Volume 2, Number
2 (July 2005)
“Baudrillard
Bytes”: Selection From Digital Matters: Theory and Culture of the
Matrix1
Dr. Jan L. Harris
(The Institute for Social Research,
University of Salford, Greater Manchester, UK).
and
Dr. Paul Taylor
(Institute of Communications Studies,
Leeds University, UK).
I.
Introduction
No doubt it is
partly what Orwell called nostalgie de la boue. But it is a
nostalgia prompted by the sense that the entire world is now a space
traversed by signals, everything virtual,
and
nothing
solid; our employments increasingly having to do with abstract
operations, every operation stroked one way or another into the
digital network economy. To go
“home”
was to return for a time to a time where, at the risk of sounding
like the bleary-eyed saloon-bar crooner, and to quote the historian
Robert Colls, nobody talked of
“community”
and everybody belonged to one.2
Our continued
interest in Baudrillard's work is founded upon the sophisticated
manner with which he puts intellectual substance into otherwise
largely inchoate perceptions of the pathologically enervated nature
of contemporary life. Such perceptions are a result of the cultural
dominance of surfaces over symbolic content as vividly described in
Gordon Burn's above lament for the growing loss of something so
essential to our human identity as community. In developing our
analysis of digital matters, we supplement Baudrillard's insights
with a consideration of other theorists who can help us add further
to his account of the systemic, matrix-driven nature of contemporary
culture.
We combine
theorists normally associated with the information society with
those who are not, but who we claim are
nevertheless
crucial for a fuller understanding of the non-technological aspects
of the digital. In the book proper, we focus in particular upon the
work of Jacques Ellul, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Kittler and
Niklas Luhmann, whilst in these amended extracts we concentrate (for
obvious reasons) upon our use of Baudrillard and prefigurements of
his thought in the earlier works of Georg Lukács and Georg
Simmel. Our summaries of various thinkers serve to outline the
processes by which an informatic capitalism has come into existence.
Nevertheless, by typically adopting a neutral tone and perspective,
some of these accounts remain curiously
“bloodless”.
It is because our concern is not only the theory of the matrix but
also the cultural and experiential consequences of its institution
that we continually return to the work of Baudrillard. Perhaps more
than any other theorist, Baudrillard has attempted to articulate the
cultural consequences of the fusion of commodity, subject and
environment within a generalized space of informatic flows.
This blurring is the phenomenon that inspires the plot of the
Matrix films, and Morpheus (the character that delivers Neo from
his enslavement to simulation), when revealing the world that exists
outside of the computer-generated simulation in which humanity is
enslaved, declares, in homage to Baudrillard, “welcome to the desert
of the real”. Another significant allusion to Baudrillard occurs in
the same film, when one of Baudrillard’s
key theoretical accounts of hyperreality, the book
Simulations (1983), appears as a literally hollowed out
container in which the protagonist’s
computer disks are stored. We suggest that the pun is deeper than it
may appear. Baudrillard’s
insights are inevitably hollowed out themselves as a result of
Hollywood’s
movie treatment of the simulation phenomenon of which it is a more
than a willing accomplice. Yet at the same time, these allusions
also demonstrate the currency that Baudrillard’s
account of the modern scene
possesses outside the academy, wherein he has often been castigated
for the extremity, and the seemingly arbitrary logic, of his claims.
Whatever is presently understood by the phrase
“the
matrix”, it is safe to assume that for most people it has
connotations relating to digital phenomena. We argue that, to match
its simultaneously abstract and material nature, the matrix can be
conceived of in both much more philosophical and grounded ways than
attention to mere digitality on its own
affords. The
title of our book, Digital Matters, is deliberately chosen
for its ambivalent meaning. It is intended to signify the
perhaps most obvious meaning of “issues relating to the subject of
digital technology,” but we also want to draw attention to a central
tension of digital technology: the paradoxically immaterial
materiality of its virtual qualities – the im/material. A central
element of our argument is that digital technology is significant,
less for its most recent technological manifestations
of
software and plastic mouldings, than the way in which it represents
the culmination of ultimately much more significant complex
historical processes.
We seek to look behind the superficial
Hollywood-driven popular culture notion of the Matrix.
In a manner
reminiscent of Heidegger's assertion in his seminal essay The
Question Concerning Technology that the essence of technology is
not actually
technological, we suggest that the essence of the digital does not
reside in bytes. Against the Matrix we present a
sustained focus upon the “matrix”: a society-wide complex
imbrication of socio-technical enframement where human agency is
limited by an integrated circuit made up of simultaneously
technological and commodity values. For us, the essence of the
digital is the enframing manner with which it circumscribes our
whole mentality to life
–
and that is why it matters.
II. The Im/materiality Of The Matrix
Communication is envisaged less as an exchange of meanings, of
ideas…and more as performance propelled into movement by variously
materialized signifiers. It is enframed into hardwares, guided by
rules and styles and ‘crowned’ by signified effects that, once
sufficiently routinized, can appear as realms of their own. To hold,
as Derrida did in Grammatology, that signifier and signified
cannot be isolated against each other, would constitute the minimal
claim of the program. The deconstructionist project uncovered
implications of the minimal claim, pursuing the infinite play of
meanings as traces without ultimate origin and control. The present
enterprise takes another direction. It is concerned with potentials
and pressures of stylization residing in techniques, technologies,
materials, procedures, and ‘media’.3
Like Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer and their above argument for the
increased need to attend to the materiality of communication, we
have centred our project upon tracing the origins of agendas of
control and demonstrating how techniques and procedures come
together in digital matters. Indeed, their statement could almost be
taken as a manifesto for various theorists who seek to compensate
for the relative over-concentration in recent times upon the
signified to the exclusion of the signifier. We argue against the
creation of an opposition between a neutral and incorporeal
conception of information and communication and the material
channels that transmit this information. Instead, communication and
information must be understood as an im/material performance in
which none of the factors involved can be privileged over the other:
medium and message must be approached as a single im/material
complex. We consistently emphasize that digital modes of
communication are not neutral. Although premised upon the rapid flow
of information in the seemingly immaterial and neutral form of
binary 1s and 0s, this mode of propulsion has historical antecedents
in both earlier forms of media and the substance of city
environments. We examine in detail the notion of enframement
and how, whilst the virtual realities of digital matters may appear
as radical new realms of their own, there is nonetheless precedence
for them in an extended history of socio-technological enframement,
and more specifically in the evolution of media technologies as a
part of this history.
