowest degree of
illusion.
Christoph Wulf is Professor
of General and Comparative Educational Science and a member of the
Interdisciplinary Centre for Historical Anthropology at the Free
University Berlin. He is also a member of the Graduate School
“Staging the Body” and of the Interdisciplinary Research Centre
“Cultures of the Performative” at the Free University Berlin.
Recent writings include: Anthropology of Education, Münster 2002;
Traité d’anthropologie historique:
Philosophies, Histoires, Cultures, Paris 2002; Corpo, cosmo,
cultura. Encyclopaedia
antropologica, Milano 2002;
Anthropologie. Geschichte, Kultur, Philosophie, Reinbek 2004;
Bildung im Ritual, Wiesbaden
2004; Penser les pratiques sociales
comme rituels, Paris 2004;
Mimésis. Culture, Art, Société, Paris 2005 (with Gebauer;
English translation, Berkeley 1995);
Ikonologie des Performativen,
München 2005; Zur Genese des
Sozialen: Mimesis, Performativität, Ritual, Bielefeld 2005.
Endnotes
1
This paper was presented at the Baudrillard and the Arts: A
Tribute to His 75th Birthday. A Symposium at the Center for
Art and Media in Karlsruhe, Germany, in July 16-18, 2004. See:
http://www.zkm.de/baudrillard-treffen
2
Jean Baudrillard. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (c
1991). Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press,
1995:49.
3
Kool Killer
(1978)
is a collection of articles by Baudrillard that has also not
been translated into English. See also Jean Baudrillard. The
Consumer Society. (c 1970, Paris: Editions Denoel). London:
SAGE, 1998; and Jean Baudrillard. Fatal Strategies: Crystal
Revenge. (c 1983, Paris: Editions Grasset), New York:
Semiotexte, 1990. More conclusive
evidence for this hypothesis can be found in Seduction (c
1979, Paris: Editions Galilee). Montreal: New World
Perspectives, 1990; America (c 1986, Paris: Editions
Grasset) New York: Verso, 1988; and
The Gulf War Did Not Take Place
(c 1991, Paris: Editions Galiliee) Bloomington Indiana:
University of Indiana Press, 1995.
4
See Jean Baudrillard. The Transparency of Evil: Essays On
Extreme Phenomena. (c 1990, Paris: Editions Galilee)
London: Verso, 1993; The Illusion of the End. (c 1992,
Paris: Editions Galilee). Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1994; and The Perfect Crime (c 1995, Paris: Editions
Galilee) New York: Verso, 1996.
5
Jean Baudrillard. Paroxysm (c1997). New York: Verso,
1998:3.
6
Given the profound nature of the
changes we have undergone in contemporary society, perhaps many
things Baudrillard sees were not “visible” in previous times
(Ed).
7
Dietmar Kamper. Wunsch. In:
Christoph Wulf (Ed.): Vom Menschen. Handbuch Historische
Anthropologie, Weinheim and Basel, 1997:592
(Translation: mine).
8
Hans Belting. Bild-Anthropologie.
Entwürfe einer Bildwissenschaft: München, 2001:89.
10
Gottfried Boehm. Die Bilderfrage In
Was ist ein Bild?. (Edited by Gottfried Boehm) Munich, 1994:330.
12
Maurice
Merleau-Ponty. Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare.
München, 1994:175.
13
Arnold Gehlen. Der Mensch. Seine
Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Frankfurt:
Gesamtausgabe Bd. 3, 1993:383.
(Translation: mine).
14
Johannes Flügge. Die Entfaltung
der Anschauungskraft. Heidelberg, 1963:93.
15
Arnold Gehlen.
Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt.
Frankfurt: Gesamtausgabe Bd. 3, 1993:374. (Translation:
mine).
16
Wolfgang Iser.
Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre. Perspektiven Literarischer
Anthropologie, Frankfurt, 1991:293.
17
Theodor Adorno.
Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie.
Neuwied u.a. 3, 1971:62 ff. (Translation: mine).
18
David Hume.
A Treatise of
Human Nature
(1739-40). In L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (Eds.), Oxford
University Press, 1975:24.
19
Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. Biographia Literaria I (Collected Works,
Volume 7). James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Eds.), 1983:304.
20
Vilém Flusser.
Eine neue Einbildungskraft. In: Volker Bohn (Ed.):
Bildlichkeit: Frankfurt, 1999:125 ff.
21
Jean-Paul
Sartre. Das Imaginäre.
Phänomenologische Psychologie der Einbildungskraft.
Reinbek, 1971.
22
Jacques Lacan.
Das Spiegelstadium als Bildner der Ichfunktion. In:
ders.: Schriften I, Weinheim u.a., 1986.
23
Cornelius
Castoriadis. Gesellschaft als imaginäre Institution. Entwurf
einer politischen Philosophie, Frankfurt, 1984:218.
24
Jean Baudrillard. “TV Fantasies“ Liberation (June 3, 1996). In
Screened Out. New York: Verso, 2002:190.
25
Published in German as: Jean Baudrillard. Agonie des Realen
is a collection of articles by Baudrillard published only in
German by Merve Publishing, 1978.
27
Jean Baudrillard. Fatal Strategies (c 1983). New York:
Semiotext(e) 1990:11.
28
Jean Baudrillard. Das Andere
selbst. Vienna, 1987:10ff.
31
Jean Baudrillard. Die Fatalen
Strategien, München 1985. Published in English as
Fatal
Strategies: Crystal Revenge.
(c 1983, Paris: Editions Grasset), New York: Semiotexte, 1990.
32
Jean Baudrillard.
Amerika.
Matthes and Seitz. Munich, 1987:29.
33
Jean Baudrillard. Kool Killer oder der Aufstand der Zeichen.
Berlin, 1978.
34
Jean
Baudrillard. Das Andere selbst. Vienna, 1987:33
ff.
36
Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation (c 1981). Ann
Arbour, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994:123.
37
Jean Baudrillard. Das Andere
selbst. Vienna, 1987:66
ff.
39
Jean Baudrillard. Seduction (c 1979).
Montreal:
New World Perspectives, 1990:30.
42
Jean Baudrillard. The Perfect Crime (c 1995). New York:
Verso, 1996:97-98.
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