ISSN: 1705-6411
                                   
Volume 6, Number 2 (July, 2009)

Saudi Arabia Does Not Exist

Kusha Sefat
(Producer, Press TV, and Member of the Council of Foreign Relations, University of Tehran, Iran)

Edited by Tene Kelly
(Long Beach, California USA)

I. Introduction

I’ve always remained deeply faithful to this primitive unsophistication, culture is something you must be able to reject (Baudrillard, 2004:103).

It is widely accepted that for a territory to be regarded as a nation-state it must be sovereign. However, the way sovereignty is conceptualized in the academy (and elsewhere) is problematic.  Just as Baudrillard invited us to think about war in a fundamentally different way, I invite you to think about nation-states in a way that effectively captures the realities of international affairs.  Baudrillard showed us that in order for any phenomenon to be in a category, it must posses certain attributes without which it may not be categorized as such.  Baudrillard claimed that “The Gulf War Did Not Take Place.”  In order to have a war, he suggested, there has to be the possibility of defeat for both sides.  During the first Gulf “War,” the U.S. was never faced with this possibility.  Hence, the Gulf “War” was not a war at all.  One may call it domination, abuse, or discipline, but not a war. 

This paper identifies that certain attribute without which “sovereignty” (attached to all of its contested meanings) is not sovereignty either.  In doing so, we find the vital attribute without which a nation-state is not a nation-state.

II. The Absurd

This beer isn’t a beer, but it is compensated for by the fact that this cigar isn’t a cigar either.  If this beer wasn’t a beer and the cigar really was a cigar, then there would be a problem (Baudrillard, 1993:180).

The main objective of this section is to demonstrate why Saudi Arabia is not a nation-state.  I neither claim nor want to know what Saudi Arabia is.  It may be a lot of things (a beautiful province, home of the Bedouins, or whatever), but what it is not is a nation-state. 

A nation-state cannot exist in the singular.  If there was only one nation-state on earth, it would have been called the planet, the world, the universe, etc., not a nation-state.  To even have a nation-state, we must have two or more.  That is to say, without the international context there is no nation-state. 

So forget what Barak Obama has the power to do domestically, or what domestic processes led him to power.  Forget everything domestic all together since nothing domestic has anything to do with why he is recognized by other nation-states as head of the U.S.  Some in the world community may even believe that the American elections were rigged.  But they would still have to recognize Obama as the leader of the U.S. because it is he who can do things to the world community, not who should have or could have won.  Thus, it is what Obama can do to others outside of the U.S. from which his recognition as the head of his state derives.  To conclude, for a “nation-state” to be a nation-state, it has to have the capability to affect other states, meaning it must be able to carry out independent foreign policy decisions, both tactical and strategic.  

A strategic foreign policy decision means that a state can realize its own regional or global agenda while having the threshold to withstand the cost of its own executive decisions and the risk of the backlash.  Let us use the example of Saudi Arabia.  Because Saudi Arabia finds itself in a situation of a complete military dependency on the U.S., it has no choice but to fit into the American strategic framework.  As such, whatever foreign policy decisions it makes become tactical as they are first and foremost to serve another state’s interests.  Country X, on the other hand, is independent from the U.S.  Because of its political independence, it sets out its own regional and global agenda.  But more importantly, it has the capability to follow such plans through.  Since country X’s regional agenda is its own umbrella that may run counter to, but not operate under the U.S.’s strategic umbrella, it has strategic foreign policy capability.  X’s strategic aims may even converge with America’s strategic aims from time to time, but so long as neither state is forced to fit into the other state’s regional or global plan, both states maintain their distinct strategic capabilities.  Any state that cannot carry out strategic foreign policy decisions does not have de facto sovereignty and is, similar to California, not a nation-state at all.  

The academy, for the most part, does not question that Colonialism had engulfed Saudi Arabia up until 1932.  And the fact that Saudi Arabia could not make a strategic foreign policy move in conjunction with the reality that the very pulse of the country, its oil industry, was unquestionably controlled by ARAMCO up to a certain point during the 20th century, is well documented (Vitalis, 2006). The conventional consensus in Western academia is that, evidently, at some point, Saudi Arabia became a politically independent nation-state.