A growing interest in the
work of Friedrich Kittler4
and volumes such as Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer’s
Materialities of Communication5
suggest that there exists a small but stubborn body of theorists
who: “…are
looking for underlying constraints whose technological, material,
procedural, and performative potentials have been all too easily
swallowed up by interpretational habits”.6
This position would involve a break with notions of creative
reception on the behalf of users/viewers/readers in favour of a
concern with the tools they employ. Thus, the work of the so-called
‘hardware
faction’
can be seen as the media equivalent of technological determinism.
The often highly speculative theory of Baudrillard (at least as it
is commonly understood) might seem to be part of the focus upon
interpretational habits
to the exclusion of technological hardware
in so far as one definition of hyperreality is “the exaltation of
signs based on the denial of the reality of things”.7
However, as we shall see, the exaltation of signs that Baudrillard
believes characteristic of our epoch is not an escape from
materiality or hardware but
rather
the enframed outcome of their working configurations8.
III. Don't Forget Baudrillard – In Defence Of Pessimism
Today the scene
and the mirror have given way to a screen and a network. There is no
longer any transcendence or depth, but only the immanent surface of
operations unfolding, the smooth and functional surface of
communication.9
The
technological plane is an abstraction: in ordinary life we are
practically unconscious of the technological reality of objects. Yet
this abstraction is profoundly real: it is what governs all radical
transformations of our environment.10
Provocative
titles such as The Evil Demon of Images, The Transparency of Evil
and The Perfect Crime reflect
Baudrillard’s
consistent attention to the pathological explicitness of media
technologies and
his acknowledgement of
the extirpation of symbolic cultural resources that results
from their ubiquity.
A key appeal of Baudrillard is this
fidelity with which
he
pursues the logical conclusions of his analysis no matter how
pessimistic they are.
This is a quality
he shares with such thinkers as Ellul and Heidegger and perhaps less
often noted, McLuhan, who beneath the techno-boosterist surface
interpretation (predictably favoured by media commentators) made
such
dark warnings about the harmful cultural effects of the media
as:
…the
power of the image to beget image, and of technology to reproduce
itself via human intervention, is utterly in excess of our power to
control the psychic and social consequences…It
is the medium that is the message because the medium creates an
environment that is as indelible as it is lethal.11
All these thinkers thus share a central concern – the notion that
technology cannot be neutral since its material components always
already testify to something beyond themselves. Allied to Ellul’s
belief in technology’s
essential autonomy from social control is Heidegger and Baudrillard’s
conceptualisation
of technology as a self-determining system that coerces its human
components into roles they must play within this system. A ready
outline of this system and its social consequences can be seen in
the following vivid description by Michel de Certeau of how the
roots of the matrix lie within the pre-digital:
We witness the
advent of number. It comes with democracy, the large city,
administrations, cybernetics. It is a flexible and continuous mass,
woven tight like a fabric with neither rips nor darned patches, a
multitude of quantified heroes who lose names and faces as they
become the ciphered river of the streets, a mobile language of
computations and rationalities that belong to no one.12
De Certeau adumbrates the complex admixture of factors involved in
digital matters. His stress is on a generalised
numericity, most fully realised in the calculation and processing of
the digital, but one that that has its origins in a range of numerisations,
in the installation of the rule of numbers. It is urban, democratic
(the count as the index of democracy), and facilitates the
administration of the polis. It abstracts and so produces an
existential anonymity (“just
a number”):
the noble subjects of history become the “ciphered river of the
streets.” Most important, however, is the inextricable relation
between number as abstraction, enframement and circumspection and
the fluidity it induces. This mixture of mobility and abstract
codification is one that is encountered repeatedly in Baudrillard's
oeuvre and constitutes the context, the matrix no less, in which
digital matters emerge and operate.
De Certeau highlights the
processes through which inhabitants of the city become translated
into elements of an urban flux. In Digital Matters we develop
the conceptual ramifications of this transformation through an
exploration of the continuities (cultural alignment) between urban
and digital flows.
Increases
in
the quantity of flows produce a qualitative change so that the
process of translation, facilitated by digital technology, creates a
complex combination of social environment, commodity and
subjectivity that results in the seemingly autonomous realm known as
cyberspace. To explore this complex admixture, we trace the early
origins of commodity culture in the nascent urbanization of the
industrial revolution that Ellul singled out as the Archimedean
point in the changed relationship between human society and its
technologies, drawing upon the work of various social theorists in
order to further explore the notion of the city and metropolitan
life as being fundamentally recast by informational flows. We show
how the matrix, commonly conceived as an underlying network of
computer systems, in fact has its roots in a culturally aligned
matrix of commodity culture, and technological reproduction.
It
had its inception in the Industrial Revolution from which the
Information Revolution can be seen to descend directly.
McLuhan13
asserted that once you have the assembly line it does not matter
substantially whether you produce Cadillacs or cornflakes on it: in
Ellul's terms la téchnique is dominant whatever the output.
This levelling out of content has an even more powerful effect when,
in the realm of digital matters, material objects and immaterial
media content are conflated to exacerbate the tension of the im/material.
From this perspective, Baudrillard's musings upon advanced
communication systems and their immanent surface of operations is in
keeping with a tradition of technologically deterministic thought
that holds that, beyond a certain threshold, technology can no
longer be seen in terms of a instrument deployed by a society, but
must be approached as a substantive entity in its own right:
technological enframement begins to determine the structure of
society. This qualitative development is a shift that reflects the
quantity/quality pole that is a dominant theoretical presence in the
work of Benjamin, McLuhan et. al. What began with the mechanical
reproduction of objects and media reaches a markedly new level in
digital matters – the surface-level operations of computer code
replace in-depth communication.
Baudrillard is
thus
a particularly suitable guide with whom to consider the tension of
the im/material and the rise of the advent of number. As the above
quotations show, he emphasizes the functional and operational nature
of networks made for circulation. He is particularly aware of both
the manner by which technology can involve a process of abstraction,
an escape from the matter/matrix within which the human has been
fashioned and reproduced, as well as the way in which its immaterial
form is frequently felt within society at a material level, either
by individuals using digital technologies or, more subtly, by the
alterations it produces on the whole cultural environment –
McLuhan's psychic and social complex. His work is an invaluable
guide to the paradox of this im/materiality and its numerous
manifestations. The fetishization of commodities that Marx
identifies in terms of their “metaphysical subtleties and
theological niceties” is aptly complemented by
Baudrillard’s vivid analysis of a
society in which such metaphysical attributes are relayed in a
self-enclosed network of screens devoted to the reproduction of
self-referential images.
In an example of the imbricated nature of the im/material, these
circulating images in turn rest upon our prior enculturation with a
complex circuit of physical commodities: Baudrillard’s system of
objects.
IV.
Baudrillard's Bringing-forth Of Furniture
There was a time
when it was not technology alone that bore the name techne. Once
that revealing that brings forth truth into the splendour of radiant
appearing was also called techne. Once there was a time when the
bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was also called techne.
And the poiesis of the fine arts was also called techne.14
Despite Baudrillard's trendy and somewhat misleading cachet as a
theorist of the Matrix the lineage of his work can be traced
to more substantive philosophical concerns underlying the
historical
enframing matrix of
which
digital matters
are merely the latest manifestation.
Baudrillard’s
perspective
on the symbolic loss that accompanies technological proliferation
can be explored
further by considering
the radical pessimism and optimism of the writings of Heidegger15
and Benjamin16
respectively. Heidegger has been accused of a reactionary idealism
for invoking a pre-lapsarian age before art and technology were
sundered. He harks back to an Ancient Greece in which technology and
art were a single, non-alienated entity. Much more optimistically,
but ultimately reinforcing Heidegger’s
conclusion that art and technology have become sundered, Benjamin
suggests that the proliferation of images made possible by the
photographic process of chemical – mechanical reproduction
represents a point at which the quantitative increase of images
leads to a qualitative change in their nature. This matches Ellul’s
identification of the Industrial Revolution’s
increase in output as marking a qualitative change in the
human/technology relationship and is a central element of first
McLuhan and then Baudrillard's interpretation of the enervating
cultural effects of the media. Benjamin uses it to argue that the
advent of photography and its mechanical reproduction of images
represent the death of the traditional conception of art:
To an
ever-greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of
art designed for reproducibility. From a photographic negative, for
example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for the
‘authentic’
print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion of authenticity
ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function
of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to
be based on another practice – politics.17
Like Heidegger, Benjamin recognizes the tendency of technology’s
ability to strip away authenticity but proceeds to make a positive
political interpretation of this reduction. Art is now freed by
photography’s
impact from its hierarchical and ritualistic role to produce images
that can empower rather than dominate the masses. In stark contrast,
Heidegger believed that only art in its refusal of utility “may
expressly foster the growth of the saving power” that protects
humanity from the danger of withdrawal from Being
(humankind's alienation from authentic experience due to
technology's mediation of
directly
experienced reality).
For Heidegger, the
“letting
be” that constitutes a non-alienated approach to Being is always
presented in terms of the artisanal, in the form of authentic craft.
Consider in this light the following passage:
One can object
that today every village cabinetmaker works with machines…
[Such objections fall] flat, because [they have] heard only half of
what the discussion has to say about handicraft. The cabinetmaker’s
craft was chosen as an example, and it was presupposed thereby that
it would not occur to anyone that through the choice of this example
is the expectation announced that the condition of our planet could
in the foreseeable future, or indeed ever, be changed back into a
rustic idyll…However
it was specifically noted that what maintains and sustains even this
handicraft was not the mere manipulations of tools but the
relatedness to wood. But where in the manipulations of the
industrial worker is there any relatedness to such things as the
shapes slumbering in the wood?18
Although Heidegger here clearly acknowledges the impossibility of
returning the planet to the conditions that preceded the
depredations of a technological society, he nonetheless believes
that certain practices remain the site of possible recuperation. The
“shapes slumbering in the wood” act as a trope for what is lost in
the technological process, the previously cited Baudrillardian point
that: “There is no longer any transcendence or depth, but only the
immanent surface of operations unfolding, the smooth and functional
surface of communication”.19
Heidegger could be
accused of a certain fetishism of craft production in arguing that
the relatedness to the wood of the modern cabinetmaker who uses
machine tools is somehow superior to that of the manipulations of
industry. The forms that the cabinetmaker reveals are said to
slumber in the wood, yet it is unclear as to when a form slumbers
and when it is pressed upon matter. The part of the process that
Heidegger privileges is
“the
relatedness to the wood”. The hands-on approach to wood, even
mediated by machinery, still confronts the aura of the wood
directly. Mass-produced cabinets are not totally aura-free because
they are made of originally auratic material (even mass-manufactured
pieces of wood can retain some of the individual characteristics of
their tree’s
whorls and burls), but their authenticity is deeply submerged within
the mass production matrix from which they are “challenged forth.”
Heidegger’s
example of cabinet making raises interesting questions regarding the
position of an object with respect to the broader existential
background from which it derives its individuality. It intimates the
existence of a matrix underlying the social use of objects that
prefigures its much more explicit development in the digital Matrix.
Thus it is perhaps not as surprising as it otherwise might be that
Baudrillard,
the
arch
post-modern theorist knowingly referred to in the
Matrix
movie, should
address, in one of his earliest works The System of Objects,20
the
superficially prosaic,
existential
significance
of furniture.