Saudi Arabia’s independence, however, has rarely been demonstrated.  It is therefore somewhat ironic that I have to make a case that Saudi Arabia is still not a state as opposed to others making a case as to why the reverse is, in fact, true.  To make a strategic foreign policy decision, a capability without which an entity cannot be a nation-state, is not a commodity one buys at the global corner store.  Its first ingredient is political independence.  And the distance from political independence to acquiring the capability for a strategic foreign policy decision is vast, its terrain treacherous and at times seemingly impossible to navigate.  Mohammad Mosaddeq’s soul, Fidel Castro’s ailing body, and millions of Haitians will attest to that.

In the case of Iran, for example, the Shah who was put into power first in 1941 by the British and Russians and again in 1953 by the CIA had a clear domain within which he could maneuver.  This domain, however, was not an Iranian one.  Rather, it first had to take into account American interests, to which the Shah’s interests were tightly connected.  After all, similar to the House of Saud, the Shah ate out of the same bowl as the Americans, be it its leftovers.

The literature on pre-revolutionary Iran’s complete submissiveness to the U.S. is vast and comprehensive.  What changed immediately after the 1979 revolution was that Iran had gained political independence.  But political independence, even though it is a necessary step in becoming a nation-state, does not alone qualify an entity as a nation-state.  Without the ability to make strategic foreign policy decisions, there is no nation-state.

The so called “Shiite Crescent” or the apparent shift in the balance of power towards Iran in the Middle East does not stem solely from Iran’s political independence.  It is a question of capability, one that Iran has been consistently accumulating since the revolution and paying the price for through war, sanctions, and isolation.  During the 2006 Israel-Lebanon confrontation, Hezbollah was transformed from a tactical instrument to a strategic instrument of Iran.  Hezbollah now has the capacity, capability, and credibility to hit Tel Aviv with its Iranian made arsenal.  How, when, and where Hezbollah deals with Israel are tactical decisions made by Hezbollah under the strategic foreign policy umbrella of Iran.  This is not solely based on Iran’s agency or independence, but rather its capability to manufacture the modified versions of Chinese, Korean, and Russian weapons and route them through Iraq, Syria, and into southern Lebanon, and give Hezbollah a green light for their usage knowing that Tehran, not Beirut, can withstand the backlash, whatever that may be.

The Saudi Arabian state too, has supported and armed different groups in the region.  But like Egypt, its military machine is American.  The Saudi Arabian defense is indeed so Americanized that it prevents the House of Saud from supporting any group that is in fundamental opposition to the interests of the U.S.  That is because if the U.S. turns off the switch, the Saudi military will cease to be relevant.  Thus, in contrast to Iran, the only foreign policy decisions that Saudi Arabia can make are those that have been pre-approved by the U.S.  The overall parameters of possibilities, the structure of the region, and the strategic arrangements have already been designated by the U.S. and the “states” that are politically dependant on the U.S. must stay within this strategic domain.  How can a “state” make strategic foreign policy decisions if the strategic guidelines have already been set elsewhere?  Even if we are to presume that the Saudi Arabian state is politically independent it still lacks the capability to act on its agency, thus, denying its sovereignty de facto.

Let us suppose that in year 2030 the realities of the Middle East have changed so dramatically that Iran has turned into the hegemonic power in the region.  As a result, Saudi Arabia is then tempted to move from its current security alliance with the U.S., as the means for its protection, to a new security alliance with Iran as its new protector.  If this move were to be made by the House of Saud, it would still not constitute a strategic foreign policy decision.  To use an analogy, sex workers are free to change pimps.  The fall out is for the pimps to work out among themselves.  But the sex worker is still a sex worker, despite having a new pimp.  In the same manner, after changing allegiances, Saudi Arabia will still remain a politically dependant “state” incapable of making strategic foreign policy decisions.  Saudi Arabia’s new security alliance would mean that it would be a mere change from following America’s strategic guidelines to following Iran’s.  The switching of pimps is a purely tactical adjustment that does not affect the framework of prostitution.