Baudrillard uses
furniture,
in
a similar fashion to Heidegger, as an exemplum of a lost
authenticity that is
exacerbated within
digital matters. He contrasts traditional and mass-produced
furniture showing how furniture handed down from one generation to
the next stands in a different relationship to concepts such as aura
and authenticity than mass-produced furniture, designed as it is as
part of a pre-ordained matrix that follows the commerce-inspired
modish trends of the interior design industry:
Whereas the
old-fashioned dining-room was heavily freighted with moral
convention,
‘modern’
interiors, in their ingeniousness, often give the impression of
being mere functional expedients…The
modern set of furniture, serially produced, is thus apparently
destructured yet not restructured, nothing having replaced the
expressive power of the old symbolic order.21
The loss of symbolism Baudrillard highlights relates to the
Being-denuded nature of Benjamin’s
technologically rich
life-world in which
the
aura
of direct experience is pumped out “like water from a sinking ship”.
This loss of aura
is a direct consequence of mechanical reproduction and the serial
nature of mass-produced objects that are set apart from the craft
objects that Heidegger seeks to privilege. To position
oneself effectively within a matrix of seriality requires the
requisite amount of reverse adaptation:
First of all man
must stop mixing himself up with things and investing them with his
own image; he will then be able, beyond the utility they have for
him, to project onto them his game plan, his calculations, his
discourse, and invest these manoeuvres themselves with a sense of a
message to others, and a message to oneself. By the time this point
is reached the mode of existence of
‘ambient
objects’
will have changed completely, and a sociology of furnishing will
perforce have given way to a sociology of interior design.22
In a section entitled called “Man the Interior Designer”,
Baudrillard proceeds to describe the effect upon the individual of
such positioning as one in which: “instead of consuming objects, he
dominates, controls and orders them. He discovers himself in the
manipulation and tactical equilibration of a system”.23
Baudrillard argues that objects such as furniture have – over and
above their practical functionality – “a primordial function as
vessels, a function that belongs to the register of the imaginary”.24
He suggests that
psychologically receptive objects reflect a natural form of Being:
“They are the reflection of a whole view of the world according to
which each being is a ‘vessel of inwardness’ and relations between
beings are transcendent correlations of substances”.25
For Baudrillard:
…the
project of a technological society implies putting the very question
of genesis into question and omitting all the origins, received
meanings and
‘essences’
of which our old pieces of furniture remained concrete symbols; it
implies practical computation and
conceptualisation
on the basis of a total abstraction, the notion of a world no longer
given but instead produced - mastered, manipulated, inventoried,
controlled: a world in short, that has to be constructed.26
We suggest that this is a succinct summary of Heidegger’s
distinction between the bringing-forth of Being in a fourfold
interrelated network of causes27
and the challenging-forth it is replaced with by the rise of
the networks of technology. We would highlight here Baudrillard’s
use of the word computation to describe the positioning
required from the human user. It demonstrates the link between the
matrix of serially-produced objects and the cyberspatial Matrix of
which it is a
hypostatisation.
In the particular case of
“Man the Interior Designer,”the reverse adaptation required from the
subject to exist within the world of serial objects applies to the
specific case of furniture.
By
extension,
however,
it becomes the standard mode of behaviour with which to approach all
technological artefacts that now appear as serial parts of a
totalising
technological whole rather than individual aspects of Being (Baudrillard
cites in support of his position Barthes’
similar analysis of the reverse adaptations required in the act of
driving a car). The industrially produced furniture Baudrillard
highlights is pre-designed to fit the pre-existing values of an
interior design industry and is emblematic of the essential nature
all commodities. The essence of these objects derives not from their
individual manufacture or consumption as unique objects but from
their relationship to a wider matrix of other commodities from which
they derive their meaning. Baudrillard distinguishes between the
closed structure of the bourgeois dining room and the freer
functional environment of the fashion-driven industrially produced
furniture and points out: “Somewhere between the two, in the gap
between integrated psychological space and fragmented functional
space, serial objects have their being, witnesses to both the one
and the other – sometimes within a single interior”.28
Baudrillard’s
example of modish furniture technologically produced to fit a pre-conceived
consumer framework helps us to understand better Heidegger's concept
of the danger of technology – the rather abstract-sounding
“withdrawal of withdrawal”. Heidegger's danger relates to
technology's ability to encourage in its users a forgetfulness of
the quality and extent of the mediated withdrawal from Being that
technology represents (McLuhan's narcissistic trance of the
servo-mechanism). Technology encourages us to withdraw from
recognising that technologies' mediation represents a withdrawal
from authentic Being:
a
withdrawal from withdrawal. In Baudrillard, “withdrawal from
withdrawal” assumes a much more material form
since
symbolically loaded family heirlooms are transformed into objects of
an industrial process that enframes and systematically
removes symbolic elements from our life world introducing a gap of
im/materiality between traditional Being and
technologically-mediated existence. The Heideggerian
conceptualisation
of Being may appear excessively abstruse and philosophical, but it
speaks directly to what is fundamentally different about
technological Being and what lies at the crux of digital matters and
their im/material tension. Discussing furniture in the context of
digital matters may seem rather strange but it serves to highlight,
by way of contrast, the social and cultural manifestations of
withdrawal in terms of excessive identification with the fragmented
functional space of the m/Matrix: Being is not so much let go of as
jettisoned with enthusiasm and it is this embracement of the
withdrawal from withdrawal to which we now turn.
V.
“Welcome
to the desert of the real”: Withdrawal From Withdrawal And The Ever-enframing
Matrix
Malls have
achieved their commercial success through a variety of strategies
that all depend on
‘indirect
commodification’,
a process by which nonsaleable objects, activities, and images are
purposely placed in the commodified world of the mall. The basic
marketing principle is
‘adjacent
attraction’,
where the most dissimilar objects lend each other mutual support
when they are placed next to each other…This
logic of association allows noncommodified values to enhance
commodities, but it also imposes the reverse process – previously
noncommodified entities become part of the marketplace. Once this
exchange of attributes is absorbed into the already open-ended and
indeterminate exchange between commodities and needs, associations
can resonate infinitely.29
The physical embodiment
of bringing-forth represented by crafted furniture can be
counterbalanced against the physical manifestation of the cultural
embracement of “withdrawal from withdrawal” found in the form of the
shopping mall. Its specific purpose is to provide a site for the
accumulation of commodities for consumption, and this consumption is
facilitated by the use of visual displays and imagery. The
idiosyncratic bricolage of images thrown up by the reproducible
image thus serves, in the shopping mall, a much more functional and
culturally aligned purpose. The juxtaposition of disparate subject
matter is refashioned into a commercially orientated but ever more
inclusive logic of association that Crawford defines above in terms
of “indirect commodification” or “open-ended and indeterminate
exchange.” In other words, more and more aspects of the mall (and by
extension the wider society) are either commodities themselves or,
alternatively,
in Heidegger’s terms
a standing reserve milieu for the promotion of commodities.
Thus
there
is a growing tendency for urban centres, and in particular malls, to
adopt the trappings of theme parks. Theming becomes a means of
creating exotic associations that, like the advertising they are a
sub-set of, and like the essentially tautologous nature of media,30
are based upon emotional appeal rather than rational discourse.
Commercial appropriations
of perception thus depend not just upon the decline in aura
described by Benjamin but also on the parodic or simulacral
recreation of aura in the form of the sign of authenticity. In place
of aura’s
dependency upon
irreplaceable
physical particularities, the intrinsic circulation of commodities
means that aura become a much more arbitrary and ultimately
manipulable phenomena. A non-space of abstract
commodification is created where the particularity of a space is
expunged.31
This paradoxical phrase captures the physical consequences of an
exclusively commodified social environment. It encapsulates the im/material
ambiguity that provides the basis to the social matrix of which
we repeatedly emphasise
digital matters are but an extreme and more explicit representation.
In practical terms, this space is typically experienced at first
hand in the mundane homogeneity of airports, chain hotels etc, a
homogeneity vividly captured in Jem Cohen’s
recent film Chain (2004) in which footage of the suburbs,
malls and business parks of seven different nations are spliced
together in a continuous whole to reveal a Ballardian interzone that
covers continents. The concept of the city itself has become
affected by this banalization of space to the extent that cities
themselves risk becoming less particular locations but spectacles
that compete with other cities as spectacles, thus: “their
‘imageability’ becomes the new selling point…in
this marketing war, style-of-life and ‘liveability’, visualized and
represented in spaces of conspicuous consumption, become important
assets that cities proudly display”.32
In other words, cities have become, due to the marriage of images
and the capitalist market, little more than the circulation of their
own signs. This commercial re-appropriation of aura also explains
why it is common in theme parks and shopping malls to effectively
suspend reality by simulating anachronistic and geographically
inappropriate mixes of different cultural, technological and
fictional themes – the pastiche of styles and aesthetics that went
by the name of postmodernism. The dominance of freely juxtaposed
images over rationally linked context occurs across a range of
social environments that all become subordinate to the subtle
influence of “indirect commodification” which tends towards the
conflation of various image-driven activities:
…shopping
with an intense spectacle of accumulated images and themes that
entertain and stimulate and in turn encourage more shopping. The
themes of the spectacle owe much to Disneyland and television, the
most familiar and effective commodifiers in American culture.
Theme-park attractions are now commonplace in shopping malls; indeed
the two forms converge – malls routinely entertain, while theme
parks function as disguised marketplaces. Both offer controlled and
carefully packaged public spaces and pedestrian experiences to
auto-dependent suburban families already primed for passive
consumption by television…33
It is this fluid way in
which commercial values circulate through various levels of society
(Jameson’s
“suffusion
through ever greater zones of social life”) that lies behinds
Baudrillard’s
claim that Disneyland’s
existence merely distracts us from the fact that the whole of
America is essentially Disney. It also makes visiting shopping malls
increasingly akin to the disparate effect achieved by “channel
hopping”, both in terms of the nature of the visual experience and
the content being viewed: “The system operates much like television
programming, with each network presenting slightly different
configurations of the same elements. Apparent diversity masks
fundamental homogeneity”.34
To oppose the anonymity
and abstractness of commodified non-space, in The Practices of
Every Day Life (1984), Michel de Certeau calls, as did the
Situationist Internationale, for the re-inscription of place as
practised space. This is to be achieved through the use of
playful and exploratory approaches to one’s
environment. The self-augmentation of the matrix militates
against such strategies. The shopping mall, for example, is designed
for an apparent oxymoron – the distractedly purposive pedestrian
consumer35
– who has replaced the urban wanderings of the flâneur, a
mid-nineteenth-century quasi-fictional Parisian figure described by
Baudelaire in his “Painter of Modern Life”
(1859) and
whose gaze was
painted by the Impressionists in terms that can be conceived of as a
short-lived personification/imaginative prefiguration of
Baudrillard's claim that “Today the scene and the mirror have given
way to a screen and a network”.36
The flâneur was a man in the crowd but not of the
crowd, he was a dandyish figure with enough time on his hands to
observe the constant motion of the vibrant city that passed him by
as an impartial spectator. This elegant bystander viewed the
cityscape as a mysterious code to be deciphered. Baudelaire famously
elaborated upon the historical epoch the flâneur was witnessing: “By
‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent”.37
The experience of the flâneur and his perambulations amidst the
rapid social change of nineteenth-century Paris serve as a usefully
illustrative precursor of the increasingly fragmented and culturally
dislocated nature of the social environment within the m/Matrix.
Vice and transient sensation becomes the economy of the flâneur’s
experience:
The crowd is not
only the newest asylum of outlaws; it is also the latest narcotic
for those abandoned. The flâneur is someone abandoned in the crowd.
In this he shares the situation of the commodity. He is not aware of
this special situation, but this does not diminish its effect on him
and it permeates him blissfully like a narcotic that can compensate
him for many humiliations. The intoxication to which the flâneur
surrenders is the intoxication of the commodity around which surges
the stream of customers.38
We can see here traces of
McLuhan's description of the narcotic/Narcissus-like trance induced
by communications media and Baudrillard's later formulation of the
ecstasy of communication. A positive quality of the flâneur in
de Certeau’s
terms was the way in which his apparent purposelessness served to
resist the excessive instrumentality of commodity culture and its
tendency to colonize social space into a standing reserve of
potential consumption. In the consumerist sites that now dominate,
privately run surveillance cameras replace the detached gaze of the
flâneur, and further fuse the non-space of the commodity with the
technologies of representation. The serendipitous dérive is
negated by the “retail grammar”
of market planners who design the sights to be seen, and even the
likely pace of the “air conditioned nightmare” of the space of
consumption. An isomorphic regimentation of experience occurs in
suburbia where the eclectic mix of the bustling city is replaced by
the elective affinities of homogenous demographic groups.