The ever so outdated realists may argue that what is being described are the power disparities among nation-states.  The U.S. dominates Saudi Arabia because the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.  That is fine, but why the insistence with labeling different spheres as nation-states.  In that case, why is California not a nation-state?  What fundamental difference is there that separates California from Saudi Arabia?  Saudi Arabia can make tactical foreign policy decisions; so can California.  In fact, there is a great deal of literature concerning California’s foreign policy (Oldsborough, 1993).  California cannot make strategic foreign policy decision; neither can Saudi Arabia.  California is protected by the U.S. government from external intrusions; so is Saudi Arabia.  California gets funds from the federal government; so does Saudi Arabia (Israel and Egypt get even more).  Saudi Arabia has its own government and laws; so does California. Saudi Arabia has a police force; California has a bigger one. Saudi Arabia is recognized by the international body via the U.N.… wait a minute.

Political scientists tell us that states are states by UN declaration and how are we to dispute this? Seriously though, are Americans talking about the UN again?  “This beer isn’t a beer, but that is compensated for by the fact that this cigar isn’t a cigar either. In the same manner, Saudi Arabia not being a state is compensated for by the fact that the UN isn’t really the UN either.  If Saudi Arabia had not been a state and the UN was real, there would have been a problem.  For in that case the non-state of Saudi Arabia would have appeared for what it is: a scandal.  Similarly, if Saudi Arabia had been a real state and the UN had not been real, the non-United Nation would have appeared for what it is: a scandal.  In fact, the UN has appeared scandalous at times, but not by Saudi Arabia.  A non-real cannot make another non-real appear as what they both are: scandals.

It is the real nation-states that often make the UN look ridiculous.  Venezuela’s Chavez does not miss an opportunity.  Ironically, the confused are so bent on the reality of the UN that they think that it is Chavez who is actually looking ridiculous – taking the non-scandal for a scandal, the real for the simulation.  Iran’s Ahmadi Nejad does not miss a chance either, calling the states of the Security Council the “accusers”, the “judges”, and the “enforcers.”  But the UN perhaps never looked more non-real by any other than the “Super State,” also referred to as the HQ of one of the bigger Empires: the United States of America. 

Do you remember the UN before the U.S. invasion of Iraq?  Had anything ever seemed more irrelevant?  Did the experts not say that if the U.S. attacks Iraq without the UN’s permission then the UN would be finished?  They did not mean, however, that something that was real would all of a sudden disappear.  What they meant was that if America invades Iraq then the UN will finally appear as what it has always been: a scandal.  After all, that which is a crime is the exposition of scandal, not the scandal itself.  True, but they underestimated the power of simulation.

“What about the question of agency?” ask my brilliant classmates on a partly cloudy day.  “Are you suggesting that the government of Saudi Arabia has no agency?”  Of course it has agency, the problem is that it lacks capability.  To use an analogy, a young Iranian woman in Tehran has, to an extent, the agency to manipulate the Islamic dress code that is the norm in her country.  She may wear her scarf in a way that covers all of her hair, or half, or on a good day, very little of it.  She also has the agency to wear a swim suit in Tehran.  But during the thirty years of the Islamic Republic’s reign in Iran, such instance is absolutely unheard of.  That is because a walk in a swim suit in the streets of Tehran is the last walk that any Iranian women will ever take.  Thus, even though all women in Tehran have the agency to take a walk in the park in a swim suit, none will, since they do not have the capability to do so.  Similarly, the government of Saudi Arabia may have a vast dungeon filled with agency, but it terms of foreign policy, it can only take actions it has the capability to take.  And a strategic foreign policy stance is not one of them.

Saudi Arabia exerts great influence on the UAE.  A sex worker can pimp a lesser sex worker.  But such power is practiced only under the watchful eyes of the neighborhood pimp or pimps, and is tolerated as long as it does not interfere with the pimps’ overall strategic objectives.  Non-state X may be the scene of rivalry for many different real nation-states. Today’s Lebanon is a clear example of a non-state that is the battleground between two real states: the U.S. and Iran.  Saudi Arabia, however, is deeply involved in Lebanon, but only to the extent that it does not get in the way of America’s strategic plans. 