In so far as the flâneur
was “in the crowd” but “not of the crowd” he arguably contained the
early signs of the solipsistic nature of the subsequently
commodified,
atomised
and discombobulatingly phantasmagorical way in which the
contemporary city is increasingly experienced. Margaret Morse39
points out that for writers such as Canetti and Bakhtin, the city
was a site where individuality was subordinated to the amorphous
mass of the crowd. In contrast, the mall experience is based upon a
similar state of distraction or dream-like solipsism to that of the
consumption of movie images identified by Benjamin. Instead of
losing individual identity in the crowd, in the mall the individual
seeks the completion of their character by buying into the spectacle
of consumer objects. The use-value of such objects is increasingly
much less significant than the image they provide of a life-style in
which the individual can seek self-expression (momentarily and
conveniently ignoring the mass-produced nature of such commodities
that would seem to contradict this aim). Baudrillard's
characterization of such phantasmagoria in terms of ecstasy and
ontological confusion provides an invaluable update to the ephemeral
and contingent aspects of our condition so vividly described by
Baudelaire.
VI.
The
Inside/outside Ontological
Confusion
–
Baudrillard's Pataphysics
In the past we
have always assumed that the external world around us has
represented reality, however confusing or uncertain, and that the
inner world of our minds, its dreams, hopes, ambitions, represented
the realm of fantasy and the imagination. These roles it seems to me
have been reversed…the
one small node of reality left to us is inside our own heads.40
Baudrillard's previously
cited observation that Disneyland helps us to forget that the rest
of America is essentially a theme park highlights the manner in
which the flâneur has been supplanted by the
privatised
mobility of the consumer. Shopping malls, theme parks and themed
urban destinations, are all premised upon their
territorially-independent eclectic non-space
which
in turn
is
premised upon
a
hyperreal model independent of any original. The consumer now
follows the path of the matrix to the point where the traditional
boundary between reality and the imagination has become
irretrievably blurred so that as. J. G. Ballard argues above, the
ubiquity and pervasiveness of modern technology has reversed our
usual ontological categories. Ballard’s
comments lead us to another aspect of our argument, namely the value
we place upon the realm of the imagination in seeking to understand
the digital matters. Digital Matter thus unapologetically
uses fiction as a conceptual resource. In doing so we follow McLuhan’s
observation that:
The percussed
victims of the new technology have invariably muttered clichés about
the impracticability of artists and their fanciful preferences. But
in the past century it has come to be generally acknowledged that,
in the words of Wyndham Lewis,
‘The
artist is always engaged in writing a detailed history of the future
because he is the only person aware of the nature of the present.’…The
ability of the artist to sidestep the bully blow of new technology
of any age, and to parry such violence with full awareness, is
age-old…41
For McLuhan, artists are the group best suited to observing the
changes to our sense ratios that occur due to the impact of various
technologies, since aesthetic production has often involved
sensitivity
to these very ratios. Reminiscent of McLuhan’s
observation, in The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze (drawing
on Nietzsche) offers his clinical definition of the work of art,
observing that artists:
…are themselves astonishing diagnosticians or symptomatologists.
There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of
symptoms… Clinicians who are able to renew a symptomatological
picture produce a work of art; conversely, artists are clinicians…
they are clinicians of civilisation… and it seems moreover, [this]
evaluation of symptoms might only be achieved through a novel.42
In this light, the novel as a form can be said to serve a diagnostic
function; identifying the composition of forces, the relations of
“labour, life and language” that characterize a given epoch and
offering an aetiology of the “ills” that seize individuals and
cultures alike. Contemporary fiction therefore illustrates some of
the key cultural impacts of digital technology. Like McLuhan and
Deleuze, Kittler has stressed the diagnostic role of literature,
which in an era where the text is deposed from its former position
at the centre of Western culture, might seen as an obsolete media,
since
...pushed to
their margins even obsolete media become sensitive enough to
register the signs and clues of a situation. Then, as in the case of
the sectional plane of two optical media, patterns and moirés
emerge: myths, fictions of science, oracles…43
Our recourse to literature
within Digital Matters
is also in keeping with Baudrillard’s
characterization of himself as a practitioner of (the playwright and
aesthete Alfred Jarry’s)
pataphysics (the science of imaginary solutions) and
a comparative analysis of
his theoretical interpretation of communication
with Baudelaire’s observations of nascent modernity allow us a
deeper insight into
Ballard’s
observation that increasingly in the contemporary condition:
“…we
will suffer from this forced extraversion of all interiority, from
this forced introjection of all exteriority which is implied by the
categorical imperative of communication”.44
The non-empirical
imaginative excess of fiction and the cyberpunk genre in particular,
is a potentially useful resource with which to better understand the
underlying zeitgeist of the digital age. Its theoretical pertinence
and methodological suitability to the here-and-now of real life are
reflected in claims that cyberpunk can be viewed as social theory,45
whereas “Baudrillard’s
futuristic
post-modern
social theory can be read in turn as science fiction”.46
Baudrillard has argued that, given the fact that that phantasmagoria
of the real (or hyperreal) exceeds the imaginative projections of
science fiction; the latter has become increasingly redundant so
that its golden age of vision and prophecy has passed. In this
respect, we depart from Baudrillard and argue that science fiction
in the form of the sub-genre of cyberpunk still offers an intimation
of our future as well as a perspicacious reflection of our present.
In an essay on science fiction, Baudrillard47
equates traditional science fiction with the order of simulation
introduced by the Industrial Revolution and machinery. Science
fiction as it was known to most of the twenty-first
century is dead. It has fallen foul of full-blown simulation,
the fourth order referred to as “fractal”. From this position
Baudrillard makes several claims – namely that science fiction is a
spent force, that the real in the age of simulacra is itself
fictional (making science fiction redundant) and, finally, that
theory and analysis to the extent that it confronts this situation
is itself the ‘new’ science fiction. To quote:
We can no longer
imagine other universes; and the gift of transcendence has been
taken from us as well. Classic SF [science fiction] was one of
expanding universes: it found its calling in narratives of space
exploration, coupled with more terrestrial forms of exploration and
colonization indigenous to the 19th and 20th centuries. There is no
cause-effect relationship to be seen here. Not simply because,
today, terrestrial space has been virtually completely encoded,
mapped, inventoried, saturated; has in some sense been shrunk by
globalisation;
has become a collective marketplace not only for products but also
for values, signs, and models, thereby leaving no room any more for
the imaginary. It is not exactly because of all this that the
exploratory universe (technical, mental, cosmic) of SF has also
stopped functioning. But the two phenomena are closely linked, and
they are two aspects of the same general evolutionary process: a
period of implosion, after centuries of explosion and expansion.
When a system reaches its limits, its own saturation point, a
reversal begins to takes place. And something happens also to the
imagination.48
Phillip K. Dick is often
credited with
the
role of the godfather of cyberpunk, despite the fact that Gibson has
discounted Dick as a significant influence. Certainly, it is almost
impossible to conceive of the emergence of such an ironic or
dystopian brand of science fiction without the influence of Dick’s
oeuvre. Dick broke with a vision of science fiction as a celebration
of techno-science’s
unlimited dominion, with its bloated heroics and one-dimensional
heroes. Instead, he practiced science fiction as social critique, as
a way of satirizing the emergent trends of post-war California. Like
the cyberpunk fiction that he would perhaps inspire, Dick’s
narratives are marked by a confusion of inside and outside: reality
is no longer a certainty, identity is multiple and manipulated by
corporate and military forces. It is worth noting that Baudrillard
has from the 1970s onwards often referred to Dick, and the condition
of hyperreality that Baudrillard’s
theory convincingly establishes as our contemporary situation, is
one found throughout Dick’s
work. To cite just one famous example, consider the status of
animals in his Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep49
– which served as the basis for Riddley Scott’s
equally seminal Blade Runner. Animals have become extinct due
to the effects of some catastrophe, and their rarity has resulted in
their transformation into ultimate status symbol, accruing to their
owners much distinction but a considerable cost. The android hero of
Dick’s
story has a fake electronic sheep, and lives in mortal fear that his
neighbours will learn of his deception. Here we can see the
confusion between model and copy, the exaltation of the sign in
direct opposition to its “reality” that marks the threshold of full
blown simulation. Similarly, in A Scanner Darkly one of the
characters observes that:
In Southern
California it didn’t
make any difference anyhow where you went; there was always the same
McDonaldburger place over and over, like a circular strip that
turned past you as you pretended to go somewhere. And when finally
you got hungry and went to the McDonaldburger place and bought a
McDonald’s
hamburger, it was the one they sold you last time and the time
before that and so forth, back to before you were born…Life
in Anaheim, California, was a commercial for itself, endlessly
replayed. Nothing changed; it just spread out farther and farther in
the form of neon ooze.50
For Baudrillard, Dick’s
fiction is one of the first recognitions of the fractal order of
simulation, noting that “Dick does not create an alternate cosmos
nor a folklore or a cosmic exoticism, nor intergalactic heroic
deeds; the reader is, from the outset, in a total simulation without
origin, past, or future – in a kind of flux of all coordinates
(mental, spatio-temporal, semiotic)”.51
Alongside Dick, Baudrillard also cites Ballard as the other author
of imaginative fiction whose work registered the conditions of
simulacra, and discusses his novel Crash (“the first great
novel of the universe of simulation”) in these terms. While
accepting much of Baudrillard’s
thesis, we argue, firstly, that contra Baudrillard, the
prophetic and diagnostic capacity of science fiction remains potent,
and cyberpunk illustrates this function and, secondly, that in
contrast to the work of Dick and Ballard, cyberpunk places the flow
of information at the heart of the matrix, and in this sense offers
a powerful structural analysis of digital matters.
VII. Conclusion
The visual pun of the
hollowed out copy of Baudrillard’s
Simulations in the Matrix movie is just a glib representation of
the more substantive evisceration of critical thought that
customarily takes place in a media-saturated public sphere. McLuhan
suffered a similar fate when posthumously he was made the patron
saint of Wired magazine despite the unalloyed darkness of
some of his assessments of the cultural harm wrought by electronic
media.
We have
provided
in this paper
a range of perspectives from which Baudrillard’s work can be
re-appropriated from its glib associations with the Matrix
and instead we have shown how his oeuvre both informs and is
informed by the conceptually richer notion of the matrix. In
the following paper, Phantom Objectivity, we provide more of
a theoretical context to the
roots
of the inside/outside confusion described so inimitably by
Baudrillard
in his accounts of our society of the hyperreal.
Jan L. Harris is interested in the
intersection of continental philosophy, culture, and
technology. Recent publications include
(coauthored with Paul Taylor) Digital Matters. New York:
Routledge, forthcoming 2005.
Paul A. Taylor is a senior lecturer in
communications theory at the Institute of Communication Studies,
University of Leeds. His research interests focus upon digital
culture and critical theories of mass culture. His recent work includes (with Tim Jordan),
Hacktivism & Cyberwars: Rebels with a Cause? New York:
Routledge, 2004.
Endnotes
1 “Baudrillard Bytes” and
“Phantom Objectivity” appear here as extended and
significantly amended excerpts from
Digital Matters: Theory and Culture of the Matrix.
Forthcoming: Routledge, November 2005. See also “Phantom
Objectivity” in this issue.
Baudrillard Bytes
represents a series of related but individually distinct
themes (pursued in much fuller depth in Digital Matters)
that we present as an illustration of the range of
Baudrillard's relevance to our consideration of the social
matrix.
2
Gordon Burn.
“Essay: Living Memories.”
The Guardian Newspaper, June 11, 2005:4-6.