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and so on, are not nation-states.  In fact, there are only a few nation-states that exist.  The others are incapable of making foreign policy decisions and are masquerading in this simulation.  Outside of this simulation we call International Relations, what actually makes a nation-state a nation-state, is the ability to make strategic foreign policy decisions.  Therefore, Saudi Arabia does not exist as a nation-state. 

III. Simulation? 
This paper has redefined statehood in a manner that accurately reflects current world affairs.  It reveals that a country’s true claim to sovereignty necessarily involves the independence to devise, and the capability to carryout foreign policies, and more importantly, establishes the vital distinction between tactical and strategic decision-making.  The value of this argument, however, is not just important on a conceptual level; rather, it is deadly in its practicality.  First, this is a short guide to empire.  If Saudi Arabia is not a country, then what is it and who does it belong to?  Second, it is not just restating the problem of dependency or the client state paradigm; rather it turns the entire archetype on its head.  Saudi Arabia is not dependant on the U.S., like California, it belongs to the U.S.  But unlike the residents of California, the masses of Saudi Arabia do not get representation in the U.S. for the political taxation that has been inflicted upon them by America.  Nor do they get a voice in the American mainstream which is the space that they are actually a part of, as opposed to the Saudi national space which is nonexistent.  The Saudi political experience is therefore much similar to the experience of disenfranchised African Americans and Mexicans that I know in Southern California, characterized by total, absolute, and utter powerlessness. 

It is only now that I understand Baudrillard’s most compelling assertion concerning “terrorist” suicide bombers: “what seems to us like suicide, is actually the impossible exchange of death, the challenge to the system through the symbolism of death, which becomes an absolute weapon” (Baudrillard, 2002).  The LA riots, South Central homicides, drive by shooting, and the gang killings which are all suicidal enterprises, along with the outright Palestinian suicide bombings and finally, the killings of 9/11, in their entirety, represent the ultimate challenge to the system through the absolute weapon of death, where suppressed voices are not just heard sadistically, but also felt and touched violently.  Such are the consequences of simulation. 

IV. So What?
As we have just delineated an ample list of non-states we must now analyze their role in international affairs.  Every non-state is at all times under the strategic umbrella of one or more real states (their pimp).  Non-states have three options. The first is to remain within the sphere of their current protector.  Israel’s loyal subservience to the U.S. is the prime example of this option.  Saudi Arabia is another non-state that has been faithfully under the American strategic umbrella since it allegedly became a “state.”

The second option is to switch protectors.  Egypt, being under the strategic umbrella of the USSR found itself not fully supported by its protector in the Yom Kippur War.  In an intense midnight session on October 23rd 1973, after the Russians had bluffed a military intervention if the U.S. did not prevent the Israelis solders from destroying the trapped Egyptian Third Army, the U.S. convinced Egypt to abandon its old protector.

The way Henry Kissinger was able to convince Egypt to leave the Russian sphere was to call Kremlin’s bluff and go all in with the threat of war, to protect its sphere, Israel and soon to be Egypt.  The U.S.S.R, not wanting to “unleash the Third World War” to keep Egypt under its strategic umbrella, backed down.  Egypt realized the weakness of its protector and with the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, Cairo officially switched protectors and became the second largest recipient of aid, after Israel, from the U.S.

The third and often fatal option is the fight for statehood.  The first step is political independence.  That is to dissociate oneself from all protectors.  Success in this mission means gaining ones own strategic foreign policy capability which often conflicts with the strategic umbrella of other real states, a treacherous endeavor.  To prevent this success, these other states will drown the new feeble state in bloodshed, suffocate them with sanctions, demonize their intentions, and damn them to isolation.  Failure to endure such hardships will put the vulnerable state back onto the streets in the hands of pimps.  But to succeed is to gain strategic foreign policy capabilities, thus becoming a real state.  A rare example is Iran.  Ayatollah Khomeini’s Neither East Nor West Policy during the 1979 revolution asserted Iran’s political independence.   Iran’s treacherous road to statehood consisted of a bloody eight year war with Iraq, sanctions, isolation, and demonization.  However, today Tehran is flaunting its strategic foreign policy capabilities with Iranian backed Hezbollah gaining veto power in Lebanon and Southern Iraq hanging by the strings of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