3
H. U. Gumbrecht and K. L. Pfeiffer (Eds). Materialities
of Communication, Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1994:6.
4
See F. A. Kittler Discourse Networks 1800/1900,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; Literature
Media, Information Systems, Edited by J. Johnston,
Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association, 1997; and
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. G. Winthrop-Young
and M. Wutz, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
5
H. U. Gumbrecht and K. L. Pfeiffer (Eds). Materialities
of Communication, Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1994.
7
Jean Baudrillard. Revenge of the Crystal: selected
writings on the modern object and its destiny, 1968-1983,
London: Pluto Press, 1990:63.
8
Our theoretical approach holds out the possibility of
understanding the increasing prevalence of the trope of
immateriality in cyber-discourse without subscribing to its
simple-minded ontology. From Adam Smith’s
invisible hand to the more recent expressions of E-commerce
literature (for example, Living on Thin Air
(Leadbetter, 2000), The Weightless World (Coyle,
1998), Being Digital (Negroponte, 1995) and The
Empty Raincoat (Handy 1995), weightlessness and
abstraction are taken seriously as aspects of the social and
economic order. These works refer exclusively to new
information technologies but
we show how
the im/material tension of digital matters has its
roots much earlier in the history of technology.
9
Jean Baudrillard. The Ecstasy of Communication. New
York: Semiotext(e), 1988:12. Translated by B. and C.
Schutze.
10
Jean Baudrillard. The System of Objects. London:
Verso, 1996:5. Translated by J. Benedict.
11
Marshall
McLuhan
cited in M.
Moos (Ed.) Media Research: technology, art, communication,
Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association,
1997:90.
12
M. de Certeau The Practices of Everyday Life,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1988:v.
13
M. McLuhan. Understanding Media (c 1964). London:
Routledge, 1995
14
Martin
Heidegger.
The Question Concerning Technology
(c 1954), New York, NY: Harper and Row,
1977:3.
16
Walter Benjamin. “The work of art in the age of mechanical
reproduction” (c 1935), in H. Arendt (Ed.) Illuminations.
Translated by H. Zohn, London: Fontana, 1973:219-45.
18
Martin
Heidegger in M. E.
Zimmerman. Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity:
technology, politics, and art, Minneapolis, MN: Indiana
University Press,
1990:162.
19
Jean
Baudrillard.
The Ecstasy of Communication.
New York: Semiotext(e), 1988:12. Translated by B. and C.
Schutze.
20
Jean Baudrillard. The System of Objects. London:
Verso, 1996:17. Translated by J. Benedict.
22
Ibid.:25 (emphasis in original).
27
In the Question Concerning Technology
Heidegger argues that authentic objects not unduly mediated
by technology are brought forth into Being as an imbricated
mix of four essential causes. He uses the example of a
silver religious chalice that may be seen as consisting of:
1. Causa materialis
– the matter out of which the chalice is formed;
2. Causa formalis
–
the form imposed upon this matter;
3. Causa finalis
–
the purpose for which this matter is formed (the ritual);
4. Causa efficiens
– that which effects the forming of this matter (the
silversmith).
By way of contrast the
contemporary relationship to Being is dominated by
technology and its exclusive attention to the causa
efficiens to the exclusion of the other essential
causes.
28
Jean Baudrillard. The System of Objects. London:
Verso, 1996:19. Translated by J. Benedict.
29
M.
Crawford, M. “The World in a Shopping Mall”. In M. Sorkin
(Ed.) Variations on a Theme Park: the new American city
and the end of public space, New York: Hill and Wang,
1996:14-15.
30
See Susan Sontag (On Photography. London: Penguin,
1979) who argues that photographs show what photographs
show, contemporary celebrities are well known for being well
known etc.)
31
See
M.
Augé. Non-Places: introduction to an anthropology of
supermodernity. London: Verso, 1995.
32
C. M. Boyer. “Cities for sale: merchandising history at
South Street Seaport”, in M. Sorkin (Ed.) Variations on a
Theme Park: the new American City and the end of public
space, New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1996:193
33 M. Crawford, M. “The
World in a Shopping Mall”. In M. Sorkin (Ed.) Variations
on a Theme Park: the new American city and the end of public
space, New York: Hill and Wang, 1996:16.
35
Reminiscent of Adorno’s description of the culture industry
as a reversal of art’s “purposiveness without purpose”.
36 Jean Baudrillard.
The Ecstasy of Communication. New York: Semiotext(e),
1988:12. Translated by B. and C. Schutze.
A number of
Impressionist paintings are based upon a male gaze either
intimated as originating out of the painting's frame or
obliquely alluded to via reflections in mirrors as perhaps
most famously represented in Edouard Manet's
“A Bar
at the Folies-Bergere”
1882.
37
Charles Baudelaire. The Painter of Modern Life and
Other Essays (c 1859), London: Phaidon Press,
200:12.
38
Walter Benjamin. “The work of art in the age of mechanical
reproduction” (c 1935), in H. Arendt (Ed.) Illuminations.
Translated by H. Zohn, London: Fontana, 1973:43.
39
M. Morse. Virtualities: television, media art, and
cyberculture, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1998.
40
J. G. Ballard. Crash, London: Vintage, 1995:5.
41
M. McLuhan. Understanding Media (c 1964). London:
Routledge, 1995:65.
42 Gilles Deleuze. The
Logic of Sense. London: Athlone Press ,1990: 237
(emphasis in original). Translated by M. Lester and C.
Stivale.
43
F. A.
Kittler.
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999:xl.
44
Jean Baudrillard.
The Ecstasy of Communication. New York: Semiotext(e),
1988:26. Translated by B. and C. Schutze.
45
R. Burrows. “Cyberpunk as social theory”. In S. Westwood and
J. Williams (Eds). Imagining Cities, London:
Routledge, 1997:235-48.
46
Douglas Kellner. Media Culture, London: Routledge,
1995:299.
49
Phillip K. Dick. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
(c 1968) New York, NY: Ballantine, 1990.
50
Phillip K. Dick .
A Scanner Darkly
(c 1977). New York: Vintage Books, 1991:24.