V. Epilogue – War Options for States and non-States
There are three kinds of war: hot war, cold war, and proxy war.  A hot war is when two real states engage in head-to-head combat, for example, Great Britain and Germany in the Second World War.  A cold war is when real states engage in military build up and expand their strategic umbrella while deterring each other from hot war, as was the case with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  A proxy war is when real states fight each other using non-states.  While real state or non-state forces may be engaging in actual combat, proxy wars always take place in non-states, as in Vietnam.  All other military confrontations are non-wars.  According to Jean Baudrillard’s definition of war, both sides must have the possibility of defeat.  Therefore, the first Gulf War, in which Iraq had no conceivable way of defeating the U.S., was domination not war.  Non-states cannot go to war because the possibility of their defeat lies in the hands of their protector.  For this reason Israel cannot go to war with Iran.

No real country, including the U.S., has engaged in a hot war since the end of the Second World War.  There has been much speculation, in the past and now during the final days of the Bush administration, concerning a war between the U.S. and Iran.  While journalists and political analysts have been busy reading their classified memos, they failed to realize Iran’s strategic foreign policy capabilities as a real state.  The White House, all the while, has known that it is not ready to engage in a hot war with a real state.  The U.S. will not attack Iran… and Tehran knows it.

Kusha Sefat is currently a live program producer at Press TV.  He recently received his Masters at the University of Pennsylvania in 2008, where he studied anthropology with Brian Spooner.  He was introduced to Baudrillard’s writings  at the Annenberg School of Communication via John Jackson and was permitted by Robert Vitalis to present this paper at a Middle East seminar in the political science department.  The ideas in this paper have been developed through intense discussions with all three of the professors mentioned. Brett Wilkinson, Ananya Desgupta, and Zohra Ahmad offered their invaluable insights all along.  This is dedicated to the gangs of Long Beach and the “Arab Street,” neither of whom have ever been confused about the non-existence of the LAPD and Saudi Arabia, respectively.

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Editor’s note: On February 2, 2009 Iran further asserted its independence as a nation state by launching a rocket which propelled its first communications satellite “Omid” (Hope) into orbit. The New York Times reported (February 3) that “Iran has joined the exclusive club of states that can loft objects into orbit which now numbers at least nine”. In the continuing climate of post 9/11 ‘fear journalism’ the article continued: “Weapons experts say the same technology can be used for launching weapons”. Later in the piece, Robert Wood, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department called the matter “a great concern” that was “potentially a violation of United Nation’s agreements that limit Iran’s missile activity”. Of course, as the Americans now know all too well, those in possession of technologies which can be used a weapons includes any country in possession of a passenger airplane. As for the United Nations one wonders, after the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, if America has not demonstrated for other nation states that one indicator of independence is the ability to proceed without the UN. If Iran is in violation of UN agreements they seem to be following a famous precedent set by the US itself. Following March 20, 2003 the rules of the game became very uncertain.

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References

Jean Baudrillard (1993). Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews [Edited by Mike Gane]. London: Routledge.

Jean Baudrillard [© 1991] (1995). The Gulf War Did Not Take Place.  Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Jean Baudrillard [© 1990] (1993). The Transparency of Evil. New York: Verso.

Jean Baudrillard (1993b). Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews. London: Routledge.

Jean Baudrillard [© 1992] (1995). The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.

Jean Baudrillard [© 1995] (1996). The Perfect Crime. New York: Verso.

Jean Baudrillard [© 2001] (2002). The Spirit of Terrorism. New York: Verso.

Jean Baudrillard [© 2002] (2004). Fragments: Conversations With Francois L’Yvonnet. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Alan Cowan and William J. Broad (2009). “Iran Says It Launched First space Satellite” New York Times, (February 3).

James Oldsborough (1993). “California’s Foreign Policy.” Council On Foreign Relations.  Foreign Affairs (Spring).

Abraham Rabinovich (2005). The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. New York: Schocken Books.

Robert Vitalis (2006).  America’s Kingdom.  Stanford University Press.